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
THE THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE OF HUGH OF SAINT VICTOR

by

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A DISSERTATION

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TO MY MOTHER
AND
TO THE MEMORY OF MY FATHER

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INTRODUCTION

DURING the first half of that extraordinarily germinal twelfth century in which falls the Medieval Renaissance, Hugh of the Abbey of Saint Victor lived a quiet, scholarly life in Paris. The year he died — at the early age of forty-four — saw Peter Abelard and Saint Bernard of Clairvaux opposed at the Council of Sens. That was in 1141. It was a time of Crusades in the East and stirring nationalism in the West. The Gothic arch was beginning to supplant the Romanesque. It was a time of transition, of birth and revival — the birth of universities and vernacular literatures, the revival of Greek philosophy and science.

It was a century of deep religious spirit, too, set squarely in what we speak of as the ages of Faith. There were mystics, orthodox and heterodox; there was some heresy. The end of Hugh's century would see the confluence of the two streams of Aristotelianism and Christian Platonism which flow through medieval philosophy. Aristotle would come in his fullness, and the idealism of Plato — filtered through the great mind of Augustine — still gripped the minds of many men.

This study proposes to treat of the theory of knowledge of Hugh of Saint Victor, whom his contemporaries were to name a "second Augustine,"¹ whom Harnack was to call the most influential theologian of the twelfth century.² St. Bonaventure would say of him that he combined the gifts derived from St. Augustine, from St. Gregory the Great and Dionysius the Areopagite.³ For St. Thomas Aquinas he was to have *robur auctoritatis*.⁴

The term in the title, "theory of knowledge," has taken on two meanings in the history of philosophy. Since Immanuel Kant

¹ Cf. M. Grabmann, *Die Geschichte der katholischen Theologie* (Freiburg im Br., 1933), p. 36.

² A. Harnack, *Lehrbuch der Dogmengeschichte* (4th ed.; Tübingen, 1909) III, p. 376.

³ *De Reductione Artium ad Theologiam*, 5 (Quaracchi, V, p. 321).

⁴ *Summa Theologica* 2-2, 5, 1, ad 1.

many have limited its signification to a critique of knowledge — an analysis of the ultimate problems relating to the nature, validity and limitations of human knowledge; but always the analysis is concerned primarily with the question of validity. In an older and wider sense the theory of knowledge of any philosopher means simply his doctrines on knowledge — his *Erkenntnislehre*, as the German scholars would put it. The fact and validity of knowledge is assumed, and the description, analysis, and explanation is made in connection with tracts on logic, metaphysics, or theology.⁵

It is needless to remark that in the Middle Ages a theory of knowledge formed no separate part of the scholastic system, since truth and objectivity of knowledge were not subjected to the modern critique. In this study, therefore, we shall find that Hugh of St. Victor touched on the chief questions of knowledge sporadically and that most of his passages arise in a theological context. He writes little of truth and certitude, but he has much to say about the human mind and the world of sense, the internal world of Soul, and the superior world of God. Accordingly, his theory of knowledge is considered here in the wider sense of that term.

Until very recent times the School of Saint Victor has been dismissed in the histories of philosophy as a class of philosophical skeptics whose sole approach to Truth was through the heart and not the head — “disbelievers in human reason, who needed logic only to drive away logicians.”⁶ A recent historian of the relations between philosophy and faith has said of Hugh and Richard of St. Victor that in their works “rational knowledge is so conditioned by the (Neoplatonic) illumination that a modern theologian could not say whether it is the rational knowledge which is supernatural, or whether revelation is being lowered to the level of reason.”⁷ If that statement were an accurate summation of

⁵ Cf. R. Eisler, art. “Erkenntnistheorie,” *Wörterbuch der philosophischen Begriffe* (Berlin: Mittler, 1927), I, p. 389.

⁶ These are the phrases of Henry Adams in *Mont-Saint-Michel and Chartres* (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1933), pp. 318-322.

⁷ Th. Heitz, *Essai historique sur les Rapports entre la philosophie et la foi de Bérenger de Tours à St. Thomas* (Paris: Gabalda, 1909), pp. 82-83.

Hugh's thought, there would be little inducement to attempt the study of his philosophy of knowledge. An introductory chapter in this work will attempt to fix Hugh's position on the paramount problem of the relation between reason and revelation.

A newer interest and appreciation for the philosophy and theology of Hugh of St. Victor emerge from the intense research into medieval thought carried on over the past fifty years. Vernet's long article in the *Dictionnaire de Théologie Catholique* is a thorough summary of these investigations.⁸ But the works dedicated to an elucidation of Hugh's philosophy are few. Liebner's work on his theology and philosophy is antiquated.⁹ Mignon makes Hugh the central figure of his voluminous account of the origins of scholastic philosophy,¹⁰ but many of his conclusions are invalidated by the researches of men like Clemens Baeumker, Martin Grabmann, and the German students writing under them. Heinrich Ostler and Jacob Kilgenstein¹¹ have written excellent monographs on the psychology and theodicy of Hugh, and there have been several essays on his mysticism. Recently his philosophy of history was made the subject of investigation.¹²

This list exhausts the special studies of Hugh's philosophy. A careful survey of the bibliographical material fails to reveal any adequate treatment of his theory of knowledge. It is the purpose of this dissertation to supply the lack and thus to supplement the

⁸ F. Vernet, art. "Hugues de Saint-Victor," *D.Th.C.*, VII (Paris, 1922), cols. 240-308.

⁹ Albert Liebner, *Hugo von St. Viktor und die theologischen Richtungen seiner Zeit* (Leipzig: Lehnhold, 1832).

¹⁰ A. Mignon, *Les origines de la scolastique et Hugues de Saint-Victor* (Paris, 1895), 2 vols.

¹¹ H. Ostler, *Die Psychologie des Hugo von St. Viktor, Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der Psychologie in der Frühscholastik* (Münster, 1906), *BGPM*, VI, 1; Jacob Kilgenstein, *Die Gotteslehre des Hugo von St. Viktor* (Würzburg, 1897).

¹² W. A. Schneider, *Geschichte und Geschichtsphilosophie bei Hugo von St. Viktor* (Muenster, 1933). The writer is indebted for this reference to a notice in an article by W. M. Green, "Hugh of St. Victor: De Tribus Maximis Circumstantiis Gestorum," in *Speculum*, XVIII, 4 (Oct. 1943), pp. 484-493.

rather meager list of philosophical studies devoted to Hugh of St. Victor.

The works of Hugh of St. Victor may be conveniently divided into three classes: exegetical, theological, and mystical. The *Didascalicon* is in a class of its own. In this dissertation the following works have been used especially:

1. *De Sacramentis Christianae Fidei*. This is Hugh's chief work, containing a survey of the whole of Christian theology. The author describes it as "*brevem quamdam summam omnium*."¹³

2. *Didascalicon De Studio Legendi*, an encyclopedia of the sciences, profane (Books I-III) and sacred (Books IV-VI). Book VII, printed in Migne, is not part of the *Didascalicon* but is certainly an authentic work of Hugh.¹⁴

3. *Commentariorum in Hierarchiam caelestem St. Dionysii Areopagitae libri X*. This commentary uses the Latin translation of Pseudo-Dionysius made by John Scotus Erigena as its basic text.¹⁵

4. *In Salomonis Ecclesiasten Homiliae XIX*, a commentary on *Ecclesiastes*, I, I-IV, 8.¹⁶

¹³ PL 176, 173-618. For a general description and analysis of this work cf. M. Grabmann, *Die Geschichte der scholastischen Methode* (Freiburg im Br.: Herder, 1911), II, pp. 249-291. It will be cited as follows: E. G. *De Sac.*, 1, X, 2. — *De Sacramentis christianae fidei, liber 1, pars X, caput 2*.

¹⁴ This will be cited throughout according to the critical text edited by Brother Charles Henry Buttmer, F.S.C. (Washington: Catholic University of America Press, 1939); Book VII, a separate treatise, will be quoted from Migne (PL 176, 811-838). The editor in Migne writes, "Hunc in Didascalico non comperi, sed quasi illius appendicem: tractat enim de meditatione, qua ex visibilium cognitione ad invisibilium etiam Divinae Trinitatis assurgimus agnitionem." (811) Cf. M. Grabmann, *Geschichte der scholastischen Methode*, II, p. 235, n. 3; 236, n. 1; Manitius, *Geschichte der lateinischen Literatur des Mittelalters* (Munich, 1931), III, p. 114.

¹⁵ PL 175, 923-1154. Hugh sub-titles his work: *secundum interpretationem Joannis Scoti*. He has nothing of the pantheism of which Erigena has been accused. For Hugh's treatment of Erigena on this point and the general relation existing between them, cf. Ostler, *op. cit.*, p. 9, n. 3.

¹⁶ PL 175, 113-256. This is a product of Hugh's youthful mystical ardor, as were most of his mystical works. The dogmatic works, especially the *De*

5. *De Unione Corporis et Spiritus*, an *opusculum* which is very important for Hugh's psychology and theory of knowledge.¹⁷

6. *De Arca Noe Morali Libri IV*, a mystical work which repeats some of the details of the *De Sacramentis*.¹⁸

7. *De Sapientia Animae Christi*, devoted to a single question in theology and constituting a letter sent by Hugh in answer to a question of Walter of Mortagne.¹⁹

There has been much discussion concerning the authenticity of certain works attributed to Hugh of St. Victor. Most of this material has to do with the *Summa Sententiarum* ascribed to Hugh and printed as his in Migne. This dissertation does not make use of the work because of conflicting evidence, and especially since the *Summa Sententiarum* contains nothing that materially affects a study of Hugh's theory of knowledge.²⁰

The text of Hugh's work cited here, with the exception of the *Didascalicon*, is the Rouen text of 1648, reprinted in Migne's *Patrologia Latina*, volumes 175-177. This is the most complete and best available text, and it has been corrected in some places on the basis of later textual criticism.

From the researches of the past half-century Hugh of St. Vic-

Sacramentis, were written toward the end of his life. Cf. O. Zöckler, art. "Hugo von St. Viktor," in *Realencyklopädie für protestantische Theologie und Kirche* (1900), VIII, p. 440 ff.

¹⁷ PL 177, 285-294. On this important little work, cf. B. Hauréau, *Les Oeuvres de Hugues de Saint-Victor*, Essai Critique (Paris, 1886), pp. 191-192.

¹⁸ PL 176, 618-680.

¹⁹ PL 176, 845-857. For an analysis and history of this work, cf. Ludwig Ott, *Untersuchungen zur theologischen Briefliteratur der Frühscholastik unter besonderer Berücksichtigung des Viktorinerkreises* (Muenster i.W., 1937), BGPM XXXIV, pp. 350 ff.

²⁰ Grabmann summarized the investigations concerning the authenticity of the *Summa Sententiarum*; his conclusion (in 1911) was that Hugh was probably the author. (*Geschichte der schol. Methode*, II, pp. 290-297). Since 1911 several important articles, pro and con, have appeared, and the question does not appear settled as yet. In 1922 Vernet reviewed the arguments advanced on both sides up to that year. (*Art. cit.*, *D.Th.C.*, VII, 1, cols. 251-257). Both internal and external evidence seems to show that the work was written by another author.

tor emerges as one of the most important and significant figures of the Renaissance of the twelfth century. A study of his philosophy of knowledge will not be without value or interest for the student of medieval thought. It is the primary purpose of this dissertation to present Hugh's theory of knowledge in its historical setting. For that reason we propose to investigate the chief influences which affected Hugh's conception of man's power to know reality and to indicate the influence which he himself exercised upon the development of subsequent theories of knowledge within the scholastic philosophy.

The writer expresses his grateful appreciation to the Most Reverend Amleto Giovanni Cicognani, D.D., Archbishop of Laodicea, Apostolic Delegate to the United States, and Ordinary of the Pontifical College Josephinum, for the opportunity to engage in graduate studies. In this respect he is aware also of the gratitude he owes to the Most Rev. Henry J. Grimmelsman, S.T.D., Bishop of Evansville, the former Rector, and to the Rt. Rev. William J. Spiegel, Vice-Rector of the Josephinum. To the other members of the faculty at the Pontifical College Josephinum he is sincerely grateful for unfailing help and encouragement.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

PRINCIPAL WORKS OF HUGH OF ST. VICTOR

De Sacr. — De Sacramentis Christianae Fidei.

Did. — Didascalicon de Studio Legendi.

In cael. Hier. — Commentariorum in Hierarchiam Caelestem St. Dionysii Areopagitae Libri X.

In Eccl. Hom. — In Salomonis Ecclesiasten Homiliae XIX.

De Unione — De Unione Spiritus et Corporis.

De Arca — De Arca Noe Morali Libri IV.

De Van. — De Vanitate Mundi.

BGPM — *Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters*, herausgegeben von Cl. Baeumker, in Verbindung mit G. Freiherr von Hertling, M. Baumgartner, M. Grabmann, et al. (Muenster i.W., 1891 ff.)

ReScPhTh. — Revue des Sciences Philosophiques et Théologiques.

D.Th.C. — Dictionnaire de Théologie Catholique, ed. Vacant et Mangenot (Paris, 1902 ff.)

PG — Migne, *Patrologia Graeca*.

PL — Migne, *Patrologia Latina*.

CSEL — Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum Latinorum.

CHAPTER I

THE SOURCES OF KNOWLEDGE

TRADITIONAL VIEWS

Philosophers and theologians of the Christian tradition have been classified in three spiritual families on the basis of their attitude toward the respective roles which natural and supernatural knowledge should play in the exploration of reality. Etienne Gilson calls them the Tertullian family, the Augustinian family, and the family of St. Thomas Aquinas.¹

The first question one might ask about the theory of knowledge of a theologian who lived and wrote in the twelfth century might well be an inquiry into his position on this central problem of medieval philosophy — the relation between reason and revelation. About Hugh of St. Victor it is the more necessary to make the inquiry because there is disagreement among historians concerning the class in which he is to be placed.

Some writers would place him in the Tertullian family with men like St. Peter Damian and Jacopone da Todi — theologians who gave the unqualified supremacy to faith and resented the “intrusion” of dialectics into the study of revealed truth, men notorious for their disparagement of philosophy. This is the traditional view of the historians of the nineteenth century, many of whom saw in Hugh the mystic only, intent on eternal truths of faith and hostile to all philosophy. They would make him a partisan of exclusive otherworldliness in the order of knowledge and ascribe to him the contemptuous tone in which Peter Damian spoke of philosophy as the *ancilla theologiae*.

One writer dismisses him curtly: “For him (Hugh) everything is summed up in this axiom: to know is to believe and to believe is to love. The formula of reaction against scholasticism

¹ Etienne Gilson, *Reason and Revelation in the Middle Ages* (New York: Scribners, 1938), chapter I.

had been found.”² It is surprising to find Barthelémy Hauréau sharing this opinion because he is the author of several works on Hugh.³ To Hauréau Hugh is neither an “intolerant and rigorous dogmatist” like St. Bernard, nor does he use the *méthode inquisitive* of Abelard, nor is his attitude a compromise between these two protagonists in the twelfth century crisis between dialectics and mysticism. Yet, though he pays tribute to Hugh’s wealth of erudition in all the sciences, Hauréau concludes, “Actually, Hugh is nothing but a mystic.” In this interpretation all that is granted is that reason may help to understand truths which faith reveals.⁴

Hauréau was but one of several historians who traditionally quoted an apparently fundamental principle which would place Hugh definitely in the Tertullian family, with revelation the substitute for all other knowledge. “*Rerum incorrupta veritas ex ratiocinatione non potest inveniri*,” wrote Hugh.⁵ The sentence has led many to conclude that, despite his encyclopedic erudition and basic knowledge of the ancients, he considered all profane science worthless except as a propaedeutic to theology.⁶

² Achille Luchaire, in Lavissee, *Histoire de France depuis les origines jusqu'à la Revolution*, Vol. II (Paris, 1900), p. 377.

³ Barthelémy Hauréau, *Histoire de la Philosophie Scolastique* (Paris, 1872), I, p. 423: “Parmi les théologiens qui professent la même aversion pour toute philosophie nous devons particulièrement désigner Hugues de Saint-Victor. . . . Dociles aux conseils, aux leçons de Guillaume (de Champeaux), les jeunes chanoines de Saint-Victor veillaient donc sur leurs âmes avec la plus scrupuleuse inquiétude, priant, méditant, croyant, mais ne raisonnant pas.”

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 424. “Mais après avoir passé . . . par toutes les épreuves de l’initiation scolastique, après avoir épuisé les sources diverses du savoir contemporain, Hugues de Saint-Victor a pris en dégoût la science elle-même et n’a rien voulu retenir, ni des livres de Platon, ni de ceux d’Aristote. Hugues n’est, en réalité, qu’un mystique. On va l’apprécier.” To this Léon Gauthier would reply, “M. Hauréau la (l’école de Saint-Victor) prétend hostile à la philosophie. Le premier regard jeté sur la première page des écrits d’Hugues dément cette assertion téméraire.” (*Les oeuvres poétiques d’Adam de Saint-Victor* [Paris, 1858], I, p. 25.)

⁵ *Id.*, I, 11 (Buttimer, 20).

⁶ Cf. Ueberweg-Heinze, *Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie der aristotischen und scholastischen Zeit* (Berlin: Mittler, 1905), p. 223: “Hugo von St. Viktor, der bei enzyklopädischer Gelehrsamkeit und gründlicher

A tinge of the tradition remains in Haskins when he writes:

The importance of liberal learning is also emphasized in the great mystical philosopher of this period, Hugh of St. Victor, but chiefly as a means to the understanding of the hidden meaning of the Scriptures. . . . If, like Anselm, he starts with Augustine, the mystic soon triumphs over the philosopher, and the allegorical interpretation resolves the contradictions which perplex his more dialectically minded contemporaries.⁷

One might quarrel with some of Haskins' phrases, but his judgment is a fairer evaluation than that of many who wrote before him.⁸ The traditional description of Hugh's attitude toward rational knowledge is an extreme one, an oversimplification. It is very true that he thought of philosophy and science as a preparation for the higher science of theology. He is in the company of "his more dialectically minded contemporaries" when he makes philosophy the *ancilla theologiae*. For the Christian philosopher it was an entirely proper and logical relation. Some of Hugh's followers in the School of Saint Victor may have viewed with extreme suspicion any encroachment of reason upon revelation and have gone too far in that direction. It was inaccurate, however, to claim for the founder of the School⁹ that his attitude was

Kenntnis der Alten doch alle weltliche Wissenschaft nur als Vorbereitung zur Theologie gelten lässt, den Grundsatz aufstellt, 'rerum incorrupta, etc.'"
The same interpretation appears in W. J. Townsend, *The Great Schoolmen of the Middle Ages* (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1881), p. 127.

⁷ C. H. Haskins, *The Renaissance of the Twelfth Century* (Cambridge: Harvard U. Press, 1933), pp. 350-351.

⁸ Cf. Carl Prantl, *Geschichte der Logik* (Leipzig, reissue 1927) p. 111: "Indem er auch eine feindselige Gesinnung gegen die Dialektik hegte . . . scheint er selbst die allgemein zugängliche Literatur der Logik verschmäht zu haben." The traditional view appears in A. Fouillée, *Histoire de la Philosophie* (Paris, 1887), p. 204; Janet and Séailles, *Histoire de la Philosophie* (Paris, 1887), p. 1001; Z. Gonzalez, *Historia de la filosofía* (2nd ed. Madrid, 1886), II, pp. 161 ff.; see also Victor Cousin, *History of Modern Philosophy*, transl. by O. W. Wight (New York, 1853), II, p. 21; H. Bouchitté, art. "Hugues de Saint-Victor," in *Dictionnaire des sciences philosophiques* (3rd ed., Paris: Hachette, 1885), p. 733.

⁹ William of Champeaux is listed as founder of the School, but Hugh gave it its characteristic spirit of orthodox psychological mysticism. He

like that of such zealots as Walter of St. Victor, who was to call Abelard, Peter Lombard, Gilbert de la Porrée, and Peter of Poitiers the "four labyrinths of France" and to excoriate them as "puffed up by the same Aristotelian spirit, who treat the ineffable mysteries of the Holy Trinity and the Incarnation with scholastic levity, who spewed forth many heresies in the past and who still spout errors."¹⁰

As to the "fundamental principle" that the uncorrupted truth of things cannot be found by reasoning, it has been shown that Heinze and others have quoted it out of context and that Hugh says something quite different in the passage from which they excerpt it. Taken in isolation, the clause would indeed declare a complete skepticism with regard to rational inquiry, but in the context it means simply that one cannot reach rational truth without correct reasoning.¹¹

Other errors of method are responsible for the harsh judgments passed upon Hugh's doctrines on knowledge. Such methodical errors are due to the use of spurious works and to the evaluation of a theory of rational knowledge on the basis of

deserves the title of founder because of the influence he exerted on its members, especially Richard, who perfected his theory of mysticism. Cf. Joseph Ebner, *Die Erkenntnislehre Richards von St. Viktor*, BGPM, XIX, 4 (Münster: Aschendorff, 1917).

¹⁰ Cf. Ueberweg-Geyer, *Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie*. Die patristische u. scholastische Zeit (Berlin: Mittler, 1928), p. 271.

¹¹ Clemens Baumer has taken note of this misquotation. (*Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie*, N.F., XV (1909), pp. 136-137.) Almost the whole chapter (*Did.* I, 11) is a verbatim transcription of Boethius, *In Isag. Porph. Comm.* (ed. 2, CSEL, vol. 48, pp. 138-139) on the necessity of logic, and the point in the context is not the relation of theology to secular knowledge, but of the need for logical methods of reasoning in science. Briggmann had already noted this fact (*Kirchenlexikon*, VI, 394). The whole passage reads: "Quare necesse est falli, qui abjecta scientia disputandi, de rerum natura perquirent. Nisi enim prius ad scientiam venerit, quae ratiocinatio veram teneat semitam disputandi, quae verisimilem, et agnoverit, quae fida, quae possit esse suspecta, rerum incorrupta veritas ex ratiocinatione non potest inveniri." (Buttimer, pp. 19-20).

passages in works of ascetical or mystical theology where the emphasis lies almost exclusively on the supernatural.¹²

At the start of the twentieth century the time was ripe for a re-appraisal of Hugh's attitude toward the respective roles of reason and revelation in the quest for the truth of things. Medieval philosophy had been investigated more fully. A newer generation of historians dissociated Hugh of St. Victor from the Tertullian family and brought him much closer to that of St. Thomas Aquinas. He was seen as a forerunner of the great scholastics of the thirteenth century. He was no longer dismissed curtly as a "mystic only" and hence of no interest to the historian of philosophy; in proper perspective he emerged as a scholar with a pronounced desire for all knowledge, whether natural or supernatural. Typical of many modern appreciations of Hugh's respect for true science are these words of George Sarton: "Hugh strongly realized the need of scientific and co-ordinated knowledge. In this respect he may be considered a forerunner of the Christian encyclopaedists of the following cen-

¹² F. Vernet ("Hugues de Saint-Victor," *D.Th.C.*, VII, 1, col. 253) notes that Bouchitté and Gonzalez quote from the spurious *De Anima*. H. Siebeck (*Geschichte der Psychologie*, Gotha, 1884, Vol. I, 2, pp. 415 ff) bases his treatment of Hugh on the same work, as do Weber-Perry (*History of Philosophy*, rev. ed., New York, 1925, p. 180). This latter book has some surprising statements on Hugh's psychology. He is described as a "monist mystic" (p. 179) and "an absolute orthodoxy does not seem to him to be essential to salvation or even possible." On the next page one reads that "There is a genuineness about these lines of the *De Anima* that contrasts with the fruitless quibblings of dualistic spiritualism." From the *De Institutione Novitiorum* Hauréau quotes as an example of hostility toward science words in which Hugh speaks to novices approaching him for instruction in the school of virtue, "Scire debetis contentiones verborum nullo modo deinceps ad vos pertinere quia spiritualis doctrinae studium non litigantes sed auscultantes requirit." (Cf. Vernet, *art. cit.*, col. 240). In a later work Hauréau himself says that the author of this treatise is unknown. (*Les Oeuvres de Hugues de Saint-Victor* [Paris, 1886], pp. 116, ff.). Grassi-Bertazzi's *La filosofia di Hugo da San Vittore* (Roma, 1912) is vitiated throughout by his indiscriminate use of all the works printed in Migne, including the *De Anima*. He ignores entirely the recent researches concerning the authenticity of the works. Cf. J. Hoffman's review: *Revue Néoscholastique*, XX (1913), pp. 552-554.

ture.”¹³ Perhaps the most striking instance of the newer evaluation is reflected in the words in which Ueberweg’s most recent editor has reversed the judgment of his predecessor. “But Hugh was not only a friend of science,” writes Geyer. “In him scholasticism and mysticism were united in friendship.”¹⁴

It is clear then that the studies of the past few decades have engendered a new respect for Hugh of St. Victor as an important figure of the twelfth century Renaissance, the period which Cousin characterized as a “gross and pedantic age.” The external testimony is convincing, but a more striking refutation of the traditional view comes from the pages of Hugh’s authentic works, especially the *Didascalicon*. Six chapters of the third book of the *De Sacramentis* and almost every page of the first half of the *Didascalicon* treat of the excellence of philosophy and the power of human reason.

In Hugh’s own text one discovers the corrective for the oversimplification and the too facile classification that has been his lot. It is good to remember, however, that if Hugh was not a mystic only in the pejorative sense of that term used by older writers, he is primarily a mystic; he did think of science and philosophy as a preparation for theology.

To the “fundamental principle” taken out of context, to the effect that the uncorrupted truth of things cannot be found by reasoning, one is at once tempted to oppose a celebrated passage

¹³ G. Sarton, *Introduction to the History of Science* (Washington: Carnegie, 1931), II, 1, p. 193. Cf. H. Ostler, *Die Psychologie des Hugo von St. Viktor*, pp. 2-3: “In Wahrheit ist Hugo ein begeisterter Verehrer der echten Wissenschaft.” M. DeWulf, *History of Medieval Philosophy* (New York: Longmans, 1936), I, p. 171; *Encyclopaedia Britannica* (1943), II, p. 868; A. E. Taylor, in *European Civilization*, ed. Eyre (Oxford, 1935), III, p. 819; W. Windelband, *A History of Philosophy* (2nd ed. New York, 1914), p. 304, n. 2; O. Zöckler, art. “Hugo von St. Viktor,” *Realencyclopädie für protestantische Theologie u. Kirche*, VIII, pp. 436 ff; M. Grabmann, *Geschichte der schol. Methode*, II, p. 237.

¹⁴ Ueberweg-Geyer, *op. cit.*, p. 261. In his later work Hauréau revised his earlier estimate, at least with regard to the *De Sacramentis*: “Dans aucun de ses autres écrits il ne parle un aussi beau langage; dans aucun il ne tempère les inclinations mystiques de son cœur par un meilleur emploi de la méthode dialectique.” (*Les Oeuvres de Hugues de S-V*, p. 75).

from the same work which ends on this note: "Omnia disce, videbis postea nihil esse superfluum. Coartata scientia jucunda non est." This succinct statement of all knowledge as useful comes at the end of a charming autobiographical passage in which Hugh reminisces of his own schoolboy diligence and eagerness to learn all he could in every field of knowledge, his youthful quest for names and causes of things, his naïve excursions into experimental science:

I dare say that I never despised anything pertaining to learning and learned much that might strike others as light and vain. I practiced memorizing the names of everything I saw or heard of, thinking that I could not properly study the nature of things unless I knew their names. Daily I examined my notes of topics, that I might hold in my memory every proposition, with the questions, objections and solutions. I would inform myself as to controversies and consider the proper order of the arguments on either side, carefully distinguishing between what pertained to the office of rhetoric, oratory and sophistry. I set problems of numbers; I drew figures on the pavement with charcoal, and with the figure before me, I demonstrated the different qualities of the obtuse, the acute, and the right angle, and also of the square. Often I watched out the nocturnal horoscope through winter nights. Often I strung my harp that I might perceive the different sounds and likewise delight my mind with the sweet notes. All these were boyish occupations (*puerilia*), but not useless. Nor does it burden my stomach to know them now. . . .¹⁵

Hugh of St. Victor would never have penned that bit of rhetoric in which St. Peter Damian solemnly throws overboard and abandons to their fate Plato and Pythagoras, Nichomachus

¹⁵ *Did.*, VI, 3 (114-115). To point up the constant danger of a too facile classification of medieval writers on the central question of reason and revelation, it is only necessary to note how far removed are these sentiments from the statement of St. Peter Damian that the profane sciences are "superfluous." Cf. *Did.*, *praef.* (p. 1): "Nescire siquidem infirmitatis est, scientiam vero detestari, pravae voluntatis." The translation of the autobiographical text is from H. O. Taylor, *The Medieval Mind* (New York, 4th ed., 1930), II, p. 89. By permission of The Macmillan Company, publishers. For a vivid description of a classroom scene, cf. *De Van.* I (*PL* 176, 709-710).

and Euclid, bent-backed with complicated studies of geometrical figures, the rhetors with their syllogisms and the Peripatetics looking for truth at the bottom of a well, the tragic and comic poets, Cicero and Demosthenes.¹⁶ His was rather the medieval universalism which fostered the liberal arts as a preparation for philosophy.¹⁷ This zest for knowledge is confirmed a century later by Vincent of Beauvais.¹⁸ The *Didascalicon* helped shape the hierarchy of studies in the medieval universities.

FAITH AND REASON

In many of the Christian Platonists who looked to Saint Augustine for inspiration the lines of demarcation between the provinces of faith and reason were not sharply drawn. The theory of illumination had something to do with that. It was to be a contribution of the Thomistic synthesis that in it philosophy and theology became independent sciences — *alia et alia circa creaturas et philosophus et fidelis considerat*.¹⁹ Kilgenstein goes too far when he says that the central problem of scholasticism was already settled in satisfactory fashion by Hugh of St.

¹⁶ Petrus Damiani, *Opusculum Dominus Vobiscum ad Leonem Eremitam*, cap. I (PL 145, 232c).

¹⁷Cf. *Did.* III, 3 (53 ff).

¹⁸ Vincentius Bellovacensis, *Speculum Doctrinale*, XVIII, 62, quoted by L. Thorndike, *A History of Magic and Experimental Science* (New York, 1923), II, p. 8: "Hugo Parisiensis sancti victoris canonicus religione et literarum scientia clarus et in vii liberalium artium peritia nulli sui temporis secundus fuit." For one of several modern appreciations of Hugh's "ausgeprägtes Universalismus" cf. M. Manitius, *Gesch. der lat. Literatur des Mittelalters*, III, 113 ff. For the influence of the *Didascalicon* see Paré, Brunet, Tremblay, *La Renaissance du XIIe Siècle, Les Écoles et l'Enseignement* (Ottawa, Inst. d'Études Médiévales, 1933) *passim*. Hugh treats of the relation of liberal arts (*trivium and quadrivium*) to philosophy in *Did.*, III, 2-5 (pp. 49 ff). Cf. Mariétan, *Problème de la Classification des Sciences* (Paris, 1901), pp. 131 ff.

¹⁹ St. Thomas Aquinas, *Contra Gentiles*, II, 4. Gilson has frequently contrasted the Augustinian and Thomistic view on this point. Cf. e.g., *The Philosophy of St. Bonaventure* (New York, 1938), p. 114.

Victor,²⁰ but Hugh does represent a very definite attempt to achieve a harmonious allocation of territory to faith and to reason, and his definition of faith in relation to knowledge was to wield a great influence upon the more famous scholastics who followed his lead. The role of Hugh in the movement toward a separate science of philosophy and in the history of scholastic method is not an inconsiderable one.

Hugh distributes all knowledge between sacred and profane sciences, the latter being ancillary and propaedeutic to the former.²¹ Highest of the four main divisions of the profane sciences is theoretical philosophy, and under *theorica* are placed theology, mathematics, and physics.²² In this context theology must be considered in the Aristotelian sense — natural theology (metaphysics) as opposed to revelation. Hugh's terms are *theologia mundana* and *theologia divina*. A long introduction to his commentary on Dionysius' *Celestial Hierarchy* is given over to the distinction between the two and to the methods of demonstration, or formal objects, proper to each.²³

Here the distinction between metaphysics and theology as St. Thomas Aquinas understood them was being developed. *Theologia mundana* treats of *opera conditionis* — created things, the order of nature. It is the science which studies "invisible substances, and the invisible natures of invisible substances." It is the highest philosophy and the perfection of truth.²⁴ Natural

²⁰ Jacob Kilgenstein, *Die Gotteslehre des Hugo v. St. V.*, p. 56: "Die Hauptfrage der Scholastik, diejenige nach dem Verhältnisse von Glauben und Wissen ist in der ersten Periode der Scholastik nicht bloss angeregt, sondern auch bereits in echt kirchlichen Sinn entscheiden worden." Cf. M. D'Arcy, *Thomas Aquinas* (London: Benn, 1930), p. 264.

²¹ *Did.*, *praeformatio* (1-3).

²² *Did.*, II, 18 (37).

²³ *In cael. hier.*, I, 1 (PL 175, 923-928); *Excerpt. Prior.*, II, 1 (177, 203).

²⁴ *Ibid.* (175, 928 A), "Tertia vero sola, id est theologia (mundana) contemplatur invisibiles substantias, et invisibilium substantiarum invisibiles naturas. Et est in his quasi progressio quaedam, et profectus mentis ad cognoscendum verum consensientis. Per visibiles enim visibilium formas pervenitur ad invisibiles visibilium causas, et per invisibiles visibilium causas ascenditur ad invisibiles substantias, et earum cognoscendas naturas. Haec autem summa philosophiae est, et veritatis perfectio, qua nihil altius

theology means indirect revelation, through creatures and their elements, *visibili documento utens ad demonstrationem*. The formal object of sacred theology is the higher knowledge of God through the supernatural revelation of Christ. It is the distinction between nature and grace, between metaphysical and supernatural wisdom, which separates the approach to reality through faith and reason. It would be tedious to list here the innumerable evidences in Hugh's works that this distinction was really operative in his thought. Perhaps the clearest proof lies in the fact that the plan of division for his greatest work, the *De Sacramentis Christianae Fidei*, is based on a distinction into *opus conditionis* and *opus reparationis*. The same dichotomy into natural and supernatural knowledge runs through his other works.²⁵

esse potest animo contemplanti." Cardinal Gonzalez takes this passage as a basis for his misinterpretation of Hugh's theory of knowledge, which will be discussed later. H. O. Taylor (*op. cit.*, II, 391) uses it more effectively. Cf. *Did.*, II, 2 (25): "Quae res ad speculationem Dei atque ad animi incorporalitatem considerationemque verae philosophiae indagatione componitur, quam inquit (Boethius) Graeci Theologiam nominant. . . . Theologia igitur est, quando aut ineffabilem naturam Dei aut spirituales creaturas ex aliqua parte profundissima qualitate disserimus." Thus, theology as part of *theorica* is the philosophical knowledge of God, angels and the soul. In this Christian sense the term embraces all spiritual reality. In Aristotle *theologia* comprises the divine being, the soul so far as spiritual, and separated substances. Mariétan concludes that for Hugh *scientia theologica* means all metaphysics: "Pour Aristote la théologie n'est autre que la Philosophie première. . . . Hugues de Saint-Victor comprend évidemment aussi, sous l'expression de 'science théologique' toute la Métaphysique, comme la fondateur du Lycée. L'usage avait prévalu d'appeler la Métaphysique du nom de théologie, par déférence sans doute à l'Être divin, objet plus noble de la Métaphysique." (*Op. cit.*, pp. 134-135.)

²⁵ Cf. *De Sacr.*, prolog., 1, 2 (176, 183); *Did.*, praef: "Instruit autem (hic liber) tam saecularium quam divinarum scripturarum lectorem. . . . In prima parte docet lectorem artium, in secunda parte divinum lectorem." Cf. *ibid.*, IV, 1 (70); in *Hier.*, I, 1 (175, 926D-927A): "Sed mundana . . . theologia opera conditionis assumpsit et elementa hujus mundi secundum speciem creata, ut demonstrationem suam faceret illis. Theologia vero divina opera restorationis elegit secundum humanitatem Jesu et sacramenta ejus, quae ab initio sunt, naturalibus quoque pro modo subjunctis et in illis eruditionem conformaret. Major autem . . . declaratio divinitatis in sacramentis gratiae et carne Verbi et mystica operatione ipsius ostendi-

Sentences in which faith and reason are distinguished as means of knowledge frequently occur.²⁶ In the face of the evidence which has been barely sketched above and which could be multiplied many times over, it is impossible to sustain the thesis which maintains that "in Hugh the distinction between the domain and revelation and the domain of revelation is obliterated and becomes a question of more or less."²⁷

The medieval philosophers, despite their confusion of speech in some passages, saw faith and reason as two heterogeneous forces which naturally converged toward the same end. Hugh of St. Victor shared this idea. As Hugonin points out in writing about him in an introductory essay on the Victorine school:

If philosophy and theology have for their goal, the one the scientific knowledge of the natural world, and the other the scientific knowledge of the supernatural world, it will be found that they are distinct and that they are united. They are distinct because the two worlds are distinct; they are united, because the two worlds are the manifestation of the same Word of God.²⁸

Hugh puts his position succinctly — *fides ratione adjuvatur et ratio fide perficitur*. These words mark the conclusion of a section in his chapter on the knowledge of God where Hugh writes a summary paragraph on the relation of faith and reason

tur quam naturali rerum specie praedicentur." Hugh's distinction between faith and reason has often been developed. Cf. M. Grabmann, *op. cit.*, II, 279-283; Hettwer, *De fidei et scientiae discrimine juxta mentem Hugonis a St. Victor* (Vratislaviae, 1875); Kilgenstein, *op. cit.*, pp. 47 ff.

²⁶ E.g., *De Sac.*, I, VII, 35 (176, 303A); I, III, 1 (219); I, VII, 36 (304A); 2, XI, II (403A).

²⁷ Th. Heitz, *Essai historique sur les rapports entre la phil. et la foi* (Paris, 1909), p. 83. Heitz attributes this confusion in Hugh's works, as in all theology generally before St. Thomas, to the neoplatonic theory of illumination inherited from St. Augustine, Dionysius and John Scotus Erigena. Serious objections have been made to this thesis by R. Hourcade (*Bulletin de littérature ecclésiastique*, 1909, pp. 301-319), in his review of the book. Cf. Vernet, *art. cit.*, *D.Th.C.*, VII, 1, 259-260.

²⁸ Abbé Hugonin, *Essai sur la Fondation de l'École de Saint-Victor de Paris* (PL 175, li).

of which Mignon remarks that it will not be welcomed by either traditionalists or rationalists, but that "it will satisfy a wise philosopher and the most orthodox theologian."²⁹ Here the commonplaces of the Catholic position are taking shape. Supernatural truth comes through faith, and the superiority of religious belief lies in its attainment of truths inaccessible to reason. Faith aids reason by presenting to it truths, which, once acquired, are amenable to a rational approach. Reason, too, serves faith by showing that supernatural truths inaccessible to reason are not contradictory to it.³⁰

AUTHORITY AND REASON

The view persists today in many historians of philosophy that during the "minority of modern Europe" (as one of them calls the medieval period)³¹ philosophers most unreasonably and unphilosophically submitted their reason and their philosophy to

²⁹ A. Mignon, *Les origines de la scolastique et Hughes de Saint-Victor*, II, p. 96.

³⁰ *De Sacr.*, 1, III, 30 (176, 231D-232A), "Alia enim sunt ex ratione alia secundum rationem, alia supra rationem: et praeter haec quae sunt contra rationem. Ex ratione sunt necessaria, secundum rationem sunt probabilia, supra rationem mirabilia, contra rationem incredibilia. Et duo quidem extrema omnino fidem non capiunt. Quae enim sunt ex ratione omnino nota sunt et credi non possunt, quoniam sciuntur. Quae vero contra rationem sunt nulla similiter ratione credi possunt, quoniam non suscipiunt ullam rationem, nec acquiescit his ratio aliquando. Ergo, quae secundum rationem sunt et quae sunt supra rationem tantummodo suscipiunt fidem. Et in primo quidem genere, fides ratione adjuvatur et ratio fide perficitur, quoniam secundum rationem sunt quae creduntur. Quorum veritatem si ratio non comprehendit, fidei tamen illorum non contradicit. In iis quae supra rationem sunt, non adjuvatur fides ratione ulla; quoniam non capit ea ratio quae fides credit, et tamen est aliquid quo ratio admonetur venerari fidem quam non comprehendit. Quae dicta sunt ergo, et secundum rationem, fuerunt probabilia ratione, et sponte acquievit eis. Quae vero supra rationem fuerunt ex divina revelatione prodita sunt; et non operata est in eis ratio, sed castigata tamen ne ad illa contenderet."

³¹ C. C. J. Webb, *A History of Philosophy* (New York: Holt, n.d.), p. 111.

the dogmatic authority of an autocratic Church. Only after Europe came of age with the Renaissance and the Reformation did this submission to authority cease. Medieval philosophers like Hugh would call it submission to Truth, but in view of the widespread charge against his century, it will be interesting to discover his views on the relation between reason and Church authority.

We have seen that throughout his theological works Hugh is a speculative theologian. As an orthodox theologian he submitted wholeheartedly to the higher authority of the Church, but he held firm to the conception of speculative reason, in its proper field, as an independent source of truth and certitude. What is certified neither by any kind of authority nor by reason is doubtful, but the value of the scientific hypothesis is not disregarded.³² The most convincing proof of his respect for both reason and authority emerges from a study of his scholastic method. Hugh seldom uses the argument from human authority, and his direct quotations of authors are very infrequent, though he does heartily recommend the study of the Fathers, especially St. Gregory the Great.³³

³² *De Sac.*, I, IV, 22 (176, 277A): "Quae enim nec auctoritas probat nec ratio arguit manifesta, inter dubia relinquuntur; tamen ista non utiliter aliquando in quaestionem admittuntur, ut vel inveniatur quod verum est, vel saltem quod falsum est non concedatur." One text has been quoted by Espenberger (*Die Philosophie des Petrus Lombardus* [Muenster, 1901], *BGPM*, III, 5, p. 30) to prove an unqualified supremacy of ecclesiastical authority over reason in Hugh. Cf. *Expositio in regulam Aug.*, 3 (176, 892D), "Et sciendum est quod auctoritas ecclesiastica in omnibus magis imitanda est quam ratio, quoniam auctoritas semper obedientiae et humilitatis est; ratio vero nonnunquam praesumptionis." In the context (a religious rule) the authority meant is that which regulates the disciplinary observances of religious life.

³³ *Did.*, IV, 7 (105); cf. De Ghellinck, *Le Mouvement théologique du XII^e Siècle* (Paris, Gabalda, 1914), p. 116. On scholastic method in Hugh cf. M. Grabmann, *op. cit.*, II, 249-290; P. Claeys-Boüüaert, "La Summa Sententiarum-est-elle de Hugues de S.V.?", *Revue d'Histoire Eccl.*, X (1909), pp. 280-283; Mignon, *op. cit.*, I, p. 177 ff.

MYSTICISM *versus* DIALECTICS

It is as a mystic that Hugh of St. Victor is known to history and we are interested in his theory of rational knowledge. It will not be out of place to determine his position in the twelfth century crisis of mysticism and rationalism which was brought to its climax when Bernard faced Abelard at Sens in 1141. There can be no doubt after the researches of recent decades that this century teemed with a rich and varied spiritual life. One of the strongest and most characteristic currents flowing through it was the mystic strain. This meant an insistence on the affective approach to the knowledge of Truth. Over against the speculative and syllogistic treatment of the *depositum fidei* which was encouraged by St. Anselm of Canterbury and developed by the century's greatest dialectician, Peter Abelard, the mystics stressed the practical and psychological study of religious truth. They regarded as primary the inner experience of divine grace caused by affective contemplation — the spiritual *videre, sentire, experiri*.

There were the usual extremists on both sides, although the great minds of the century were not among them. The dialecticians wanted a thorough-going application of reason to the content of faith, and Abelard inclined toward them. At the other end were the intransigent theologians like Walter of St. Victor, who would have none of reason in theology. They spoke of dialectics as the "devil's art" and proclaimed against a "rationalism" which stifled the living experience of religious faith.³⁴

The schools of Abelard and of Saint Victor developed along two diverging lines in this century; they both introduced reason into theology and both contributed to the formation of the scholastic method which was to have such brilliant success in the next century. They have been well described by Portalié:

They did not need to set up as a principle the introduction of philosophy into theology; that had already been done by

³⁴ On mysticism and dialectics in the twelfth century, cf. P. Pourrat, *Christian Spirituality in the Middle Ages* (New York: Kenedy, 1924), pp.

Anselm, and, a little reluctantly, by Lanfranc. Hugh of St. Victor, like Abelard, adopts the principle, and both display the same zeal in its application. It is entirely false that the School of St. Victor impeded the scientific development of the faith by an excess of mystical symbolism. . . . But on the one hand it is indeed to the school of Abelard that the three essential perfections of the new theology are due: the idea of condensing, in a *Summa* worthy of the name, the synthesis of all theology; the introduction of the most rigorous processes of dialectic; and the fusion of patristic erudition with rational speculation. . . . On the other hand, it is the school of Saint Victor that has the glory of saving the new method from the great peril it encountered because of the doctrinal temerity of Abelard. . . . It required the perfect orthodoxy of the school of St. Victor and all its prudent moderation in its use of the new system, to cause its opponents to forget that the first propounders were Scotus Erigena, Berengar, and Abelard.³⁵

In this picture of mysticism *versus* dialectics Hugh of St. Victor stands on middle ground. For Hugh mysticism and dialectics joined hands, for he acknowledged the value and need of both. He does excoriate the exaggerated dialectics of some,³⁶ but it is due to him that the mystical element could claim its rightful place in scientific theology. He could reconcile the two extremes and remain orthodox throughout. His personal preference was for the affective and psychological approach of the mystic, but this chapter has shown that he was not a mystic only.

100 ff.; Ueberweg-Geyer, *op. cit.*, pp. 252-3; A. Liebner, *Hugo von St. Viktor und die theologischen Richtungen seiner Zeit*, pp. 169 ff.

³⁵ E. Portalié, "École théologique d'Abélard," *D.Th.C.*, I, 54-55. Cf. M. DeWulf, *Scholastic Philosophy*, transl. P. Coffey (London, 1907), 63-64; Feret, *La faculté de théologie de Paris* (Paris, 1894), I, 18-22.

³⁶ *De Sapientia Animae Christi* (176, 846-847).

CHAPTER II

THE SUBJECT OF KNOWLEDGE

THE EYES OF THE SOUL

A convenient approach to the theory of knowledge in Hugh of Saint Victor may be made through a study of the long section of the *De Sacramentis* which treats of the creation and the fall of man. In the first short chapters of his Prologue the point is made that the world was made for man, and therefore, the account of its creation is needed in order to understand man. Man's body exists for his spirit's sake, and the historical fact of the fall of man through his first parents with the consequent effects of original sin in the history of humankind is a pivotal point; it is the basis for dividing Hugh's work into two parts—*opus conditionis et opus reparationis*.¹

The influence of platonizing authors is seen in the medieval writers who take the fall of man as a point of departure for a description of the state of man's knowledge.² If we separate Hugh's point of view from the Christian tradition on the fall, or if we separate his account from his conception of the nature and effects of Original Sin, we cannot understand his views on human knowledge. The fall was a central, enormous fact, known by

¹ *De Sacr.*, 1, *prolog.* (176, 183A), "Opus conditionis est quo factum est ut essent quae non erant. Opus restaurationis est quo factum est ut melius essent quae perierant." Cf. *De Arca*, IV, 3 ff (176, 667B). The distinction is developed from St. Augustine. Cf. J. B. Reeves, "St. Augustine and Humanism" in *A Monument to St. Augustine* (London: Sheed & Ward, 1934), p. 150. Three states of man are distinguished by Hugh: the state of original creation, fallen nature after sin (which is not so much a state as a disaster!), and the restoration following on the resurrection of the dead. (*De Sacr.*, 1, VI, 10 [176, 269D-270A].)

² According to Baumgartner the influence of the *De Deo Deorum* ascribed to Mercurius Trismegistus, but actually the *Asclepius* of Ps.-Apuleius, is especially noticeable in this regard. William of Auvergne and Peter Lombard followed Hugh's lead here. Cf. M. Baumgartner, *Die Erkenntnislehre des Wilhelm von Auvergne* (Münster, 1893), *BGPM*, II, 1, p. 21.

faith, and when he came to analyze the different degrees of knowledge as he knew them, Hugh did not make the analysis in terms of philosophical reasons from the start. His philosophy was in the tradition of St. Augustine, an exercise of reason intrinsically subordinated to theology; he did not prescind from the superior knowledge of faith. Once you admit that the fall of man is responsible for the actual state of man's knowledge, an analysis of that state constitutes an exercise in philosophy.

The knowledge of the first man was fixed on three things—God, the Soul, the World. This hierarchy of being, frequently enunciated in the Augustinian tradition, is the ontological structure on which Hugh rears his theory of knowledge. It constitutes his metaphysical presuppositions. Man knew his Creator and what he had been made; he knew what was made with him and what he must do.³ The knowledge of God and Self was salutary and necessary; the knowledge of external creation was indifferent—not harmful, but tolerated.⁴ To indicate the source of this threefold knowledge Hugh here employs the term around which Augustine had built his whole theory of knowledge—illumination.⁵

3 *De Sac.*, 1, VI, 12 (176, 270D), "Triplici autem cognitione primum hominem eruditum constat, cognitione scilicet creatoris sui ut cognoscerat a quo factus erat, et cognitione sui ut cognosceret quid factus erat, et quid sibi faciendum erat. Deinde cognitione quoque illius quod secum factum erat, et quid sibi de illo et in illo faciendum erat."

4 *De Sac.*, 1, VI, 8 (176, 269A), "Sunt item intus quaedam salubria et necessaria, quibus sine laesione carere non potest, qualis est cognitio Dei et cognitio sui. . . . Sunt item alia quae adesse et abesse sine laesione possunt, et haec ad utrumlibet se habent, quia salutem non impediunt quasi noxia, nec velut necessaria operantur, qualis est cognitio rerum extrinsecarum et alia quaedam huiusmodi." This non-Aristotelian disparagement of sense knowledge is very frequent. Cf. *De Arca*, IV, 665D, ff., and the whole of *De Vanitate Mundi*.

5 *De Sac.*, 1, VI, 12 (176, 270CD), "Nam sicut (quantum pertinet ad perfectionem staturae et aetatis humani corporis) primum hominem perfectum credimus factum, ita quoque (quantum ad animam) cognitionem veritatis et scientiam (eam duntaxat quae primae perfectioni congrua fuit) perfectam mox conditum accepisse putamus, ut ad illam non studio aut disciplina aliqua per intervalla temporis profecisse; sed simul et semel ab

This threefold knowledge came to the first man through three eyes with which his soul was equipped — the eye of flesh, the eye of reason, and the eye of contemplation. Hugh describes them:

For there were three things — matter and spirit and God. Matter was the world, and spirit the soul. And the soul was, as it were, in the middle, with the world outside and God inside itself. It had received an eye, by which it might see the world outside itself and those things which were in the world; and this was the eye of flesh. Another eye it had received, by which it might see itself and the things that were within itself; and this is the eye of reason. Yet another eye it had received, by which it might see God within itself and those things which were in God; and this was the eye of contemplation.⁶

Hugh of St. Victor does not receive much notice in most of the modern histories of philosophy, but when he is remembered, this doctrine of the three eyes is one of the things noted. It is by no means an original device, for many before him had described the degrees of knowledge as different kinds of seeing. The whole Greek tradition spoke of intellectual cognition as seeing—*θεωρία*, and St. Augustine uses the figure freely.⁷ In his *Consolation of Philosophy*, the most popular philosophical work of the Middle Ages, Boethius has some well-known lines on the different views which man has through senses, imagination, reason and intelligence.⁸ Hugh's distinction of the three eyes reappears in St. Bonaventure and others of the Franciscan school.⁹

ipso sui conditionis exordio una ac simplici divinae aspirationis illuminatione illam percepisse." In the context *illuminatione* means revelation.

⁶ *De Sac.*, 1, X, 2 (176, 329C); cf. *ibid.*, 1, VI, 13.14.15 (271 ff); *In cael. Hier.* (175, 976).

⁷ Cf., for example, *Soliloquia*, II, 12-13 (*PL* 32, 875-876) on the *oculi animae*; cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologica*, 1, 67, 1, corp.

⁸ *De Consolatione Animae*, V, prosa 4 (Fortescue-Smith, p. 150), "Ipsum quoque hominem aliter sensus, aliter imaginatio, aliter ratio, aliter intelligentia contuetur."

⁹ St. Bonaventure, *Breviloquium*, p. 2, c. 12, n. 5; *Collationes in Hexaemeron*, 3, n. 23. Matthew of Aquasparta, a pupil of Bonaventure, has this doctrine of Hugh in back of his proofs for the necessity of faith *ex*

In modern terminology the three eyes of the soul are apprehension of the sensible world through sense-perception, consciousness or intuition (introspection), and contemplation of God.

Original sin, which consisted essentially in ignorance of the mind and concupiscence of the flesh,¹⁰ brought with it disastrous consequences for man's ability to know God, the Soul, and the World:

As long then as these eyes were open and unclouded, the soul saw clearly and distinguished rightly, but when the darkness of sin had entered into it, the eye of contemplation was extinguished so that it could see nothing. The eye of reason became bleary, so that it could no longer see accurately. Only that eye which was not extinguished (*oculus carnis*) retained its clearness and made no uncertain judgment, as long as it had clear (physical) light. But the eye of reason, as long as its light is cloudy, can have no clear judgment because it does not distinguish clearly what it does not see clearly. That is why men agree more easily about things which the eye of flesh perceives than about those which require a sharp mind and the activity of reason; for if there is no darkness in seeing, there is no discrepancy in judgment. A man, then, since he has the eye of flesh can see the world and what is in the world. Likewise, since he retains the eye of reason in part, he can see the soul and what is in the soul. But since he does not have the eye of contemplation, he cannot see God and the things that are in God.¹¹

defectu humanae intelligentiae (QQ. de fide et de cognitione, ed. Quaracchi [1903], p. 66); cf. M. Grabmann, *Die phil. u. theol. Erkenntnislehre des Kard. Matthäus v. Aquasparta* (Vienna, 1906), p. 119.

¹⁰ *De Sac.*, 1, VII, 28 (176, 299A), "Si ergo quaeritur quid sit originale peccatum in nobis, intelligitur corruptio sive vitium quod nascendo trahimus per ignorantiam in mente, per concupiscentiam in carne." For Hugh's doctrine on original sin and its effects, cf. J. B. Kors, *La Justice Primitive et la Pêché originel d'après S. Thomas* (Paris: J. Vrin, 1930), pp. 43-50. It should be noted, however, that Kors bases some of his doctrine on a commentary of St. Paul's *Epistle to the Romans* which was not written by Hugh, though printed among his works in Migne. (Cf. Vernet, *art. cit.*, col. 248.)

¹¹ *De Sac.*, 1, X, 2 (176, 329D-330A), "Hos igitur oculos quandiu anima apertos et revelatos habebat, clare videbat et recte discernibat; postquam autem tenebrae peccati in illam intraverunt, oculus quidem contemplationis

An unimpaired faculty of sense-perception, a weakened power of reason, an intelligence which sees the invisible but can no longer know God directly—these are the consequences of Adam's sin, and it is about these three that a treatment of Hugh's theory of knowledge must revolve. What a man does know he knows by the powers of his soul, and to the soul we must devote some attention. "And since the most excellent good of philosophy has been related to human souls, the exposition must begin with the powers of the human soul itself that it may proceed in some sequence and order."¹²

THE SOUL AND ITS POWERS

The definitions of the soul in Hugh of St. Victor do not conform to the logician's rules. They describe it; they do not exhaust its nature. There are echoes in his descriptions of men who wrote before, but they are free from the errors which some of his predecessors had introduced into their psychology. The soul is a spiritual substance, created directly by God, one, simple, and immortal. It is rational, the source of vegetative and sensitive life as well; it has free-will and directs to good or avoids evil.¹³

extinctus est, ut nihil videret; oculus autem rationis lippus effectus est, ut dubie videret. Solus ille oculus qui extinctus non fuit in sua claritate permansit, qui quandiu lumen habet clarum, iudicium dubium non habet. Oculus vero rationis quandiu lumen ejus est nubilum, iudicium certum habere non potest; quia quod clare non videt discernit ambigue. Hinc est quod corda hominum facilius sibi consentiunt in his quae oculo carnis percipiunt, quam in his quae acie mentis et sensu rationis attingunt, quia ubi in videndo non caligant, in iudicando non discrepant. Homo ergo quia oculum carnis habet mundum videre potest, et ea quae in mundo sunt. Item quia oculum rationis ex parte habet, animum similiter ex parte videt et ea quae in animo sunt. Quia vero oculum contemplationis non habet, Deum et quae in Deo sunt videre non valet." Cf. *De Sacr.*, 1, VI, 5 (276A); *De Aroa. prolog.* (619A). For a comparison of the weakened intelligence of man with angelic knowledge, cf. *De Sacr.*, 1, V, 12 (251C).

¹² *Did.*, I, 2 (7).

¹³ *De Sacr.*, 2, I, 6 (176, 383B). Speaking of Christ's human soul, "Accepit ergo (Christus) cum carne et in carne ipsa animam rationalem, quae et carnem ipsam vegetaret et sensificaret ad vitam, et secundum liberam voluntatem peccatum respueret et sectaretur justitiam."

Soul and spirit are two aspects of the one reality. Hugh does not reproduce the tripartite division of man into Spirit, Soul, and Body which was one of the fundamental triads of Plotinus and also appears in St. Augustine.¹⁴ The Victorine school repeats, too, the Plotinian and Augustinist formula of the whole soul present in the whole body and in every part of it.¹⁵

William of Champeaux, Hugh's predecessor at St. Victor, could have taught him most of this, but Hugh elaborated his own theory of the relation of soul and body, a problem over which Aristotelians and Augustinists were to wage acrimonious controversy in the following century. The varied solutions of this problem, of course, have immediate consequences in epistemology. Hugh does not say that the soul is the form of the body, nor does he describe both as complete and separated substances, but his treatment is decidedly in the Platonic and Augustinist spirit. The scholastics of the first period did not envisage the problem as it appeared in the thirteenth century, since matter and form did not mean to Hugh and his contemporaries what it meant for the strict peripatetics of the next century.¹⁶ It was St. Albert the Great who broke decidedly from "the platonizing standpoint of

¹⁴ in *Canticum B. Mariae* (175, 420A), "Nam unus et idem spiritus ad seipsum spiritus dicitur, et ad corpus anima. . . . Anima autem humana, quia et in corpore esse habet et extra corpus, proprie et anima vocatur et spiritus. Sed anima dicitur in quantum est vita corporalis, spiritus autem, in quantum est ratione praedita substantia spiritualis." Cf. St. Augustine, *De Anima et ejus origine*, IV, 36 (PL 44, 544). For Plotinus, cf. W. R. Inge, *The Philosophy of Plotinus* (3rd ed., London: Longmans, 1929), I, 122. It should be noted that St. Augustine speaks at times as Hugh does, of *anima* and *spiritus* as two aspects of the one reality. Cf. e.g., *De Fide et Symbolo*, X, 23 (PL 40, 193-4); E. Gilson, *Introduction à l'Étude de Saint Augustin* (Paris: J. Vrin, 1931), p. 53, n. 1.

¹⁵ *Summa sententiarum*, I (176, 49D-50A). This work, attributed to Hugh by many, at least manifests his influence. Cf. *supra*, p. xiii. For a detailed analysis of Hugh's psychology, treating of the existence, substantiality, spirituality and immortality of the soul, of its origin, unity, and relation with the body and its own faculties, see Ostler, *op. cit.*, pp. 14-96.

¹⁶ Cf. Portalié in his section on the influence of St. Augustine, art. "Saint Augustin," *D.Th.C.*, I, 2504; M. DeWulf, *Histoire de la Philosophie Médiévale* (Paris: J. Vrin, 1934), I, p. 28.

the older Scholastics, among whom Hugh of St. Victor still regarded the soul alone as the true man. . . Albert makes his own the Aristotelian definition of soul as the *entelechy* of the body.¹⁷

Hugh compares the body to an appendage which does not enter into the essential definition of the human person. His formula is simple, "What is man but the soul?"¹⁸ In describing the relation between soul and body he does not speak of composition, but of *apposition*, for the soul of itself and through itself is the person. Like most men of the Middle Ages he accepted the famous definition of Boethius—*persona est naturae rationalis individua substantia*, but for him the basis of personality was entirely in the soul.¹⁹ "The soul, insofar as it is a rational spirit, of itself and through itself constitutes the essence of personality."²⁰ This is not a unique position on the body-soul relation-

17 Cl. Baeumker, *Studien und Charakteristiken zur Geschichte der Philosophie insbesondere des Mittelalters*. (Ed. M. Grabmann) *BGPM*, XXV, 1-2 (Münster i.W., 1927), pp. 108-109.

18 *De Sac.*, 2, I, 11 (176, 407D). "Quid enim magis est homo, quam anima?" Hugh devotes much space to this theme in a long chapter entitled: *Quod Christus separata anima a carne et persona fuit et Deus et homo*. In the context he cites an unnamed *ethnicus* who had said before him that the soul was the Ego. This pagan could well have been Macrobius (V. cent.), who makes the statement in his *Comm. in Somnium Scipionis* (c. 19, 1). Cf. P. Schedler, *Die Philosophie des Macrobius und ihr Einfluss auf die Wissenschaft des chr. MA* (Münster, 1916), *BGPM*, XIII, 1, p. 121.

19 Cf. *De Sac.*, 2, I, 11 (176, 406A). "Secundum nos ergo dicamus: Persona est individuum rationalis substantiae. Quae est rationalis substantia nisi spiritus rationalis? Haec est enim proprie rationalis substantia, spiritualis substantia quae sola rationis capax est; quia in ea sola ratio esse potest." *De scriptoribus et scripturis sacris*, XIV (175, 21C).

20 *De Sac.*, 2, I, 11 (176, 408D-409B). "Aliud quippe est aliqua simul per unionem ad unitatem componi, atque aliud aliqua per unionem unitati apponi. . . . Paries, tectum et fundamentum, tria quaedam sunt, et nullum horum per se domus est. Quando ergo conveniunt, ut haec esse incipiant tria simul componuntur, non duo tertio apponuntur. Non autem sic iuncta sunt corpus et anima. Anima quippe, in quantum est spiritus rationalis, ex se et per se habet esse personam, et quando corpus ei sociatur, non tantum ad personam componitur, quantum in personam apponitur, ut in eo quod per unionem quodammodo unum sit cum illa, eadem, quae ipsa est, persona esse incipiat cum illa. In quantum ergo corpus cum anima unitum est, una persona cum anima est; sed tamen personam esse anima ex se habet, in

ship which so exercised the minds of Greek and Christian philosophers, but it may be said to be an original one. It certainly proved unacceptable to the later Aristotelians, and St. Thomas refused to admit the authority of Hugh on the point.²¹ We shall see, however, that Hugh does not follow Plato in making the body the prison-house of the soul.

SOUL AND FACULTIES

The question of the relation between the soul's faculty and substance may be reduced to the more fundamental principle of act and potency. The great medieval doctors are united in rooting the causality which operates in the very actuality of the being—in *actu primo*,²² but there were different opinions on the relation of the faculties which operate to the substance to which it belongs. These opinions are reflected in the different explanations of the relation of the soul's faculties to its substance. Most writers to the twelfth century followed Augustine and did not distinguish soul and operations. For them the soul acts directly by its essence. They spoke of a succession of acts and not of a distinction of powers which acted.²³ Hugh of St. Victor quotes Augustine on

quantum est rationalis spiritus; corpus vero ex anima habet, in quantum unitum est rationali spiritui." Cf. *Did.*, I, 5 (12); *De Sacr.*, 1, VI, 2 (176, 264C).

²¹ Hugh himself concedes (408B) that this was not the *usus loquendi*. R. Vaughan (*Thomas of Aquin* [London, 1890], p. 132) calls it a "decided and original view." Stöckl, *Geschichte der Phil. des Mittelalters*, I, 336: "Was nun aber die menschliche Natur als solche betrifft, so weicht Hugo hier von der in der christlichen Philosophie allgemein vertretenen Absicht ab. Er erklärt sich nämlich gegen die Annahme, dass die menschliche Natur als solche etwas anderes sei, als ihre beiden Bestandteile für sich genommen." Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologica*, 3, 50, 4, *corp.* for a criticism of Hugh's position. Duns Scotus also rejects this position. Cf. *Rep. Par.* II, d. 22, n. 4; *Oxon.* IV, a. 10, q. 7, n. 2.

²² Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologica*, 1, 48, 5, *corp.* "Actus autem est duplex: primus et secundus. Actus quidem primus est forma et integritas rei; actus autem secundus est operatio."

²³ St. Augustine, *De Trinitate*, IX, 4, 5 (*PL* 42, 963-4): "Admonemur, si utcumque videre possumus haec in animo existere substantialiter . . . non

this, but does not follow him in the prevalent opinion.²⁴ Although he, too, insists on the simplicity and identity of the soul, he admits a distinction between soul and faculties. The soul acts through its faculties, but the distinction is reduced to a minimum. The faculties are *affectiones* or accidents. Consciousness reveals the opposition of operation and substance in the soul. Knowledge and love are added to it as to a substance already wholly constituted. The faculties are not the soul; they are in the soul.²⁵

Each of the two greatest Greek philosophers transmitted a threefold division of the soul's faculties to the western world. Plato's division into reason, courage, and desire was popular with many of the Fathers. St. Gregory, for instance, who was one of the chief influences on Hugh's mystical thought, gave it ethical and teleological implication: "The soul is quickened by three natures. For it is rational in judgment, desirous in seeking virtues, courageous in avoiding vice."²⁶ Hugh was familiar with it

tamquam in subiecto ut color in corpore . . . quia etsi relative dicuntur ad invicem, singula tamen substantialiter sunt in substantia sua." Among those who followed Augustine were Gregory the Great, Isidore of Seville, Alcuin, Rhaban Maur, William of St. Thierry, William of Auvergne. Cf. Ostler, *op. cit.*, pp. 90-91; Espenberger, *op. cit.*, pp. 88 ff.

²⁴*Speculum ecclesiae* (doubtfully Hugh's), IX (177, 377D): "Ex hoc enim sensu haec tria (*scil.* mens, intellectus, amor) unum dicuntur quia secundum Augustinum substantialiter existunt in anima, non tamquam in subiecto, ut color in corpore."

²⁵*De Sac.*, 1, III, 25 (176, 227B): "Videt enim (ratio) quoniam quae in mente sunt non vere idem sunt quod est ipse mens. Separantur enim a mente haec aliquando; et cum adfuerint recedunt, et redeunt iterum cum abierint et variantur circa ipsam, nec vere sunt idem cum ipsa, sed quasi affectiones quaedam et formae ipsius . . . non est omnino eis proprium esse persona sed personae inesse tantum." Some few lines later the faculties are called *accidentia*. St. Thomas also makes the faculties accidents, not "as Hugh of St. Victor does, to mark that they are hardly distinguishable, but to emphasize the reality of the distinction." Cf. E. Gilson, *The Spirit of Medieval Philosophy* (New York: Scribners, 1940), p. 445; for a comparison of Hugh and St. Bonaventure on the point, see Gilson's *Philosophy of St. Bonaventure* (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1938), pp. 341-342.

²⁶Greg. Magnus, in 7 *Pss. Poenit.*, *Praef.* (PL 79, 551C). Plato's division is most fully expressed in the *Republic*, IV, 441; VI, 504.

and used it on occasion,²⁷ but the general division of the soul's powers which he elaborated, following Boethius, was that of Aristotle, whose broad classification of faculties into vegetative (nutritive and reproductive), sensitive, and rational found wide acceptance in the Middle Ages. Hugh made Boethius' treatment his own:

There is a triple power of the soul to be found in animated bodies. Of these one supports life for the body, that it may arise by birth and subsist by nourishment; another lends judgment to perception; the third is the foundation for the strength of mind and for reason.²⁸

In the last analysis the faculties of the soul may be reduced to knowledge and love:

For there are two things in which the whole nature of the rational soul is distributed, cognition, namely, and desire (*affectus*) — that is, wisdom and love. . . . The whole substance, therefore, of the rational soul is ruled by these two . . . that through wisdom indeed it may find truth and through love embrace virtue.²⁹

We are interested here in the two cognitive powers: sensation, which man shares with animals, and reason, the unique privilege of human nature, which is "occupied in the very firm conception of present things, or in the understanding of absent things, or in the investigation of unknown things."³⁰

²⁷ *Did.*, II, 4; II, 13 (28, 33).

²⁸ *Ibid.*, I, 3 (7) — Boethius, in *Isag. Porphy. comm.*, I (*CSEL*, 48, p. 136). This chapter sets forth also the hierarchical relation between the faculties. The one soul has all three functions. Cf. in *Cantic. B. Mariae* (175, 419B), "Unam eandemque animam esse verissime testatur, quae in homine et corporis vitam praebet per sensum, et in semetipsa vivit per intellectum." For Aristotle's division of faculties cf. *Nichom. Ethics*, I, 13; VI, 2 (1102b; 1139a 16 ff.).

²⁹ *Hom. in Eccl.*, II (175, 141BC): "Duo quippe sunt, quibus animae rationalis natura tota disponitur, videlicet cognitio et affectus, id est sapientia et amor. . . . Tota ergo animae rationalis substantia his duobus regitur . . . ut per sapientiam quidem veritatem inveniatur, per amorem autem amplectatur virtutem." Cf. *In cael. Hier.*, III (175, 975A).

³⁰ *Did.*, I, 3 (7).

The object of knowledge may be present to the soul in various ways. The modes of knowing are mentioned by Hugh in his discussion of the impossibility of knowing the *invisibilia Dei* except by the higher mode of faith. These are the ways of knowing: sense-perception, intellectual apprehension through the imagination, or, if the object be the soul itself or its acts, in consciousness itself, an internal experience.³¹ We shall soon turn to a study of sense-perception, through which man attains to one of the worlds in which he lives.

THE TWO WORLDS

In his peculiar conception of personality and the theory of body-soul relation which grew out of it Hugh shows himself an exponent of the two-worlds theory which St. Augustine, following the Platonists, had given to the western world and which persisted after the twelfth century in philosophers like Descartes and Spinoza and Kant. Hugh emphasized the impossibility of any real comparison between the two substances brought together in man's nature by placing the whole essence of personality in the soul.³² Soul and body do not form the composite human person as posited by Aristotle and Aquinas; body is placed in apposition to soul; it can only be called a person in that it partakes of the personality of the soul. But the gulf between the two is not so great as in Plato. With St. Augustine Hugh held that the soul loves its body,³³ but the influence of Plotinus is apparent in the

³¹ *De Sac.*, 1, X, 2 (176, 328C-329D).

³² Cf. *Did.*, I, 5 (12): "Nam homo, cum simplex natura non sit, sed gemina compactus substantia, secundum unam partem suam quae potior est, et ut apertius id quod oportet dicam, quae ipsa est, immortalis est . . ." *De Sac.*, 1, VI, 2 (176, 264C): "Factus est homo ad imaginem et similitudinem Dei quia in anima (quae potior pars est homini vel potius homo erat) . . ." For the immutability of God as opposed to the constant flux of the corporeal world, cf. *De Sac.*, 1, III, 13 ff. (176, 220D ff.). Souls change only in *affectu et cognitione* (222B).

³³ *De Sac.*, 1, VII, 19 (176, 295C): "Nam sicut Deus praesidebat spiritui ita spiritus praesidebat carni, et ipsa caro jumentum spiritus erat. . . . Quia ergo spiritus sessor erat, injunctum est ei officium ut jumento suo pabulum provideret. Ne ergo in illo exsequendo (si sola praeceptione non

Victorine's mystical insistence that real knowledge comes not so much through the senses as through the meditation of the soul. For there is a changing world of sense and a changeless world of spirit, and man is placed between them.

From the Pseudo-Dionysius the Middle Ages had inherited a principle that what is highest in the inferior order touches the lower confines of the superior order—*natura inferior secundum sui supremum attingit infimum naturae superioris*.³⁴ This principle placed man between angel and animal and made him the microcosm, "for in him everything else in the world is, in some way, represented."³⁵

It is the unique privilege and dignity of man, that through reason he can know the world, his soul, and God. "That the rational creature is highest of all in dignity"³⁶—this title of one chapter is a constantly recurring theme in Hugh's works. There is nothing original in this exaltation of the dignity of man, but it places Hugh in the company of those who describe man as the microcosm, the meeting place of the two worlds of spirit above and matter below, in both of which he participates. Man is a spirit clothed with flesh.³⁷

etiam amore impleret) servili conditione praemeretur dedit ei Deus affectum quo corpus suum amaret, ut sicut ejus integritatem et sanitatem diligeret, sic etiam omnia quae ad illam servandam valerent libenter provideret." For the reasons advanced by some (of whom Hugh disapproves) *de animabus incorporandis*, cf. *De Sac.*, 1, VII, 36 (303D-304A). St. Augustine, *De doctrina christiana* I, XXIV, 24. Cf. A. Schneider, *Die abendländische Spekulation des 12ten Jahrhunderts in ihrem Verhältnis zur aristotelischen und jüdisch-arabischen Philosophie* (Muenster i.W., 1915), BGPM, XVII, 4, p. 76.

³⁴ Dionysius Areopagita, *De Divinis Nominibus*, VII.

³⁵ St. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologica*, 1, 96, 2 corp. Cf. E. Gilson, *The Spirit of Medieval Philosophy*, p. 218.

³⁶ *De Sac.*, 1, V, 3 (176, 247); *De Van.*, III (721B); *De Sac.*, 1, VI, 1 (263C).

³⁷ *Hom. in Eccl.*, XII (175, 191C): "Nam et ipse homo mundus est et minor mundus dictus est homo. Hujus terra est caro ejus, et coelum ejus anima ejus." Cf. *De Sac.*, 1, I, 19 (176, 200); *Did.*, VII, 19 (176, 826 ff.). Baumgartner quotes many examples of this favorite medieval designation of man as the microcosm. (*Die Philosophie des Alanus de Insulis*, BGPM, II, 4, pp. 88 ff.) Cf. e.g., S. Thomas, *Summa theol.*, 1, 96, 2. See also

This is man's place in the hierarchy of creation which Hugh often describes. To the angels God gave a faculty of knowledge wholly interior, to animals a sense-knowledge limited to external objects. The rational soul of man has both—pure reason, or intelligence, by which he grasps the invisible and immaterial objects of his thought, and sense-perception, which brings him knowledge of the visible and material world of space and time.³⁸ Through the powers of sensation the soul reaches out to the sensible; man's relation to the suprasensible has its term in reason or intellect. This sharp separation between the worlds of sense and spirit is made in the spirit of Augustine, but Hugh does not lack originality completely. In placing man between the brute and the angel he anticipates much of what Pascal was to put into his phrase about "the grandeur and the misery of man." Man is the crown of visible creation, the cause of all the world, because God, who created him, made all things for him.

Hans Meyer, *Thomas von Aquin, Sein System und seine geistesgeschichtliche Stellung* (Bonn: Hanstein, 1938, p. 237. The valuable and erudite study by Rudolf Allers, "Microcosmus. From Anaximandros to Paracelsus" (*Traditio*, volume II, New York, 1944) appeared while this work was in press.

³⁸ Cf. *De Sac.*, I, VI, 5 (176, 266 ff.) for a lengthy development of this theme, which often reappears. "Anima autem rationalis idcirco duplici sensu instructa est; ut visibilia foris caperet per carnem et invisibilia intus per rationem quatenus et visibilia et invisibilia ad laudem creatoris illam excitarent. . . . Facta est creatura una cujus sensus totus intus erat, et creatura altera facta est cujus sensus totus foris erat. Sensus angelorum intus erat, et sensus brutorum animalium foris erat. . . . Et positus est in medio homo ut intus et foris sensum haberet. Intus ad invisibilia, foris ad visibilia. Intus per sensum rationis, foris per sensum carnis." Cf. *ibid.*, I, IV, 26 (246); *Did.*, I, 1 (4-6); Hugonin, *op. cit.* (175, *lxx* ff.). For free will as a parallel case of a middle faculty between sense and spiritual appetites see *De Arca.*, I, 4 (176, 633 ff.). Peter Lombard follows Hugh completely on the place of man in the universe. (Eспенberger, *op. cit.*, p. 83.) Cf. A. Schneider, *Die abendländische Spekulation, etc.*, p. 73.

CHAPTER III

THE WORLD OF SENSE

THE VALIDITY OF SENSE-PERCEPTION

The reliability of sense-perception with reference to the reality and intelligibility of the universe has been discussed by philosophers ever since Parmenides and Zeno of Elea maintained that the senses deceive men—that the world of change perceived by them is illusory and that truth comes not through such agencies. For Plato, as is well known, senses afforded no basis for anything more than mere opinion, while the world of Ideas was the source of true knowledge. Aristotle stoutly defended the importance of the senses. St. Augustine seems to hesitate, for at one time he can speak of the world of sense-objects as a Heraclitean flux and doubts the ability of the senses to attain to necessary truth:

Whatever is attained by sense, what we call the sensible, never for an instant ceases to change. . . . What does not remain steady cannot be perceived; for to perceive is to comprehend by science, and the perpetually changing cannot be comprehended. From our corporeal senses, then, no genuine truth is to be looked for.¹

Later against the skeptics of the New Academy he argues that the senses are indeed trustworthy in reporting external reality; through them we learn of earth and heaven and the things that

¹ St. Augustine, *De div. quaest.*, 83, 9 (*PL* 40, 13). The last sentence is well-known and is quoted as an objection by St. Thomas: "Non est expectanda sinceritas veritatis a corporis sensibus." *Summa Theologica*, I, 84, 6.

² *De Trinitate*, XV, 12. "Multi illi philosophi garrierunt contra corporis sensus, sed absit a nobis, ut ea, quae per sensus corporis didicimus, vera esse dubitemus; per eos quippe didicimus coelum et terram et ea, quae in eis nota sunt nobis." *Ibid.*, XI, 1. "Nemini dubium est, sicut interiorem hominem intelligentia, sic exteriorem sensu corporis praeditum." Cf. *Contra Academ.* III, 11, where Augustine uses the famous example of the stick apparently broken in water; *De Civ. Dei.*, XIX, 18.

are in them.² But the tendency to distrust the senses finds an echo in Augustine's followers among the Christian Platonists, for, as Gilson observes:

Truth is necessary and immutable; but in the sensible order nothing necessary or immutable is to be found; therefore sensible things will never yield us any truth. That may be said to be almost a commonplace in the Augustinian schools of the thirteenth century. St. Bonaventure, Matthew of Aquasparta, Roger Marston and many others taught it—not without some perception of the grave difficulties inherent in the position.³

The thirteenth-century Aristotelians, of course, had no such doubts about the matter,⁴ but one might expect some hesitancy in Hugh of St. Victor a century before, imbued as he was with the spirit of Augustine. At times he does speak with a mystical fervor on the insufficiency of sense-knowledge, its inability to penetrate beyond the mere surface of things, and of the mutability of sense-objects in general.⁵ The eye of the flesh is limited in place and time to what is present to the senses; it is dull and lazy.⁶ These, however, are the impatient words of the more mystical

³ E. Gilson, *The Spirit of Medieval Philosophy*, p. 230.

⁴ Thomas Aquinas (*Summa Theol.*, I, 17, 2; *De Veritate*, I, 10); St. Anselm (*Dialogus de Veritate*, VI [PL 158, 474]), had said that error is not found in the senses.

⁵ Cf. e.g., *Hom. in Eccl.*, II (175, 139D-140B, 143). At the beginning of this long exposition of a text (*Ecclesiastes* I, 8): "Non saturatur oculus visu, nec auris impletur auditu," he writes (140A), "Quantis ergo tenebris homo involvitur; quanta ignorantiae caecitate coaretatur, cujus sensus vix etiam superficie tenus pauca rerum potest attingere? Qui etsi cuncta, quae sunt secundum speciem exteriorem cerneret, nondum tamen vim latentem rerum, invisibilemque naturam penetraret."

⁶ *De Van.*, I (176, 703 ff.): "Oculus carnis quanto sublimior et in altiore loco constitutus fuerit, tanto amplius per visionem in latum se diffundit. . . . Sed haec quidem eo ipso, quo per corporis instrumentum emicat, multis ac variis modis nullo etiam foris interveniente obstaculo, in semetipsa caligat. Nam quia angusta est maxima comprehendere non sufficit; et quia hebes est, minima non discernit, quia autem pigra est, cum in remotissima extenditur etiam si intercurrat, sola tamen spatii longinquitate hebetatur, quia vero perspicax non est, intima quaeque non penetrat, sed ea sola quae in rerum superficie sunt constituta, observat (corrected from *oberrat*)."

works of his youthful ardor for the great and shining truths of faith, which come not through the senses. Even they do no more than say that the senses are insufficient in themselves to perceive the inner nature of sensible things, and this is the thesis of all but the crudely sensistic philosophers.

Matthew of Aquasparta, writing much later, and deeply influenced by Hugh's works, was much exercised about establishing the possibility of certitude against the skeptical. He was led to a purely *a priori* demonstration of scientific knowledge and to a denial of the possibility of any certainty from instable sensible things. His epistemology, based on an essentially theological doctrine of illumination, is a philosophical skepticism saved by fideism. "Things are not the necessary cause of our knowledge."⁷ He did not take this attitude from Hugh of St. Victor. Matthew of Aquasparta represents a purely Platonic or Augustinian tradition which would have nothing to do with Aristotelian moderate realism. His extreme views are a reaction against it.

Hugh followed Augustine's lead in many things, but he seems to have felt no compulsion to defend the validity of sense perception against any skepticism. He was among the many medieval philosophers who assumed that the mind was in contact with real objects in space and time through the medium of the senses, and that sense-perception was an avenue to truth. The reasons for this assumption of objective reality, which was quite unconscious on his part, were partly conditioned by his theology, as we have seen. One knew the external world through the eye of flesh which God gave man that he might "see the world and the things that were in the world."⁸ After the fall this eye remained clear and bright, requiring only a corporeal light of the sun for its operation.

⁷ Matthew of Aquasparta, *Ten disputed questions on Knowledge*, Q. 1, ad 12. Transl.: Richard McKeon, *Selections from Medieval Philosophers*, II (New York, 1930), p. 263.

⁸ *De Sac.*, 1, VI, 13 (176, 271AB). Here a perfect knowledge of all visible things made with and for man is ascribed to the first man, and it is stated that this knowledge was not lost in the fall: "Hanc autem scientiam (quemadmodum et illam qua carnis suae commoda et necessaria providere debuerat [Deus]) . . . homo peccando non perdidit." Cf. *De Sac.*, 1, X, 2 (176, 329C-330A).

That is why it is easier for men to agree about the objects of sense than about the suprasensible.

THE EXTERNAL SENSES

It seems clear, then, that the cooperation of the senses is required before the eye of flesh can see its objects. But Hugh is not so successful in his account of the nature of this perception. He wrote no *ex professo* treatment of the sense-process and its validity—no *De Sensu et Sensato*, but there are a few passages to draw upon in formulating his undeveloped theory of sensation. Running through them one notes a vague but striking reflection of the Aristotelian analysis of the subject, act, and object of sensation—*sensus, sentire, sensibile*. There is a distinction between intellectual apprehension and sense-perception, between external and internal senses. This is the hierarchy of sensitive life:

The first stage of corporeal life is sense activity; the second, imagination, entering through sense; the third, memory of what has been conceived by imagination; the fourth, a kind of foresight . . . without rational discernment.⁹

In the first stage the union with the external world is begun. The usual five senses are listed. Of internal senses Hugh mentions three—memory, imagination, and “foresight.”

Every reader of St. Augustine's *Confessions* will remember the famous chapters on memory. To Hugh memory is but an aspect of imagination and he dismisses it in a few words, calling it merely the retention of images received in imagination. Memory is useful in that reason may employ its images when the object of thought is not present to the senses.¹⁰

⁹ *In cael. hier.*, IX (175, 1119A ff.): “Primus enim gradus corporeae vitae est sensificatio; secundus per sensum ingrediens imaginatio; tertius per imaginationem conceptorum memoria; quartus . . . quaedam sine intelligentia discretionem providentia. . . .

¹⁰ *Hom. in Eccl.*, I (175, 116D). Hugh defines cogitation (which we shall discuss later) as occurring “when the mind is touched with the ideas of things, and the thing itself is by its image presented suddenly, either en-

Of the nature of the act of external sensation Hugh merely says that whether the sense is called a sight, hearing, smell, taste, or touch,—each passively receives the “form” of the external object. After the sense organ has this form impressed upon it, the form passes inward to become an image in the imagination, which is localized in the *cella phantastica*, a particular cell in the mid-brain.¹¹ The image in the internal sense is but the reaction to its impression upon the external sense organ.¹²

Only in connection with sight does he speak of a medium between sense-object and organ. Boethius had asked about the medium of sight—whether it were an image coming to the eye or a ray of vision going out to the object. The doubts which he mentions continued to the twelfth century, for both of the alternatives found defenders.¹³ Some of Hugh’s predecessors accepted Augustine’s “effluence from the eye” as sufficient explanation of the sense medium. The Bishop of Hippo had developed a theory that every visual sensation meant that rays of corporeal light

tering the mind through sense or rising from memory.” *De Sac.*, 2, XVIII, 17 (176, 615A). Memory is termed *arcula* (*Did.*, III, 11) recalling St. Thomas’ *thesaurus* (*Summa Theol.*, 1, 78, 4) or, more prosaically, *venter* (*Did.*, III, 11). With all educators of the medieval period (when manuscripts were scarce) Hugh lays great stress on training of memory in education and gives a few practical rules for it. (*Did.*, *loc. cit.*; *De modo dicendi et meditandi libellus*, 7 [176, 878CD].)

¹¹ *De Unione* (177, 287D). “Sensus namque sive per visum, sive per auditum sive per olfactum, sive per gustum, sive per tactum, extrinsecus corpus contingens formatur, ipsamque formam ex corporis contactu conceptam intrinsecus reducens per meatus singulis sensibus emittendis et revocandis introrsum dispositos ad cellam phantasticam colligit, eamque illi parti puriori corporei spiritus imprimens imaginationem facit.” It will be noted that Hugh uses *imaginatio* in the sense of image and of imagination. Hugh’s source for his physiological doctrines in the *De Unione corporis et spiritus* is probably Constantinus Africanus. Cf. Karl Werner, *Kosmologie und Naturlehre des scholastischen Mittelalters mit specieller Beziehung auf Wilhelm von Conches* (Sitzungsberichte der kais. Akad. Wien, Bd. LXXV, pp. 309 ff.), quoted in the same author’s *Der Entwicklungsgang der mittelalterlichen Psych. von Alcuin bis Albertus Magnus* (Vienna, 1876), p. 14.

¹² *De Unione* (287B), “Ipsa utique vis ignea, quae extrinsecus formata sensus dicitur, eadem forma usque ad intimum traducta imaginatio vocatur.”

¹³ Boethius, *De Musica*, I, 1 (PL 63, 1167D).

were emitted by the eyes and that these rays were the agency through which vision of an external object was accomplished.¹⁴ Hugh also maintained that sight went "from inside to outside," that the ray of vision was the medium of sight, the organ of touch for the eye.

According to the laws of nature, the sense-object is grasped (*concepta*) exteriorly by the rays of vision and carried back to the eyes, and its reception there is called vision.¹⁵

The distance of the object from the eye makes no difference as far as the speed of the ray of vision is concerned.¹⁶ Such passages, fragmentary as they are, tell us something of the subject's activity in sense-perception, but they say nothing of the relation of the object itself to which the ray of light goes. This

¹⁴ St. Augustine, *De Trinitate*, IX, 3, 3 (PL 42, 962): "Per oculos enim corporis corpora videmus, quia radios qui per eos emicant et quidquid cernimus tangunt . . ." Cf. *De Gen. ad litt.*, IV, 34 54 (PL 34, 319-320). Augustine had a purely passive conception of matter. Cf. *De Civ. Dei*, V, 9, 4 (CSEL, 40, 1, pp. 266 ff.; PL 41, 151-152); Gilson, *The Phil. of St. Bonaventure*, p. 271 ff.; *Introd. a l'étude de S. Aug.*, p. 72, n. 2. Light is of the order of fire, and Augustine also makes fire an agency of sensation. (*De Gen. ad litt.*, VII, 13, 20 [PL, 34, 362]). It will be seen that Augustine influenced Hugh in these matters. He himself was under the influence of the *Lichtmetaphysik* of Plato and Plotinus. Cf. W. Ott, "Des hl. Augustins Lehre über die Sinneserkenntnis," *Philosophisches Jahrbuch*, XIII (1900, Fulda), pp. 45 ff.; on the development of the point in the Middle Ages, see Cl. Baeumker, *Witelo, Ein Philosoph und Naturforscher des XIII Jahrhunderts* (Münster, 1908), BGPM, III, 2, p. 454, ff.

¹⁵ *De Unione* (177, 287B): "Forma namque rei sensibilis per radios visionis foris concepta operante natura ad oculos usque retrahitur atque ab eisdem suscepta visio nominatur." For Hugh all the senses were in some way aspects of touch. (*Did.*, VII, 7 [176, 818A].) "Tactus specialem sedem non habet, qui ideo universalis est, qui cunctis cooperatur sensibus." The context here describes sight as the highest sense. "Scimus autem quod reliqui omnes sensus foris intro veniunt, solus visus intus foras exit, et eminens posita mira prae caeteris agilitate percipit. Bene ergo quasi speculator, etc. . . ."

¹⁶ *De Sac.*, 2, XVII, 9 (176, 600C): "Et ut radius oculi nostri non citius pervenit ad propinquiora, tardius ad propinquiora, sed utraque intervalla parili celeritate contingit."

was as far as many of Hugh's predecessors, following Augustine, had gone. Others, remembering Empedocles, had spoken of an "effluence" from the object also and held that the meeting of both ray and image was necessary.¹⁷ William of Conches and Hugh of St. Victor added something when they used physiological considerations derived from Constantinus Africanus to explain the role of the sense-image coming from the object seen.¹⁸ The general tenor of Hugh's theory is that sense-perception is a passive process, which consists in the impression of the object's "form" on the sense medium. The sense receives an image of its object. Hugh expresses a fundamental scholastic principle that it is a condition of all knowledge that a representation of the thing known must somehow be in the knower.¹⁹

In Hugh there is no clearcut distinction into *sensibilia propria* and *communia* as objects of the various senses, no division into secondary and primary qualities, whose objectivity later philosophers were to question and thus precipitate the problem of knowledge in its present form. But he does specify qualities as objects of perception.²⁰ Objects may be known through their outer form (configuration), or interior nature, which are the proper sensibles of the different organs.²¹ Color and figure are in the outer form and this is the object of sight, while other senses perceive "inner

¹⁷ William of Conches mentions both opinions in his *Elementa Philosophiae* (PL, 90, 1175 ff., inter opera Bedae).

¹⁸ *De Unione* (177, 287 ff.); cf. Espenberger, *op. cit.*, pp. 16-17; Werner, cf. note 11, *supra*.

¹⁹ *Did.*, I, 1.

²⁰ *Did.*, II, 5 (29): "Sensus est passio animae in corpore ex qualitibus extra accidentibus."

²¹ *De Sac.*, 1, prolog, 5 (176, 185B): "Cognitio rerum circa duo versatur, id est formam et naturam. Forma est in exteriori dispositione; natura in interiori qualitate." The rest of this quotation demonstrates the confusion in Hugh's theory of sensation, for it has physics attaining the *natura interior*, which means for Hugh the arrangement of the four elements, not the abstract *nature* of the Aristotelians: "Forma rerum aut in numero consideratur, ad quem pertinet arithmetica; . . . aut in proportionem . . . aut in dimensione . . . aut in motu . . . *Ad interiorem vero naturam physica spectat.*"

qualities.”²² Shape is made a proper object of sight and touch. Hugh does not develop the notion of common sensibles and in this represents a retrogression from St. Augustine.²³ This is due to the absence of any *sensus communis* in the Victorine’s theory. The primary qualities, of course, are assumed to be objective, and the question of subjectivity is not even raised.²⁴

The bodily senses are prepared to offer true knowledge of the external world, but their activity is not sufficient in itself to accomplish this knowledge. The sensible form cannot proceed further than the various external sense-organs, while reason cannot grasp it immediately. A higher degree of sensitive life is required to take over the sense-images, and the medium is found in imagination.

THE INTERNAL SENSES

We have noted already that memory receives little attention from Hugh and that there is no mention of any special internal sense which compares and synthesizes the data offered by the five external senses before the phantasm is given to the imagination. The *sensus communis* postulated by St. Thomas Aquinas and Aristotle, which had appeared in St. Augustine as one aspect of the one *sensus interior*,²⁵ is lacking in Hugh’s account.

²² *De scripturis et scriptoribus sacris*, 14 (175, 21BC): “Omnis igitur res aut secundum interiorem naturam aut secundum exteriorem formam significat. Sub forma figurae rerum et colores continentur, quae visu percipimus. Ad interiorem naturam pertinent aliae rerum proprietates, quas caeteris sensibus comprehendimus, ut est dulcedo in sapore, quam percipimus gustu; fragrantia in odore, quam percipimus olfactu, melos in sono, quod et quem percipimus auditu; lenitas sive asperitas in corpore et caetera hujusmodi, quae percipimus gustu.” Cf. *Did.*, VII, 1, 9, 11, 13 (176, 812D, 819 ff.). The seventh book of the *Didascalicon* develops the notions of species, figurae, colores, etc., at some length. A whole chapter (12, 820-821) is devoted to color, which requires a corporeal light to be seen. Intellection is conceived along parallel lines. Cf. *De Arca*, IV, 8 (176, 676B): “Nam sicut oculus pascitur ex specie, sic animus pascitur ex cogitatione.”

²³ For St. Augustine on common sensibles, cf. Storz, *op. cit.*, p. 40.

²⁴ Cf. *Did.*, VII, 13 (de sensibilibus rerum qualitibus [176, 821BC]); *Hom. in Eccl.*, II (175, 140D).

²⁵ St. Augustine, *De Libero Arbitrio*, II, 3, 8 (PL, 32, 1244): “Intelligis

The fourth stage of sensitive life which he had mentioned—a “certain foresight without rational discernment”—appears to be a blind instinct given to animal nature. It performs the functions attributed to the *vis aestimativa* by St. Thomas. It is the ability to distinguish between useful and harmful, but blindly and unconsciously. This “sense” is analogous to reason, but it is not rational and belongs rather to the affective order of sense-appetite than to intelligence.²⁶ It has no cognitive function and has nothing of the importance ascribed to the cogitative power by later Scholastics.

Hugh may be said to have evolved a true theory of imagination. In the next chapter we shall see that one of the functions attributed to reason is the intellectual apprehension of external reality through imagination—*ratio in imaginationem agens*.²⁷ Imagination plays the predominant role in the process of sense-perception and its function is a necessary preliminary to the rational grasp of reality. It is the bridge between sense and reason. Thus reason depends on imagination for its knowledge of material objects, and Hugh would accept the Aristotelian principle in this regard—*nihil in intellectu nisi prius fuerit in sensu*. Whether he would accept it for all rational knowledge, as Mignon contends,²⁸ is another question.

Sensation alone does not afford complete or certain knowledge of material things.²⁹ The higher faculty of reason is demanded,

ergo et quaedam singulos sensus habere propria, de quibus renuntient et quaedam quosdam habere communia.” Cf. Gilson, *Introd. a l'étude de Saint Augustine*, p. 17.

²⁶ *In cael. Hier.*, IX (175, 1119): “Quartus gradus (corporeae vitae) secundum passibilem applicationem, sensus, quaedam sine intelligentiae discretionem providentia. In qua quidem quasi rationis imago est, sed ratio nulla est. Secundum hanc et bruta quaedam animalia aliis sui generis callidiora videntur, et quadam quasi sensus facilitate rationalis mentis providentiam imitantia. Quod tamen magis sensus passio quam intelligentiae operatio esse probatur. Primum videlicet in eo quod sentit; secundo, in eo quod sive in sensis per sensus passionem secundum quamdam rationis similitudinem vel ad appetendum vel ad fugiendum ea inflectit.”

²⁷ *De Unione* (177, 288D); cf. pp. 55, 67 *infra*.

²⁸ Mignon, *op. cit.*, I, 119.

²⁹ *Did.*, II, 5 (29): “Imaginatio est memoria sensuum ex corporum reli-

and the importance of imagination lies in the fact that through a progressive refinement of the image impressed on the sense-organ it brings that image into contact with the spiritual power of reason. In the Victorine's writings the description of this process from sensation through imagination to intellectual apprehension is far more crude than the analyses of St. Thomas or St. Bonaventure. Many details are lacking, but the attempt is made in a remarkable short treatise, the *De Unione Corporis et Spiritus*. This treatise begins with a statement of the essential disparity of body and spirit and the need of a medium if they are to meet.³⁰ Hugh finds the medium in a kind of *spiritus corporeus*—a finer kind of fire, but still corporeal—the highest of the elements.³¹ Imagination is the highest form of this material force.

After stating the need of something by which body might ascend to spirit and spirit descend to body, Hugh writes of one of his favorite themes—the hierarchy of nature from God, the most pure spirit, down through different degrees of spiritual and corporeal creatures. There is even a hierarchical arrangement of the four elements of which matter is composed, from the lowest, earth, to the highest, fire. And among the elements, “the more any one is a subject of sense perception the more material it is. The further an element is removed from sense-perception, the

quibus inhaerentibus animo, principium cognitionis per se nihil certum habens.” *Ibid.*, I, 3 (9); *Hom. in Eccl.*, II (175, 139D ff.).

³⁰ *De Unione* (177, 285A): “Si nihil inter spiritum et corpus medium esset, neque spiritus cum corpore, neque corpus cum spiritu convenire potuisset. Multum autem distat inter corpus et spiritum; . . . Est ergo quiddam quo ascendit corpus, ut appropinquet spiritui, et rursus quiddam quo descendat spiritus, ut appropinquet corpori.”

³¹ Hugh speaks of this medium as a corporeal substance like air (*De Unione*, 287B). It is described as a *spiritus corporeus*, by which he understands either air or fire (*ignis, quo ipse aere longe subtilior est* 288D). In this “fiery spirit” he finds the organ for sense and imagination (286B ff.). It is contrasted sharply with *ratio* as *spiritus incorporeus*, or *incorporea lux* (288A). On the different medieval theories regarding such intermediate elements in general, cf. A. Schneider, *Die Psychologie Alberts des Grossen* (Muenster, 1903) BGPM, IV, 5-6, pp. 383 ff.; also Jansen, *Der Kommentar des Clarenbaldus von Arras zu Boethius de Trinitate* (Breslau, 1926), pp. 51 ff.

closer it is to the nature of spirit.”³² That is why air, though material, in a certain sense can be termed spirit. Far more subtle and mobile is fire, which has self-movement and pervades all material things. There is a hierarchy of fire, too, for it is a different degree of fire which gives growth to plants, sensation to animals, and even imagination to some animals. This is the highest, most subtle form of fire and can be called spirit, but not properly so, because it never loses its material nature. Imagination is thus the highest material force. It is closest to spirit and “imitates rational life.”

For nothing in the body can be higher or closer to spiritual nature than what is thought of as following upon and above sense — the power of imagination.³³

The sensible form, already impressed on the external sense organs, comes to the central brain after a “purification.” The image is formed in the *cella phantastica*, and here imagination “touches” the rational soul, whereupon a “judgment” is aroused.³⁴ The concept is formed.

The purification process, which is vaguely stated, enables the imagination to unite directly with the spiritual soul, though it retains its own material nature and remains outside the substance of soul. “Nevertheless spirit is not changed into body nor body

³² *Ibid.* (286B).

³³ *Ibid.* (287AB).

³⁴ *Ibid.* (287BC). “Forma namque rei sensibilis per radios visionis foris concepta, operante natura, ad oculos usque retrahitur, atque ab eisdem suscepta visio nominatur. Deinde per septem oculorum tunicas et tres humores transiens, novissime purificata et collata introrsum ad cerebrum usque traducitur, et imaginatio efficitur. Postea eadem imaginatio (i. e., image) ab anteriore parte capitis ad mediam transiens, ipsam animae rationalis substantiam contingit, et excitat discretionem, in tantum jam purificata et subtilis effecta, ut ipsi spiritui immediate jungatur; veraciter tamen naturam corporis retinens et proprietatem. . . . Tamen quod summum est in corpore, propinquum est spiritui, et in ipso vis imaginandi fundatur, supra quam est ratio. Quod enim imaginatio extra substantiam animae rationalis sit, argumentum est quod bruta animalia vim imaginandi habere probantur, quae rationem omnino non habent.”

into spirit." In proof Hugh points out that animals, though they have imagination, have no reasoning power.³⁵ Thus imagination is the sense where the highest point of matter touches the lowest extreme of spirit, and the principle of Dionysius is confirmed again.³⁶ The meeting occurs in the *cella phantastica* and there somehow the material image becomes the spiritual concept.

This, of course, touches upon a crucial point in any theory of knowledge—the origin of the spiritual representation of material reality. What is the cause of this transference across the admittedly wide gulf which separates matter and spirit? And what is the relation of the representation in the mind and the object represented? All the great epistemologies had faced this problem, for it is the problem of a dualistic psychology. The Peripatetics spoke with Aristotle of abstraction, and St. Thomas also used the notion of *intellectus agens*. Plato offered his theory of reminiscence. Later philosophers talked in terms of occasionalism and psychophysical parallelism. In the treatise we have been analyzing Hugh of St. Victor states the fact; his answer to the question of *how* is not clear. Imagination touches the rational soul and the transfer takes place. The further analysis belongs to a chapter on intellectual knowledge.

³⁵ *Ibid.*

³⁶ Cf. *supra*, p. 27.

CHAPTER IV

THE PROBLEM OF UNIVERSALS

THE NATURE OF KNOWLEDGE

From the Upanishads of India and the Pythagoreans of Greece to Peter Abelard in the twelfth century the great philosophers before Hugh of St. Victor had assumed as axiomatic the principle that like things are known by like—*simile simili cognoscitur*.¹ In the first chapter of his *Didascalicon* Hugh urges his readers to obey the Socratic oracle, "Know Thyself," if they would be truly wise, for one should not seek outside one's self that which he can find within his own soul. This thought leads Hugh to remark that according to the ancient philosophers the human soul is composed of all parts of the universe, and that according to Plato's *Timaeus* it is itself a world. For the soul grasps the sensible as well as the suprasensible. In cyclic fashion the soul moves toward the two worlds—the world of sense and the world above sense—and returns again, building up in itself the representations of all things. "And thus it is that this same mind, which is capable of grasping all things, is composed of every substance and nature, which it represents in a likeness within itself."²

As the basis for this power of the soul to become all things Hugh quotes the "Pythagorean dogma," as he terms it—*similia similibus comprehendit*. Any false interpretation of this principle could have disastrous consequences for a dualistic philosophy, and we shall see that Hugh avoids any diminution of the soul's

¹ A. Schneider, "Der Gedanke der Erkenntnis des Gleichen durch Gleichen in antiker und patristischer Zeit," *Abhandlungen zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters* (Münster, 1923), *BGPM*, Suppl. Band II, pp. 49-77.

² *Did.* I, 1 (4-5): "Probata apud philosophos sententia animam ex cunctis naturae partibus asserit esse compactam. . . . Ad seipsam rerum similitudines trahens regyrat, et hoc est quod eadem mens, quae universorum capax est, ex omni substantia atque natura quo similitudinis repraesentet figuram, coaptatur."

spirituality. For those who accept spirit and matter as essentially disparate realities, as Hugh does,³ a great and decisive epistemological question from Plato through St. Thomas Aquinas and beyond is this: can the intellect, a spiritual faculty, know concrete, individual and corporeal things? The principle of like combining with like is at stake. Hugh of St. Victor states this tenet of both the Aristotelian and Platonic traditions, which in the problem of knowledge becomes *simile simili cognoscitur*. Among the Presocratics the axiom had led to the conclusion that the soul was material, composed of the four elements, since it could know material things.⁴ In Aristotle the spirituality of the soul was upheld by the doctrine of intentional presence of corporeal things in the mind. St. Thomas was to express the same thing—*cognitum est in cognoscente secundum modum cognoscentis*, and expressed the idea that the soul, "somehow," was all things.⁵

Although his words are not as concise as those of Aristotle and Aquinas, Hugh also would say that the soul is somehow all things. Whether the objects of knowledge be sensible or suprasensible, a likeness of them must be in the soul. In his own enunciation of the principle he safeguards the spirituality of the soul by distinguishing, as St. Thomas was to do, between act and potency. The soul is not all things in the sense that it is quantitatively composed and divisible, but in that by virtue of its own native power—*ex nativa quadam potentia et propria virtute*—it can form the representations of all things.⁶ The mind does not take any cor-

³ It is the theme, for example, of the short work *De Unione Corporis et Spiritus* (177, 286-294).

⁴ Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologica*, 1, 84, 2 ad 2: "Aristoteles non posuit animam esse actu compositam ex omnibus, sicut antiqui naturales; sed dixit 'animam quodammodo esse omnia,' inquantum est in potentia ad omnia, per sensum quidem ad sensibilia, per intellectum vero ad intelligibilia."

⁵ *De Veritate*, X, 4; *Summa Theol.*, 1, 80, corp.; 1, 14, 6 ad 1.

⁶ *Did.*, I, 1 (5): "Pythagoricum namque dogma erat similia similibus comprehendere, ut scilicet anima rationalis nisi ex omnibus composita foret, nullatenus omnia comprehendere posset . . . nec tamen existimare debemus viros in omni rerum natura peritissimos hoc de simplici essentia sensisse,

poreal substance into itself, but receives and becomes the representation of it, just as the external senses receive the *species* of the sensible object which itself is not received.⁷ Hugh's analogy is to the effect that a piece of metal, after the metalsmith beats out a figure from it, represents the image of itself—*ex propria virtute et naturali habilitate*—and not because of the figure impressed into it from without.⁸

Thus the mind, stamped with the representation of all things is said to be all things and to be composed of all things, not actually, but virtually or potentially.⁹

This, then, is the nature of knowledge according to Hugh of St. Victor—an assimilation between knower and known. It is not too difficult to conclude that Hugh's definition of truth would be couched in terms of the correspondence theory, and that his statements on truth would recall those of the classical tradition which defines truth as the agreement between the representation in the mind and that which is represented, the object.

We shall find that Hugh formulated no explicit theory of truth and certitude; he rather took for granted the various state-

quod ulla se partium quantitate distenderet, sed, ut apertius mirabilem eius demonstrarent potentiam, dicebant ex omnibus naturis constare, non secundum compositionem sed secundum compositionis rationem. Neque enim haec rerum omnium similitudo aliunde aut extrinsecus animae advenire credenda est, sed ipsa potius eam in se et ex se nativa quadam potentia et propria virtute capit." Hugh agrees with Sextus Empiricus (*Adv. Math.*, I, 303, cf. VII, 92) in naming Pythagoras as the proponent of the axiom τοῖς ὁμοίοις τὰ ὅμοια γινώσκειται. Cf. A. Schneider, *loc. cit.*, p. 66. In the context he quotes (but not by name) the verse of Empedocles illustrating the principle. Aristotle uses the same verse (*Metaphysics*, III, 4, 1000b6). Hugh is repeating in this chapter much of what Chalcidius had said in his Commentary on Plato's *Timaeus*. Cf. St. Augustine, *De Musica* VI, 5, 10 (*PL* 32, 1169); Plotinus, *Enneads*, I, 6, 9 (ed. Bréhier, p. 116).

⁷ *De Unione* (177, 287D ff.).

⁸ *Did.*, I, 1 (5): "Videmus cum paries extrinsecus adveniente forma imaginis cujuslibet similitudinem accipit. Cum vero impressor metallo figuram imprimit, ipsum quidem non extrinsecus, sed ex propria virtute et naturali habilitate aliud jam aliquid repraesentare incipit."

⁹ *Ibid.* (6).

ments of the classical theory collected in the course of his wide reading. Some elements of this tradition may be found scattered through his works. Thus, for Hugh, as for St. Augustine and St. Thomas, the ontological truth of things lay in their correspondence to the Divine Creative Intellect. He expresses the idea succinctly: "Supreme Truth is the measure (*regula*) of all truth."¹⁰ In a passage which advises caution in controversy (since the eye of reason was weakened in the Fall of man and error is thus possible) Hugh notes that logical truth is the recognition of agreement between thought and thing—*adaequatio rei et intellectus*.¹¹ The source of truth is in the intellect and not in the senses. This last thought is implicit in a few sentences where Hugh writes that logic and mathematics are the instruments for achieving truth, and that the objects of logic and mathematics are *intelligibilia*, not *sensibilia*. It is physics which deals with sensible objects, and since sense-experience is fallible, the study of nature (Physics) must follow the study of logic and mathematics. In reason alone is the source of irrefragable (*inconcussa*) truth.¹²

¹⁰ *Miscellanea*, I, 1 (177, 472C): "Summa veritas regula omnis veritatis."

¹¹ *De Sapientia Animae Christi, praefatio* (176, 846D-847A): "Numquid omnes noverunt unum id quod est, sed amore fallendi diversa finxerunt? Non sic ego puto. Sed narrant quique somnia sua, et ea qua primum ipsi in se opinione decepti sunt postmodum alios nescientes seducunt. . . Dignum ergo est ut idipsum in nostra nos assertionem reddat timidos, quod in unius assertionem veritatis tot jam videmus esse diversos. Quia enim de longe veritas videtur, diversaque judicium parit; et tantum de ipsa quisque potest, quantum ipse est. *In nobis quippe quod de rerum cognitione percipimus, et eo modo, cordis intellectus de iis quae extra sunt ad veritatem indicant, quo se interius animus in repraesentatione figurat.* Unde necesse est, ut dum mens interius corrupta prave afficitur, intellectus quoque in iudicio eorum quae foris sunt, decipiatur." This is but one of many places in which Hugh stresses the ethical presuppositions of the quest for truth—*tantum de veritate quisque potest, quantum ipse est*.

¹² *Did.*, II, 17 (36): "Quia enim logica et mathematica priores sunt ordine discendi quam physica, et ad eam quodammodo instrumenti vice funguntur quibus unumquemque primum informari oportet antequam physicae speculationi operam det, necesse fuit ut non in actibus rerum (i. e., sense objects), ubi fallax experimentum est, *sed in sola ratione, ubi inconcussa veritas manet*, suam considerationem ponerent, deinde ipsa ratione

With a definition of truth as agreement between thought and thing we touch on the problem of universals. This is a point on which different interpreters of Hugh give us an extraordinary variety of opinions. The reason will be found in the difference of emphasis concerning Hugh's literary sources. In the first chapter of the *Didascalicon* which we have analyzed in the preceding pages we found stray thoughts from Plato and Aristotle, from the Pre-Socratics and Augustine, from eclectics like Boethius and Chalcidius.¹³ It will not be surprising, therefore, if we find that different interpreters stress the different sources of Hugh's remarks about the great question of his century.

prævia ad experientiam rerum descenderunt." Cf. Ueberweg-Geyer, *op. cit.*, p. 263.

¹³ On Hugh's literary sources, cf. F. Vernet, *loc. cit. D. Th. C. VII*, 1, pp. 289 ff. L. Baur, *Dominicus Gundissalinus de divisione philosophiae herausgegeben und philosophiegeschichtlich untersucht nebst einer Geschichte der phil. Einleitung bis zum Ende der Scholastik* (Münster, 1903), *BGPM* IV, 2-3, p. 361. Baur says of Hugh that he is not the usual mere copyist; also "L'Héritage Littéraire et Philosophique" in Paré, Brunet, Tremblay, *La Renaissance du XIIe Siècle*, pp. 147 ff.; Amable Jourdain, *Recherches critiques sur l'Age et L'Origine des traductions latines d'Aristote et sur les Commentaires Grecs ou Arabes employés par les docteurs scolastiques* (Paris: Joubert, Paris, 1843). Ed. Ch. Jourdain, pp. 26, 256. —Jourdain says "Les philosophes Arabes lui (Hughes) étaient absolument inconnus." (256). St. Augustine was Hugh's favorite author. Speaking of him in relation to Origen and Jerome, Hugh writes: "Horum tamen omnium studia Augustinus ingenio vel scientia sui vicit. Nam tanta scripsit, ut diebus ac noctibus non solum scribere libros ejus quisquam, sed nec legere quiden occurrat." (*Did.*, IV, 14, 88). Cf. St. Isidore, *Origines*, VI, 7, 2-3. Several of the sermons attributed to Hugh are panegyrics of St. Augustine and show the high regard in which he was held: *Sermo XXV* (177, 949D), *Sermo LXXXIV* (177, 1166); *Sermo XCIX* (177, 1205). Augustine's influence on Hugh is frequently mentioned in terms like these: "Il prit pour modèles les anciens, nommément Saint Augustin, dont il suit les principes et la doctrine" (R. Ceillier, art "Hughes de S-V.", *Histoire générale des Auteurs Sacrés et ecclésiastiques*, Nouvelle Ed. Bazouon (Paris: Vives, 1863), t. XIV, p. 361. "Hughes . . . ne cité presque jamais personne, pas plus Augustin que les autres; mais il est tellement pénétré de l'esprit du docteur africain, que non seulement ses idées, mais ses formules sont augustinienues; on l'appelait pour cela un second Augustin, l'âme dé Augustin. . . ." (E. Portalié, art. "Développement historique de l'Augustinisme," *D. Th. C.*, I, col. 2503.)

THE PROBLEM OF UNIVERSALS

Victor Cousin has written that "one may say that scholastic philosophy was born at Paris and died there. One phrase of Porphyry, a single ray borrowed from the literature of the ancient world, called it into being; the complete revelation of that literature extinguished it."¹⁴ Not everyone will agree with this recapitulation of scholastic philosophy in terms of the controversy over universals, nor will the competent historian concede that scholasticism died with fourteenth century nominalism. It remains, however, a commonplace in the history of philosophy that the twelfth century furnished the background against which one great phase of the bitter controversy was fought. And it may well have been the famous lines from Porphyry¹⁵ which touched it off. Porphyry declined to discuss the problem suggested by the works of Plato, Aristotle, and his own master Plotinus. Boethius' translation of Porphyry transmitted the *dicere recusabo* to the early Middle Ages.

The *Universalienstreit* came to a head over this issue: how is it in a world where all that is real is a particular and individual thing, the human mind is able to distribute the manifold of reality into classes, in which particular things are contained? What is a class of things, or in other words, what is the essence of universality?¹⁶

When Hugh of St. Victor was born in 1096 the battle-lines had already been drawn. Four years previously the first phases

¹⁴ V. Cousin, *Ouvrages inédits d'Abélard* (Paris: Imprimerie Royal, 1836), p. lx.

¹⁵ In his Introduction to the *Categories* of Aristotle Porphyry had said: "At present I shall refuse to say, concerning genera and species, whether they subsist or whether they are placed in the naked understandings alone or whether subsisting they are corporeal or incorporeal, and whether they are separated from sensibles or placed in sensibles and in accord with them. Questions of this sort are most exalted business and require very great diligence of inquiry." (Quoted from McKeon, *Selections from Medieval Philosophers*, I, 91). Hugh would have read this in Boethius' translation and commentary on Porphyry.

¹⁶ E. Gilson, *The Unity of Philosophical Experience* (New York: Scribners, 1931), p. 4.

of the medieval controversy had come to a climax in the condemnation of the tritheism of Roscelin of Compiègne by the Council of Soissons. Roscelin's heresy had grown out of his extreme nominalism. At the beginning of his career William of Champeaux went toward the other extreme—Platonic realism. William's brilliant pupil, Peter Abelard, forced him in a gradual retreat toward a position closer to the middle road of the moderate realism of Aristotle, the theory of similitude of essences. Essences are really multiplied in individuals, although similar in each of them. Abelard was to speak in similar terms.¹⁷ After the dialectical contest which rocked the schools of Paris William retired to found the abbey-school of St. Victor, and there Hugh came under his influence when he came to join the community.

All this is familiar to the historian, but Hugh's own position in the great debate is still contested. Under the circumstances it would be strange if he said nothing of the subject in his works, for he was a pupil of William of Champeaux, and Abelard still spoke in the lecture halls about Paris. This was the period in which John of Salisbury was complaining that the problem of universals was one in which the weary world had grown old, in which more time was consumed than the Caesars had taken to acquire and rule their world-empire.¹⁸

A wide range of conflicting answers awaits anyone who searches through the few paragraphs which most historians devote to Hugh. Different writers on his theory of knowledge have read different interpretations into the lines in which he seems to touch upon the persistent problem of the one and the many which Boethius had given to the *Frühsholastik*.

There are those who make of him a complete Neoplatonist. Heitz, for example, speaks of the "neoplatonic doctrine of illumi-

¹⁷ Cf. G. Lefèvre, *Les variations de Guillaume de Champeaux et la question des universaux* (Lille, 1898), quoted by M. De Wulf, *Histoire de la Philosophie Médiévale* (Paris-Louvain, 1934), 6e ed., I, pp. 177-178. De Wulf has traced the early phases of the problem of the universals, *op. cit.*, pp. 143-150.

¹⁸ John of Salisbury, *Polycraticus*, VII, 12 (PL 199, 664-665). Henry Adams gives an interesting account of the twelfth century controversy in his chapter on Abelard (*Mont-Saint-Michel and Chartres*, pp. 283-315).

nation which the masters of Saint Victor had adopted.”¹⁹ Prantl and Werner write of his acceptance of the Platonic theory of knowledge.²⁰ Some maintain that Hugh did not treat the problem of universals at all or that he barely touched it. Edward Myers says that “Hugh systematically avoids the whole question, although in places he rejects some of the principal arguments put forward by the Realists.”²¹ The influence of Aristotle exercised on Hugh through Boethius led several authors to conclude that Hugh would have followed Boethius if he had developed his thought more fully.²²

Most writers who have touched on the subject in recent years

¹⁹ Th. Heitz, *Essai historique sur les Rapports entre la Philosophie et la Foi*, p. 82: “. . . la doctrine néo-platonicienne de l'illumination qu'ont adoptée les maîtres de Saint-Victor. Ces doctrines, Hugues les tient de saint Augustin, de Denys le Pseudo-Aréopagite et de son traducteur et commentateur médiéval, Scot Érigène, dont Hugues fait le plus grand cas.”; Gonzalez writes (*Historia de la filosofía*, II, 162): “El misticismo en Hugo . . . se encuentra unido además con lo que pudiéramos llamar misticismo neoplatónico é idealista La suma de la Filosofía para Hugo, es contemplar las naturalezas invisibles de invisibles substancias, y las causas invisibles de las cosas visibles. . .” This is based on a passage (*In cael. Hier.*, I, 1, 175, 928A) discussed previously (p. 9 *supra*). Turner (*History of Philosophy* [Boston, reprint, 1929], p. 304) seems to incline to this opinion, even though he notes that Gonzalez follows a spurious work (*De Anima*) in his study of Hugh's mysticism. Siebeck (*Geschichte der Psychologie*, I, 2, 415 ff.) uses this work and concludes that Hugh has the Augustinian theory. Cf. Hugonin, *loc. cit.*, IV (175, 1).

²⁰ Carl Prantl, *Geschichte der Logik* (Leipzig, reprint 1927), I, 2, p. 111: “Hugo von St. Viktor steht eigentlich völlig ausserhalb jener reichhaltigen Bewegung, welche damals in der Dialektik eintrat, und sowie er auf die logischen Partei-Controversen nicht mit einem Worte eingeht so hat für ihn auch sein eigener platonischer Realismus kein logisches Interesse, sondern nur ein psychologischespraktisches.” K. Werner, *Wilhelms von Auvergnés Verhältnis zu den Platonikern des XII Jahrh.* (Sitzungsberichte, Vienna, 1873), pp. 50 ff.

²¹ E. Myers, “Hugh of St. Victor,” *Catholic Encyclopedia* (New York: 1910), VII, 522.

²² H. Ostler, *op. cit.*, pp. 130 ff.; followed by A. Landgraf, “Hugo von St. Viktor,” *Lexikon für Theologie und Kirche* (Freiburg im Br., 1933), V, 184: “Im Universalienstreit bekennt er sich zur Aristotel.—boethian. Erkenntnis und Abstraktionstheorie.”; Ueberweg-Geyer, *op. cit.*, p. 264.

assert that Hugh of St. Victor gives the Aristotelian solution of moderate realism. A. E. Taylor is quite emphatic:

It is a sign of the developments of the next century that he (Hugh) like John of Salisbury and Abelard, is Aristotelian in his epistemology; in all three abstraction from particular sense experiences replaces direct illuminative contact with the suprasensibles as the process which conducts to knowledge.²³

Mignon is eloquent in concluding that there is no difference between the doctrines of Hugh and the theses of Albert the Great and St. Thomas on the phantasm, the illumination of the *species sensibilis* by the active intellect and the production of the *verbum mentale* by the intellect. He quotes Hauréau to the effect that in the *De Unione Corporis et Spiritus* one finds without reserve the peripatetic psychology.²⁴ Others who find the Aristotelian epistemology in Hugh are Sarton and Klimke.²⁵

23 A. E. Taylor, "Ancient and Medieval Philosophy," in E. Eyre, ed., *European Civilization* (Oxford, 1935), III, 819. DeWulf also finds an Aristotelian inspiration: "La théorie de la connaissance est d'inspiration aristotélicienne et s'harmonise fort bien avec les solutions du problème des universaux. Hugues distingue nettement, d'une part la sensation et l'imagination, d'autre part la pensée abstraite et générale." (*Histoire de la Philosophie Médiévale*, I, p. 219).

24 A. Mignon, *op. cit.*, I, 120. This author finds only a difference of more or less between Hugh and Thomas. "Il y a la différence du moins parfait au plus parfait, d'une première ébauche, si l'on veut, à un travail soigné et complet: mais tout ce que l'on trouve dans les grands docteurs de l'École est ici en germe. M. Hauréau a bien raison de dire en parlant du traité de *Unione carnis et spiritus* auquel nous empruntons ces explications, qu'on y trouve sans réserve la psychologie péripatéticienne." (*Les œuvres de Hugues de S-V*, p. 191). But Ostler notes (*op. cit.*, p. 126, n. 2) that in the context Hauréau maintains only that "On y voit qu'il soupçonnait quelques-unes des thèses principales de la psychologie thomiste." We shall see that there is no mention of an *intellectus agens* in Hugh.

25 G. Sarton, *op. cit.*, p. 120, "Hugh . . . went even further than William (of Champeaux), accepting Abelard's compromise." Fr. Klimke, *Institutiones Historiae Philosophiae* (Romae, 1923), p. 160: "In psychologia sequitur (Hugo) in genere Augustinum, sed exhibet jam Aristotelicam doctrinam de intellectu agente, licet hic terminus nondum occurrat, et moderatum realismum in questione de universalibus."

What is the reason for this remarkable range of opinions concerning the influences which shaped Hugh's position? The answer to that question must come from a study of the scattered references in passages where Hugh writes on logic, psychology, and epistemology. For, as Maritain writes:

Does the *problem of universals* belong to logic, psychology, or metaphysics (criticism or epistemology)? To all three, in fact, according as it is studied from three different standpoints. We may inquire what constitutes the nature of a universal (standpoint of the *formal cause*) or the manner in which a universal is formed in the mind (standpoint of the *efficient cause*), or the epistemological value of the universal (standpoint of the *final cause*).²⁶

LOGIC

The twelfth century writers did not possess the full Aristotelian corpus, but they were familiar with the *Organon*, through translators and commentators like Isidore, Cassiodorus, and Boethius. Anyone who pages through the first part of the *Didascalicon* and the logical tracts of Abelard will agree with the statement that "in the twelfth century the influence of the Aristotelian logic makes itself powerfully felt in such writers as Abelard and Hugh of St. Victor."²⁷

In his remarks on the origin of logic there are some indications that Hugh was inclined to accept the Aristotelian doctrine of moderate realism with regard to the knowledge which reason has of external, individual reality. Quoting Boethius, he infers the

²⁶ J. Maritain, *An Introduction to Philosophy* (New York, n. d.), p. 159, n. 1.

²⁷ A. E. Taylor, *Platonism and Its Influence* (New York: 1932), p. 21. On the knowledge of Aristotle in general during the twelfth century, cf. J. E. Sandys, *A History of Classical Scholarship* (Cambridge: at the University Press, 1921), I, pp. 527 ff.; Amable Jourdain, *op. cit.*, p. 256. Hugh himself (*Did.*, III, 2: *De auctoribus artium*) lists Boethius as the translator of Euclid (the geometrician) and Nichomachus and says that Logic was reduced to rules fixed by Plato, that Aristotle "amplified, perfected, and reduced it to an art," and that it was communicated to the Latins by Varro and Cicero. (Buttimer, 52).

necessity of logic from the fact that when the ancients first attempted to investigate the nature of things and moral qualities, they were often led to reason falsely, because "they could not distinguish between words and concepts (*voces et intellectus*)". This was the mistake, for example, of Epicurus, "who thinks that the world consists of atoms and who measures virtue by pleasure."²⁸

These words lead at once to a rejection of Platonic Realism:

It is clear, moreover, that this happened to him (Epicurus) and to others, because they thought, through inexperience in logical argument, that everything they comprehended in reasoning occurred also in things themselves. This surely is a great error; for in reasoning it is not as in numbers. For in numbers whatever has come out in computing the digits correctly, must without doubt also eventuate in the things themselves, so that if by calculation there should happen to be a hundred, there must also be a hundred things subject to that

²⁸ *Did.*, I, 11 (19): "Nam sicut dicit Boethius: Cum primitus antiqui circa naturas rerum et morum qualitates investigandas operam impenderent, necesse fuit saepe falli eos, quia vocum et intellectuum discretionem non habebant, ut in multis evenit Epicuro, qui atomis mundum consistere putat et honestum voluptatem metitur."—Boethius, in *Porph. comm.* 1 (*CSEL*, 48, pp. 138-9). *Natura rerum* is here taken in the second of three senses of *natura* just defined by Hugh (*Did.* I, 10). "Natura unamquamque rem informans propria differentia dicitur. Secundum quam significationem dicere solemus: Natura est omnia pondere, ad terram vergere, levia alta petere, ignem urere, aquam humectare". This is to recall the Aristotelian *forma substantialis*. Hugh is no nominalist. On the relation between concept and spoken word he speaks in the usual terms. Speech manifests concepts. Cf. *De Sac.*, 1, III, 20 (176, 225AB): "Quemadmodum cogitatio hominis quasi intrinsecum verbum illius est quod latet et absconditum est donec revelatur per prolationem oris; et est ipsa prolatio vocis verbum similiter ut verbum est cogitatio cordis. Sed verbum quod manifestum est prodit et revelat verbum quod occultum est." *Ibid.*, prolog, 5 (185B): "Cognitio autem vocum in duobus consideratur; in pronuntiatione videlicet et significatione. Ad solam pronuntiationem pertinet grammatica, ad solam significationem pertinet dialectica: ad pronuntiationem simul et significationem pertinet rhetorica;" *ibid.*, 2, VIII, 19 (616B): "Proinde verbum quod foris sonat, signum est verbi quod intus lucet, cui magis verbi competit nomen. Nam illud quod profertur ore carnis, vox verbi est. Verbumque ipsum dicitur propter illud a quo, ut foris appareret, assumptum est."

number. But this does not hold equally in argumentation; nor, in fact, is everything which the evolution of words may have discovered fixed in nature too.²⁹

Moderate realism is certainly not explicit here, but Plato's separated Ideas are rejected by implication. And Hugh is quite explicit on the power of abstraction in man. Mathematics, for example, has abstract quantity for its object, which is an *ens rationis*—*doctrina facit non natura*. The line which mathematics studies is abstracted from the three-dimensional object as it exists in reality.³⁰ It has no separate existence as a Platonic Idea or Form. The line and surface of the mathematician are abstract *entia rationis*.

For Hugh abstraction (a term he does not use) means the separation by reason of a thought-content from the manifold of reality. Reason "attends" or "considers" this abstracted thought-content; it "separates." These are the words used to describe the function of mathematics and physics.³¹ Physics alone has things

²⁹ *Did.* I, 11 (19)—Boethius, (*CSEL*, 48, p. 138). Transl. McKeon, *op. cit.*, I, p. 73.

³⁰ *Did.*, II, 3 (26): "Haec (mathematica) est quae abstractam considerat quantitatem. Abstracta quantitas dicitur, quam intellectu a materia separantes, vel ab aliis accidentibus, ut est, par, impar, et hujusmodi, in sola ratiocinatione tractamus, quod doctrina facit, non natura." Cf. Isidore, *Orig.*, 2, 24, 14; Cassiodorus, *Cassiodori Senatoris Institutiones*, 2, 3, 21 (Ed. R. A. B. Mynors, Oxford: at the Clarendon Press, 1937), p. 131. Hugh's definition of abstract quantity is found verbatim in Cassiodorus: *Did.*, II, 17 (35-36): "Mathematicae proprium est actus confusus inconfuse per rationem attendere. Verbi gratia, in actu rerum non invenitur linea sine superficie et soliditate. . . . Ratio tamen attendit sine superficie et crassitudine lineam pure per se, quod est mathematicum, non quia in re ita vel sit vel esse possit, sed quia ratio saepe actus rerum considerat, non ut sunt, sed sicut esse possunt, non in se, sed quantum ad ipsam rationem, id est, ut ratio pateretur esse." Cf. *Excerptiones priorum*, I, 7 (177, 197B).

³¹ Cf. note 30 for mathematics; *Did.* II, 17 (36): "Physicae autem proprium est actus rerum permixtos impermixte attendere. Actus enim corporum mundi non sunt puri, sed compositi ab actibus purorum, quos physica, cum per se non inveniuntur, pure tamen et per se considerat. Purum scilicet actum ignis, sive terrae, sive aeris, sive aquae, et ex natura uniuscujusque per se considerata de concretionem et efficientiam totius judicat." For Hugh physics considers the four elements in themselves, not as they are "mixed"

themselves for its object, while mathematics and logic treat of the *intellectus rerum*—things as existing in thought. Since mathematics considers quantity, it is still bound to the thing and hence must work through the imagination. Logic, on the other hand, since it is concerned with the predication of concepts existing in the mind only, has for its object *intellectus rerum secundum praedicamentalem constitutionem*.³² Logic has as its object *genera* and *species*, its purpose being to teach the science of speaking correctly and disputing accurately.³³

Of these passages Reade says:

How then does the logician deal with *sermones*? Not as the rhetorician . . . or the grammarian. The object of his study is what Hugh calls *intellectus*, a term to be clearly distinguished from *voces*. Words as *voces* are only sounds of the particular kind produced by human speech and analyzed by the grammarian. *Intellectus* are much more than this. The worst translation of the word would be "concepts;" the best, perhaps, is "meanings". Thus when Hugh is explaining the interrelation of mathematics, logic, and physics he remarks that physics *de rebus agit, caeterae omnes de intellectibus rerum*: a statement to be explained with reference to the power of abstraction possessed by the human mind and illustrated, though not precisely in the same way, by both logic and mathematics. The mathematician can examine the line and the surface by ignoring one or two dimensions; the logician can attend only to the fact of likeness, neglecting the properties of things in their concreteness. And thus it is, says Hugh, that the logician comes to consider *genera* and *species*. No

in nature. This will explain his "Ad interiorē vero naturam physica spectat." (*De Sac.*, prol., 5 [176, 185C].)

³² *Did.*, II, 17 (36): "Hoc praetereundum non est, quod sola physica proprie de rebus agit, ceterae omnes de intellectibus rerum. Logica tractat de ipsis intellectibus secundum praedicamentalem constitutionem; mathematica vero, secundum integram compositionem, et ideo logica quandoque utitur pura intelligentia, mathematica autem nunquam sine imaginatione est, ideoque nihil vere simplex habet."

³³ *Did.*, II, 17 (35): "Logica consideratio est in rebus, attendens intellectus rerum. . . . Considerat ergo logica species et genera rerum." Cf. *ibid.*, II, 28 (44-45): "Logica dividitur in grammaticam et in rationem disserendi."

discussion of the familiar controversy is offered in this context. We can only assume that, if Hugh had chosen to proceed further, he would have continued to follow Boethius. In that case he would have paid no heed to Nominalism, a heresy unknown to Boethius, and probably would have declined to discuss the metaphysics of Plato. He would only have defended the right of the intellect to discern what he calls *intellectus* and would have refused to condemn the mathematical line or the logical genus as figments, merely because they were not concrete things such as the physicist examines.³⁴

That Hugh is following Boethius in these brief comments on the material and formal objects of logic, physics, and mathematics, and in his implicit acceptance of the Aristotelian degrees of abstraction is evident, and we may conclude that Hugh is right as far as he goes, but that the Aristotelian doctrine of moderate realism is found in these passages would be an unwarranted conclusion. Hugh is speaking of logical abstraction. All that these passages tell us is that there are concepts in the mind which are classifications of things according to genera and species. We are not told the epistemological value of universals, the relation between the universals and the reality they represent.

PSYCHOLOGY

One writer, as we have noted,³⁵ professes to find in one treatise of Hugh the Thomistic theory of necessary abstraction by the *intellectus agens*, which is the psychological basis for the doctrine of moderate realism. To say this much is an exaggeration, but

³⁴ W. H. V. Reade, "Philosophy in the Middle Ages," *Cambridge Medieval History* (Cambridge University Press, England, 1926), V, p. 802. By permission of The Macmillan Company, publishers. Ueberweg-Geyer arrive at a similar conclusion: "Wie Abaelard, steht auch Hugo auf dem Boden der aristotelischen-boethianischen Erkenntnis und Abstraktionstheorie" (*op. cit.*, p. 263). Vernet's conclusion is sound: "Il ne faut pas s'attendre à trouver dans les écrits de Hugues une philosophie complète; les temps n'étaient pas mûrs pour une oeuvre pareille. En logique il ne fait qu'effleurer, exactement du reste, le problème des universaux." (*art. cit.*, col. 266).

³⁵ A. Mignon, *op. cit.*, p. 120. Cf. p. 49 *supra*.

the *De Unione Corporis et Spiritus* does seem to contain some vague but striking resemblances to the Aristotelian doctrine. On the other hand there sounds through these same passages an overtone of Plotinus and St. Augustine.

In the chapter on sense-knowledge we have followed the process of knowledge from the external object to the reception of the sense-image in the imagination, where the highest degree of material life touches the lowest degree of rationality.³⁶ Hugh continues by recapitulating the progress of knowledge from the "form" of the external object through the five sense channels to imagination. In animals the image stops there, but in rational creatures it proceeds further to "touch the incorporeal substance of soul itself" and to arouse what Hugh calls *discretio*. In man the image is "more pure"; it is "cleansed" (*defecatur*) but it remains outside the soul because it is still a material image, still based on matter (*fundatur in corpore*).³⁷

Hugh then describes the passage from sense to intellect in terms of light and shadow:

But the rational immaterial substance is light. The image, however inasmuch as it is an image of matter, is a shadow. And therefore, after the image has risen to the intellect (*ratio*) like a shadow coming into light and superimposing itself upon the light, it (the image) is made manifest and definite inasmuch as it comes to the light, but insofar as it superimposes itself upon the light, it beclouds it, overshadows it, and enfolds and covers it. If, indeed, the intellect receives the image

³⁶ *De Unione* (177, 287D): "Est itaque imaginatio similitudo sensus, in summo corporalis spiritus, et in imo rationalis corporealem informans et rationalem contingens."

³⁷ *Ibid.* (288A): "Quae quidem imaginatio in brutis animalibus phantasticam cellam non transcendit; in rationalibus autem usque ad rationalem progreditur, ubi ipsam incorpoream animae substantiam contingit et excitat discretionem. Ergo imaginatio nihil aliud est quam similitudo corporis, per sensus quidem corporeos ex corporum contactu concepta extrinsecus, atque per eosdem sensus introrsum ad partem puriorem corporei spiritus reducta eique impressa. Haec autem in rationalibus purior fit, ubi ad rationalem et incorpoream animae substantiam contingendam defecatur; tamen illic quoque extra substantiam illius manens, quia similitudo corporis est et fundatur in corpore."

for purposes of contemplation only, the image is like a garment which remains outside of and about it, of which it may easily divest or strip itself. But if reason clings to the image with pleasure, the image becomes a skin about it, so that it is painful for reason to strip itself of an image to which it clings with love. That is why souls separated from their bodies can still be bound to their passions, because they are not yet cleansed of the stain of their bodily dispositions—*quia videlicet a corruptione corporalium affectionum nondum mundatae sunt*.³⁸

In these lines there are as many reminiscences of Plato, Plotinus, and St. Augustine as there are of Aristotle and St. Thomas. For if the peripatetics could think of the image being illuminated by the intellect, the Neoplatonists had spoken of the soul being darkened and stained by the images served up by the senses. St. Augustine had accepted the Neoplatonic doctrine that it was necessary to restrain the imagination if one were to comprehend and to arrive at the perception of the incorporeal.³⁹ There is no doubt but that Hugh speaks in the tone of Augustine when he advises his readers of the advantage of avoiding any prolonged preoccupation with the bewitching charm of sensuous things. He insists as much as Plato does on the need for the purification of soul in the true philosopher.⁴⁰ This purification

³⁸ *Ibid.* (288B): "Rationalis autem substantia corporea lux est; imaginatio vero, inquantum corporis imago est, umbra est. Et idcirco postquam imaginatio usque ad rationem ascendit, quasi umbra in lucem veniens, et luci superveniens, inquantum ad eam venit, manifestatur, et circumscribitur; inquantum illi supervenit, obnubilat eam, et obumbrat, et involvit, et contegit. Et siquidem ratio ipsa sola contemplatione eam susceperit quasi vestimentum, ei est ipsa imaginatio extra eam, et circa eam quo facile exui et spoliari possit. Si vero etiam delectatione illi adhaeserit, quasi pellis ei fit ipsa imaginatio ita ut non sine dolore exui possit, cui cum amore inhaesit. Hinc est quod animae corporibus exutae, corporalibus adhuc passionibus teneri possunt, quia videlicet a corruptione corporalium affectionum nondum mundatae sunt."

³⁹ St. Augustine, *Confessions*, I, VII, 10 (PL 32, 742); *De Trinitate*, X, VII (PL 42, 979); VII, II, 3 (804). Cf. Portalié, *art. cit.*, *D.Th.C.*, I, 2, cols. 2327-8; Plotinus, *Enneads*, 4, 3. Inge, *op. cit.*, I, 260 f. On the Plotinian *káθαρσις*, cf. Marcel de Corte, *Aristote et Plotin* (Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1935), Ch. III: La Purification Plotinienne, pp. 178-227.

⁴⁰ Cf. Plato, *Phaedo*, 67. In this passage Socrates speaks of purification

even has its advantages for the separated soul after death.⁴¹

At the end of this description of the process of knowledge Hugh outlines the degrees of knowledge from sensation to imagination through *ratio to intelligentia*. In the next chapter we shall study the distinction he makes between reason and intelligence, and shall note once more the eclectic character of his philosophy.

In logic Hugh did no more than scratch the surface of the problem of universals. There is no definite analysis of the universal concept (abstracted by the *intellectus agens*) in his psychology.⁴² It can be said of him, as Grabmann says of St. Augustine,⁴³ that the psychological presuppositions of the Thomistic theory of abstraction are lacking. The basic principle in the psychology of thirteenth century Aristotelians is the substantial union of body and soul in the composite human person. Hugh's peculiar theory of the body-soul relationship is conceived in the Platonic and Augustinian tradition, which thought of soul and body as two disparate substances.

There are, however, other passages besides those in the work we have analyzed above which would seem to indicate an inclination towards the *via media* between Realism and Nominalism. Again following Boethius, whose works contain the elements for the Aristotelian solution, Hugh writes:

as the separation of the soul from the body, and says that true philosophers "are always occupied in the practice of dying, wherefore also to them least of all men is death terrible." Cf. *The Dialogues of Plato*, transl. Jowett (New York: Random House, 1937), I, 450-451. One of the definitions of philosophy which Hugh repeats after Isidore and Cassiodorus is this: "*Philosophia est meditatio mortis, quod magis convenit Christianis, qui saeculi ambitione calcata, conversatione disciplinali, similitudine futurae patriae vivunt.*" (*Did.* II, 1 [24].) Cf. *Excerpt. Priorum*, I, 6 (177, 196C). In a note to this passage St. Albert the Great is quoted (*De Animalibus*, I), defining philosophy: "*victoria et abstinencia concupiscibilium.*"

⁴¹ *De Unione* (177, 288OD).

⁴² Cf. Ostler's conclusion (*op. cit.*, p. 132): "Von einem Allgemeinbegriff, gewonnen durch naturnotwendige Abstraktion von den individuellen Bedingungen ist keine Rede."

⁴³ M. Grabmann, "Der göttliche Grund menschlicher Wahrheitserkenntnis nach Augustinus und Thomas von Aquin" (Münster i. W., 1924), *Veröffentlichungen des katholischen Institutes für Philosophie, Albertus-Magnus-Akademie zu Köln*, Bd. I, Heft 4, p. 25.

This power (*ratio*) is present in the human genus alone, which not only receives sensations and perfect and unconfused imaginations but also explains and confirms by the full act of understanding what the imagination has supplied. Consequently, as has been said, those things which it comprehends subject to the senses do not alone suffice this divine nature for knowledge, but besides, it can put names conceived by the imagination on insensible and absent things, and it also opens to the imposition of words that which it comprehends by way of understanding.⁴⁴

We shall find, too, that in his analysis of the knowledge of God possible to human reason Hugh, like St. Thomas after him, takes experience as the starting point for his proofs for God's existence. It is maintained by some that in doing this Hugh is accepting a moderate realism into his theory of knowledge.⁴⁵

But the real problem of universals is not in logic or in psychology; it is an epistemological problem, concerned with the correspondence which exists between intellectual concepts, which are abstract and general, and extramental reality. We shall next attempt to discover what answer, if any, Hugh of St. Victor has given to this epistemological problem.

EPISTEMOLOGY

From scattered references which seem to touch the problem one may conjecture that Hugh's epistemological explanation of universals would have echoed that of Boethius⁴⁶ and William of Champeaux in taking "similarity" as its foundation. Under the insistent attack of Abelard William had fallen back from his earlier "identity" and "indifference" theories to what DeWulf calls the "theory of the similitude of essences," i. e., essences are really

⁴⁴ *Did.* I, 3 (9) (transl. McKeon, I, p. 72).

⁴⁵ After analyzing Hugh's proofs from experience, Grunwald remarks, "Es begreift sich leicht, dass dieser gemässigte Realismus Hugos und Richards ausser Beziehung zu ihrer sonstigen mystischen Richtung steht, durch welche sie vor allem in der Geschichte bekannt sind." Georg Grunwald, *Geschichte der Gottesbeweise im Mittelalter bis zum Ausgang der Hochscholastik* (Münster, 1907), BGPM, VI, 3, p. 69.

⁴⁶ Boethius, *Comment. in Porphy. a se transl.*, I (PL 64, 82 ff.).

multiplied in individuals, though similar in each of them.⁴⁷ The similarity theory also seems to be the final solution of Peter Abelard himself. In his "Logic for Beginners"⁴⁸ he says that universals are words, not mere *voces* (the doctrine of Roscelin). The universal word does not indicate a universal thing; rather it forms a certain conception which is common to the individuals it names. Its universality consists in the multitude of individuals named by it in that common likeness. "We can also call the status of man those things themselves, established in the nature of man, the common likeness of which he who imposed the word conceived."⁴⁹

Richard McKeon says of Abelard's final solution:

The doctrine of the universal which Abailard finally states in his commentary on Porphyry may be said to be the solution with which the twelfth century closed its acute and isolated discussion of the problem. For the thirteenth century it was only one among many problems in the context of a rounded philosophy. . . . The solution of Abailard is an aristotelian moderate realism; in its essential features his statement of the doctrine is not much different from the statement of Hugo of Saint Victor; John of Salisbury too agrees in this resolution, and in it numbers Abailard among his friends.⁵⁰

How does Hugh of Saint Victor fit into this group of philosophers who have been here named together? In a passage on the unity of God he distinguishes the essential unity of God from other kinds of unity, which are not unities by essence. One kind

⁴⁷ M. DeWulf, *Histoire de la Philosophie Médiévale*, I, p. 178.

⁴⁸ Cf. B. Geyer, *Peter Abaelards Philosophische Schriften, I Die Logica "Ingredientibus"* (Münster, 1919-27), BGPM, XXI, 1-3. Geyer has summarized this work in his edition of Ueberweg, pp. 217-218. "Abaelard sucht dann aber noch weiter das gemeinsame Reale, auf das sich die intellectus universalium beziehen, zu bestimmen. Er findet es darin, dass die Einzeldinge in gewissen Eigenschaften oder in ihrer Natur übereinstimmen oder ähnlich sind." (p. 218).

⁴⁹ Peter Abelard, *op. cit.* (transl. McKeon, I, p. 238). According to McKeon, Abelard's discussion is derived from Boethius, for the *Logica* "*De Ingredientibus*," "although it is a work which is designated a gloss on Porphyry, could more properly be called a commentary on the selection from Boethius." (p. 204).

⁵⁰ R. McKeon, *op. cit.*, p. 204. Gilson, on the contrary, finds Abelard's

of unity mentioned in the latter group is unity "by similarity"—*unum similitudine*. As an example Hugh gives the word (*vox*) which is spoken by many.⁵¹ By the fact that he denies essential unity to the union by similarity Hugh is rejecting the position of the Realists who had held that the essence of man, for example, was present in each individual of the species of man. By the fact that he is giving the similar word *some* kind of unity he is denying the nominalistic position.

Hugh means more than mere similarity of sound when he speaks of a common name as an *unum similitudine*. This becomes evident from another passage where he treats of similarity as the reason for putting things in a common genus. In the context he proves the excellence of God's power by calling attention to the indefinite multitude of created things. There are innumerable similar things and innumerable different things—*quanta existimanda est potentia tam multa facere?*, he asks, and continues:

What things are similar? Those things contained under the same genus, as this or that man, this or that lion, this or that eagle . . . these individual things and the others like them in their genera are similar. What things are different? Those that are formed by dissimilar differences, as a man and a lion, or a lion and an eagle . . . those things are different. How, therefore, are an indefinite number of individual things? The man is one genus, but there is not only one man. Who can enumerate them? The lion is one genus, but there is not only one lion. Who can enumerate them? . . . And thus it is in the other innumerable genera of innumerable things. And in each genus there is an indefinite number of similar things.⁵²

solution no solution of the real problem of universals. Cf. *The Unity of Philosophical Experience*, Chapter I, "Logicism and Philosophy," esp. p. 24.

⁵¹ *Did.*, VII, 19 (176, 827A): "Nam est unum collectione, et unum compositione, et unum similitudine. . . . Unum similitudine, quemadmodum cum vocem unam dicimus quae a multis est prolata. Sed horum omnium nihil vere unum est." Ostler notes that "Wenn wirklich die Universalien niemals als blosser 'flatus vocis' erklärt wurden, dann ist durch dieses Beispiel der extreme Nominalismus abgewiesen, weil eben doch die 'flatus vocis' Ähnlichkeit, also Einheit haben." (*op. cit.*, p. 131).

⁵² *Did.*, VII, 2 (176, 813B): "Quae sunt similia? Quae sub eodem genere continentur, ut homo unus et alter; leo unus et alter, aquila una et

In speaking of the hierarchy of angels Hugh also implies that similarity constitutes the basis of universality when he says that, even where beings have different degrees of perfection, one may speak of something common to them. The difference is one of degree, not of kind, and therefore the name of one being may be used to designate all that partake in some degree at least of the same perfection.⁵³

We have seen enough of Hugh's passages in logic, psychology, and epistemology to realize that he was aware of the problem of universals, even though somewhat vaguely, and that from these passages an answer is hinted that might be construed as moderate realism. But to this writer the best answer to the problem of whether Hugh was an Aristotelian on the point is this—that he barely touched the real problem, or rather that he inclined toward the neutral attitude of Porphyry and Boethius in a kind of eclectic suspension of judgment—*dicere recusabo*. It is hardly possible that he remained unaware that the nature of *species* and *genera* was a burning issue in the schools at his time. He seems to have refrained deliberately from entering the debate on either side, though he does reject Realism and Nominalism. He seems to have underestimated the importance of the discussion. In the dedication to his letter answering the question of a Walter of Mortagne concerning the wisdom of the soul of Christ—*an aequalis cum divina fuerit*—he writes in unwonted exasperation against the exaggerated dialectics of his age. He asks Walter to “avoid inept and purposeless questions, which spring more from a craze for novelty than from a sincere love of truth.”⁵⁴

altera . . . haec singula, et caetera talia in suis generibus similia sunt. Quae sunt diversa? Quae dissimilibus differentiis informantur, ut homo et leo, leo et aquila . . . haec invicem diversa sunt . . . Quomodo ergo in similibus infinita? Quomodo in diversis infinita? Audi. Homo unum genus est, sed unus homo non est. Quis eos enumerare potest? . . . et ita in caeteris innumerabilibus innumerabilium rerum generibus, infinita rerum genera, et in singulis generibus infinita similia . . .” Cf. *De Sac.*, 2, I, 3, (176, 373 ff.); Boethius, *In Porph. Comm.* III (*PL* 64, 110C, 111B) .

⁵³ Cf. *In cael. Hier.*, IX (175, 1109C-1110A).

⁵⁴ “Obsecro autem, ineptas et importunas questiones insipientium in verbo

Several authors have quoted a passage from the preface to this treatise itself which seems to repeat this polemic against the variety of opinions among the dialecticians with particular reference to the problem of universals. But it can be shown that the reference is again to the dialecticians in general; it does not prove that Hugh is taking sides on the question of the great struggle current in the schools.⁵⁵

Intellectual knowledge means more than the knowledge of the individual things in the world of sense, which Hugh describes as *ratio in imaginationem agens*, and which we have considered in this chapter. The suprasensible is the more important object of knowledge, and this comes through reason and intelligence, which play an important role in the Victorine's theory of knowledge.

Dei familiares habere nolite, qui prava ac perversa quadam curiositate, non tam amore veritatis quam cupidine novitatis circumcurrentes magis volunt nova audire quam vera discere." The words from the dedication of the letter, which does not appear in Migne, are quoted from the text printed by Ludwig Ott in his *Untersuchungen zur theologischen Briefliteratur der Früh-scholastik unter besonderer Berücksichtigung des Viktorinerkreises*, p. 353.

⁵⁵ Ostler, *op. cit.*, p. 130 and Grabmann (*Die Geschichte der scholastischen Methode*, II, 290) have quoted the Migne text (*De Sapientia animae Christi*, praefatio (176, 845D-846D), but according to Ott's text-criticism there are two false readings in Migne which remove any specific reference to the controversy. As printed in Migne the text reads: "Quid enim hoc putatis, quod de rerum veritate tam diversa sentire solent homines? Numquid nomina est veritas? Ecce, ut interim de Deo (i. e.,—about theology) taceamus, quid est quod dialectica tot diversas et tam adversas, ne dicam perversas habet sententias? Numquid omnes noverunt num id quod est sed amore fallendi diversa finxerunt? Non sic ego puto. Sed narrant quinque somnia sua, et qua primum ipsi in se opinione decepti sunt, postmodum alios nescientes seducunt." (Italics mine.) Ostler and Grabmann interpret *quinque somnia* as the five predicables (*genus, species, differentia specifica, proprium, accidens*). But the corrected readings are these: the ungrammatical *numquid nomina est veritas?* should read *numquid non una est veritas?* And *quinque* should be read *quique*. These readings remove specific references to nominalism and the predicables. (Ott, *op. cit.*, p. 355, n. 10). The better text, which Ott bases on MSS evidence, is found in Oudin's edition of Hugh (II, 1145), and Thomas Garzonius reads *quique* for *quinque* in his edition: *Hugonis de S. Victore, canonici regularis, Opera Omnia tribus tomis digesta studio et industria Donni Thomae Garzonii de Bagnacaballo* (Moguntiae, 1617), v. III, p. 43.

CHAPTER V

REASON AND INTELLIGENCE

THE FIELD OF REASON

The word *ratio*, reason, is the term which appears most frequently in the passages which Hugh of St. Victor devotes to his theory of knowledge. It is a very broad term as he uses it, for it covers every phase of the intellectual life. It is the usual term by which he designates the cognitive faculty in the wide sense, just as we may speak of intellect as the power of knowing in contrast to the powers of willing and feeling.¹ In different contexts it signifies various aspects of intellectual activity.² How, then, does one explain the fact that Hugh speaks of the eye of reason as that faculty by which the soul "sees itself and that which is within itself?"³ This would seem to make reason the faculty of inner experience or of introspection. The use of the term *eye* is metaphorical, however, and Hugh frequently substitutes *oculus mentis*⁴ or *oculus cordis*⁵ in place of the usual *oculus rationis*. Therefore one cannot limit the "eye of reason" to any one operation, and this chapter will be devoted to an analysis of the several intellectual functions which Hugh ascribes to reason.

¹ Cf. A. Liebner, *Hugo von St. Victor und die theologischen Richtungen seiner Zeit*, p. 179. Liebner notes here that reason, as in most of Hugh's contemporaries, means reflex understanding, knowing through concept, judgment, ratiocination.

² *Intellectus* is infrequent in the meaning of "intellect." In the *Didascalicon*, for example, this meaning occurs only two or three times. More often *intellectus* means concept. Cf. *supra*, p. 53, n. 33.

³ *De Sac.*, 1, X, 2 (176, 330): "Alium oculum acceperat, quo seipsam (anima) videret et ea quae in ipsa erant; hic est oculus rationis."

⁴ For example, *De Van. Mundi*, II (176, 715A); *In cael. Hier.* III (175, 975D-976A); *De Unione* (177, 291C). In the last place cited *oculus mentis* and *oculus cordis* are used interchangeably in the same paragraph.

⁵ Cf. e. g., *In cael. Hier.* III (175, 975A): *De sapientia animae Christi*, praef. (176, 847A): "In nobis quippe quod de rerum cognitione percipimus, et eo modo, cordis intellectus de iis quae extra sunt ad veritatem indicant, quo se interius animus in repraesentatione figurat." *Did.*, VI, 14 (131).

Consciousness or introspection is indeed the ordinary function attributed to the eye of reason, but other objects are not excluded from it.⁶ *Ratio* knows the sensible world in apprehension, the first operation of the intellect, and it is the faculty which performs the other two operations of formal logic—judgment and reasoning. Hugh's chapter on the three powers of the soul ends with the assurance that reason, the highest of them, can comprehend the nature of things present to it in sense perception and that it can acquire further knowledge through the reasoning process. The Aristotelian conception of reason as that which comes to true knowledge through the investigation of causes is implicit in these lines:

Consequently, as has been said, those things which reason comprehends subject to the senses do not alone suffice this divine nature for knowledge, but besides, it can put names conceived by the imagination on insensible and absent things, and it also opens to the imposition of words that which it comprehends by way of understanding (*intelligentia*). Moreover, it is proper to that nature to investigate unknown things by means of those known to it and to wish to know of each single thing, not only whether it is, but also what it is, and how it is, and even why it is. Only the nature of man, as has been said, has received this power of the soul. The power of this soul does not lack the movements of intelligence, for it exercises the power of reason itself in the following four respects. It inquires of a thing whether it is, or if it has

⁶ A principle of Boethius is to the point here: "nam superior comprehendendi vis amplectitur inferiorem, inferior vero ad superiorem nullo modo consurgit." (*De Cons. Phil.* V, prosa 4, Fortescue, 150-151). St. Thomas Aquinas, following Augustine (*De Civitate Dei*, XXII, 29; *CSEL* 40, 2, pp. 660 ff.) says the same. (*Summa Theologica*, I, 84, 1 ad 2). Hugh's acceptance of this well-known principle is reflected in these lines: "Qui enim videt oculo contemplationis, videt animum et ea quae in animo sunt. Qui videt oculo carnis videt mundum et ea quae in mundo sunt. Qui autem videt ea quae videntur oculo contemplationis, videt et ea quae videntur oculo rationis et ea quae videntur oculo carnis, quia in superioribus inferiora cognoscuntur. Qui autem videt oculo rationis, ea quidem quae videntur oculo carnis videt; sed non similiter ea quae videntur oculo contemplationis videt. Qui vero oculo carnis videt, ex eo nec ea videt quae videntur oculo contemplationis, nec ea quae videntur oculo rationis." (*Miscellanea*, I, 1 [177, 471C].)

determined that it is, it has doubts concerning what it is. But if it has the knowledge of both of these by reason, it searches out how any particular thing is, and investigates the other changes of accidents in it; having learned these things, it also inquires and traces out by reason why it is thus.⁷

In this passage which Hugh incorporates from Boethius the influence of Aristotle is clear. All men desire by nature to know and wisdom is knowledge about certain principles and causes—that is what Aristotle had said.⁸ Hugh will accept the idea if by wisdom is primarily meant a knowledge of the Highest Cause. In Hugh's account of the genetic history of man's mind from sense cognition to science to wisdom the echoes of Aristotle are stronger than those of the Platonic tradition. For this genetic account excludes any Platonic reminiscence of innate ideas.

Hugh writes the history of man's intellectual development within an interesting framework of speculation on this hypothesis: we know that the first man was born with perfect knowledge of the world, himself, and God; what about the knowledge of his descendants with regard to the development of sense-knowledge and ability to know truth—if Adam had not sinned? Hugh concludes that on this hypothesis the intellectual development of man would have been the same as it actually is now. That means the evolution of sense-knowledge before intellectual cognition. "For it is indeed natural in human nature that in its first years it should be moved and progress according to sense-impressions only."⁹ Only at the age of discretion is pure sense-knowledge followed by the cognition of truth. This later intellectual operation is aroused, not from within (as it is in angels and the first man) but from without—painfully through the senses.¹⁰ And

⁷ *Did.* I, 3 (9-10). Transl. McKeon, *op. cit.*, I, 70-71. Cf. Boethius, *In Isag. Proph. Comm. ed. 2a* (CSEL 48, pp. 137-138). See also Boethius *Anal. Post.* II, 1 (PL 64, 743C); Aristotle, *Anal. Post.*, II, 1, 89b, 23 ff.

⁸ Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, I, 908a1, ff.

⁹ *De Sacr.*, 1, VI, 26 (Utrum perfecti nascerentur homines statura et scientia) (176, 278D-280B): "Naturale siquidem humanae naturae est, in prima aetate secundum solos sensuum affectus moveri atque incedere." (280A).

¹⁰ *De Sacr.*, 1, VII, 33 (176, 302CD): "Angeli quippe quia perfecti facti

in another long passage Hugh states that man's knowledge of the invisible, his own soul and God, must start from without, since the order of creation and the order of cognition are in inverse ratio.¹¹ We shall find, however, that in these statements Hugh does not mean that "nothing is in the intellect unless it is first in the senses." He says only that it is the external object which arouses the mind to action.

REASON AND INTELLIGENCE

At the end of his description of the process of knowledge in the *De Unione Corporis et Spiritus* Hugh summarizes the ascending degrees of human knowledge in relation to their objects in the ontological hierarchy of World, Soul, God. We may take this description as a summary statement of Hugh's thought on the function of external senses, imagination, reason and intelligence.

sunt, ab intus eruditi sunt; homines autem excepto duntaxat primo illo, qui sicut suo modo perfectus factus est, ita et ipse quoque ab intus eruditus est, quia per intervalla temporum ad cognitionem promoveri debuerunt, per species rerum temporalium et visibilium foris ad cognitionem veritatis excitandi et erudiendi fuerunt. Quae tamen excitatio et eruditio naturaliter et sine labore homini adesset, si sensus hominis in carne mortali per peccatum corruptus non fuisset, ut tunc plenum ac perfectum constaret, quod ait Apostolus: Invisibilia ejus a creatura mundi per ea quae facta sunt intellecta conspiciuntur." It will be remembered that the *oculus rationis* was weakened in original sin, and that is why Hugh can say that knowledge comes "painfully." But the eye of reason was not completely extinguished. Cf. *De Arca Noe Mystica*, "Naturale enim bonum in homine per peccatum corrumpi potuit, extinguere omnino non potuit: quia vivit adhuc scintilla quaedam naturalis rationis in mente hominis." Quoted by Liebner, *op. cit.*, p. 179. Cf. *De Sapientia Animae Christi* (176, 847A).

¹¹ *Did.*, VII, 25 (Quod ordo conditionis et cognitionis rerum e diverso se habeant) "Quando pridem de visibilibus ad investiganda invisibilia progredi coepimus, primo a corporea creatura ad incorpoream hoc est rationalem creaturam transivimus; ac deinde a rationali creatura usque ad sapientiam Dei pervenimus . . . ille ordo est cognitionis . . . quia primum corporea creatura, quae visibilis est, in cognitione occurrit; deinde a corporea creatura ad incorpoream cognitio transit; postremo via investigationis aperta, usque ad conditorem utriusque pervenit." (176, 835A).

His whole theory of knowledge is based on an expansion of these lines:

Thus from the lowliest and most insignificant bodies up to incorporeal spirit there is a certain progression through sense and imagination, which are both in the corporeal spirit. Directly above these is the representation of the image which imprints itself on the soul as the result of the soul's connection with the body; and above this is the reason which acts upon the image. Then comes the pure reason, above imagination, in which the highest point of the soul (proceeding from the body upwards) is achieved.

But when one goes from the soul upwards towards God, first is intelligence, that is, reason formed from within. Here the presence of God comes together with reason and is joined to it—the presence of God which informs reason from above and produces wisdom or intelligence, just as imagination informs reason from below to produce science or knowledge.¹²

These sentences give one the key to Hugh's theory of knowledge. For they introduce us to a distinction between reason and intelligence which Hugh develops in a manner that places him definitely in the Augustinian tradition. In this passage the opposition between the corporeal and spiritual natures of man is reaffirmed. Man is viewed once more as the middle point of creation, situated between the two worlds of angelic nature and brute creation. Through imagination man looks out to the material creatures below him. Then, withdrawing from the representations of external objects and recollecting himself, he becomes conscious of himself through introspection. This is as far as reason can go of itself. But reason also has within itself the

¹² *De Unione* (177, 288D-289A): "Sic itaque ab infimis et extremis corporibus sursum usque spiritum incorporeum, quaedam progressio est per sensum et imaginationem; quae duo in spiritu corporeo sunt. Postea in spiritu incorporeo proxima post corpus est affectio imaginaria, qua anima ex corporis conjunctione efficitur, supra quam est ratio in imaginationem agens. Deinde ratio pura supra imaginationem in qua ratione supremum est animae a corpore sursum. Quando autem ab anima sursum itur ad Deum, prima est intelligentia, quae est ratio ab interiori formata, quia rationi concurrens conjungitur praesentia divina, quae sursum informans rationem facit sapientiam, sive intelligentiam, sicut imaginatio deorsum informans rationem, scientiam facit."

capability of being informed from above by the illuminating grace of God. It can transcend itself and contemplate God. In the following chapters we shall consider the knowledge which the soul has of itself and of God. Here we are interested in Hugh's description of reason and intelligence as faculties of the soul.

From the tradition of centuries Hugh of St. Victor accepted the essential distinction between an understanding of eternal things which alone merits the name of wisdom and the rational cognition of temporal things which constitutes science. St. Augustine found it in Neoplatonism,¹³ and his frequent discussions of the different terms describing the various intellectual operations caught the interest of medieval philosophers.¹⁴ Wisdom and science are intellectual habits which imply a corresponding distinction of faculties into reason and intelligence. One is not surprised that the couplet *ratio-intelligentia* receives frequent development in the theory of knowledge of Christian philosophers. But it is Boethius who is the more immediate inspiration for Hugh's terminology, and a brief discussion of reason and intelligence as they are described in the *Consolatio Philosophiae* will introduce us to Hugh's use of the terms.

It was the avowed intention of Boethius to translate and reconcile the philosophies of Plato and Aristotle and to make them intelligible to his Latin-speaking contemporaries.¹⁵ He called this the "chief solace of his life"—*summum vitae solamen*.¹⁶ Boethius never achieved this end, and one result of the

¹³ E. Portalié, "Saint Augustin," *D.Th.C.*, I, 2, col. 2328. Cf. F. J. Sheen, *God and Intelligence in Modern Philosophy* (New York: Longmans, 1925), pp. 62, ff.

¹⁴ For the distinction of *ratio superior-ratio inferior*, *mens. ratio, intelligentia*, etc., in St. Augustine, cf. A. Gardeil, "Le 'Mens' d'après S. Augustin et S. Thomas d'Aquin," *ReScPhTh*, XIII (1924), pp. 145-161; J. Peghaire, "Le couple augustinien Ratio superior et Ratio inferior"; "L'Interpretation thomiste," *Ibid.*, XXIII (1934), pp. 221-240; E. Gilson, *Introduction à l'étude de Saint Augustin*, p. 54, n. 1; p. 148.

¹⁵ *Comm. in Arist. De Interpretatione*, Sec. editio, II, 3 (ed. Meiser: Teubner, 1880), p. 79: "Aristotelis Platonis sententias in unum quodammodo revocare concordiam."

¹⁶ *De Syllogismo Hypothetico* (PL 64, 831B). Cf. E. K. Rand, *Founders of the Middle Ages* (Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1928), p. 158.

failure was to perpetuate the confusion he introduced into the division of intellectual faculties. In his attempted synthesis he superimposed an *intelligentia* on the faculty of *ratio*.¹⁷ In the *Consolation of Philosophy* the hierarchy of knowledge is four-fold: *Sensus, imaginatio, ratio, and intelligentia*.¹⁸ There is a sharp distinction of object and mode between reason and intelligence. Reason finds its object on a lower plane, in sensible things, known in their universal aspect by discursive reasoning.¹⁹ In the highest point of the mind (*acies mentis*) intelligence attains its primary object—the vision of God. It soars above created things to be lost in the contemplation of the pure and simple form of divinity.²⁰ Its mode transcends every other human knowledge. Without the aid of any organ it sees all *formaliter*, even the objects of the senses beneath it.²¹

Intelligence bears the stamp of divine origin on it, and indeed it is called the divine faculty.²² To designate its object Boethius

¹⁷ Cf. M. D. Chenu, "Notes de Lexicographie philosophique: *Disciplina*," *R.Sc.Ph.Th.*, XXV (1936), pp. 691-692.

¹⁸ *De Cons. Phil.*, V, pros. 4 (Fortescue, 150): "Ipsum quoque hominem aliter sensus, aliter imaginatio, aliter ratio, aliter intelligentia contuetur."

¹⁹ *Ibid.*: "Ratio vero hanc (imaginationem) quoque transcendit, speciemque ipsam quae singularibus inest universali consideratione perpendit." On the semantics of *ratio-intelligentia* in Boethius, Augustine, Gundisalvi, etc., cf. G. Ed. Demers, "Les divers sens du mot Ratio au Moyen Age" in *Études d'Histoire Littéraire et Doctrinale du XIIIe Siècle, première série* (Ottawa: Inst. d'Études Médiévales, 1932), p. 105-139.

²⁰ *Ibid.* "Intelligentiae vero celsior oculis existit; supergressa namque universitatis ambitum, ipsam illam simplicem formam pura mentis acie contuetur." The idea of *acies mentis* is a fruitful one for the medieval mystics, and Hugh will use it. Cf. *infra*, p. 114.

²¹ *Ibid.* (Fortescue, p. 151): "Nam (intelligentia) et rationis universum et imaginationis figuram et materiale sensibile cognoscit, nec ratione utens nec imaginatione nec sensibus; sed illo uno ictu mentis formaliter, ut ita dicam, cuncta prospiciens."

²² *Ibid.* (p. 154): "Ratio vero humani tantum generis est sicut intelligentia sola divini." Fortescue (p. 154, n. 3) calls this a *mira sententia* and interprets it to mean that intelligence is ascribed to God alone. But Boethius would give intelligence to some few men. Gundisalvi (ca. 1150) says, "Per intelligentiam acquiritur sapientia, qua secundum Boetium admodum paucorum hominum est et solius Dei." (*De Anima*, c. 3; ed.

coined the term *intellectibilia*, a translation of *νοητά*.²³ One arrives at this stage of intelligence by a kind of spiritual *ascesis*, disengaging oneself from the material and turning to the immutable. Only the elect attain it, but Boethius advises men to make the effort. "Let us therefore raise ourselves, if so be that we can, to that height of loftiest intelligence, for there reason will see what it cannot of itself perceive."²⁴

Many of these ideas in the *Consolation of Philosophy*, which was the most popular philosophical work of the Middle Ages,²⁵ were adopted and fitted into the various theories of knowledge which appear in the works of the twelfth century authors.

Boethius had used the terms *intellectibile*, *intelligibile*, and *naturale* to designate the objects of theology, mathematics, and physics.²⁶ They were adopted by Hugh of St. Victor, together with their definitions, to denote the objects attained in the three sciences into which he had divided *theorica* or speculative philosophy.²⁷ The objects of theology are God and spiritual creatures. These are grasped by the intellect alone, working without

Loewenthal, p. 122). The pseudo-Augustinian *De Spiritu et Anima* (which Fortescue, p. 154, n. 3, wrongly attributes to Hugh of St. Victor) makes the same remark. This work is a compilation of texts of Augustine (*inter opera Augustini*, PL 40, 779 ff.) made by Alcher of Clairvaux. Cf. G. Théry, "L'authenticité du 'De Spiritu et Anima' dans Saint Thomas et Albert le Grand," *ReScPhTh*, X (1921), pp. 373-377.

²³ Boethius, *In Isag. Porph. Comm.*, Ed. la (CSEL 48, p. 8) "*νοητά quoniam latino sermone nunquam dictum reperi intellectibilia, egomet mea verbi compositione vocavi.*"

²⁴ *Cons. Phil.*, V, prosa 4 (Fortescue, p. 155). Cf. Demers, *art. cit.*, pp. 118-119.

²⁵ Cf. Ueberweg-Geyer, *op. cit.*, p. 137.

²⁶ *In Isag. Porph. Comm. Ed. la* (CSEL, 48, pp. 8-9).

²⁷ *Did.*, II, 1 (24-25): "Theorica dividitur in theologiam, mathematicam et physicam. Hanc divisionem Boethius facit aliis verbis, theoricen secans in intellectibilem et intelligibilem et naturalem, per intellectibilem significans theologiam, per intelligibilem mathematicam, per naturalem physicam." Chenu remarks apropos of Boethius' terminology, "Ce vocabulaire eut du succès au moyen âge (cf. par. ex. Hugues de S. V., *Did.*, II, 3, 18), mais non sans confusion, littéraire et paléographique, des deux mots." (*Art. cit.*, p. 292, n. 1).

the aid of the senses.²⁸ The objects of the lower science of mathematics, the intelligibles, are also achieved in intellect alone, but always with the cooperation with the senses.²⁹ The conclusion must follow that Hugh will admit with Augustine and Boethius³⁰ that not all knowledge begins in the senses, for the *intellectibilia* are attained without their cooperation, and Hugh states that the senses are only a hindrance if the object of knowledge is God or a spiritual creature.

We have noted a certain element of inconsistency creeping into Hugh's theory of knowledge. This is due to his acceptance of the terminology and ideas of Boethius with regard to *intellectibilia* and *intelligibilia*. But in general it may be said that the faculties of reason and intelligence corresponding to these two categories created by Boethius are consistently described in Hugh's works. Reason is the faculty which descends to lower things, while intelligence ascends to the higher objects of knowl-

²⁸ *Did.*, II, 2 (25): "Intellectibile est quod unum atque idem per se in propria semper divinitate consistens, nullis unquam sensibus, sed sola tantum mente intellectuque capitur. Quae res ad speculationem Dei atque ad animi incorporalitatem considerationemque verae philosophiae indagatione componitur, quam, inquit (Boethius) Graeci theologiam nominant. Dicta autem theologia quasi sermo habitus de divinis." And Hugh continued, borrowing from Isidore of Seville, "Theologia igitur est, quando aut ineffabilem naturam Dei aut spirituales creaturas ex aliqua parte profundissima qualitate disserimus." Cf. Isidore, *Origines*, 2, 24, 13; *Intellectibilis* is also called *divinialis* (*Did.*, II, 18). For Hugh's concept of theology, cf. p. 9 *supra*.

²⁹ *Did.*, II, 3 (27): "Intelligibilis autem quod ipsum quidem solo percipitur intellectu, sed non solo intellectu percipit, quia imaginationem vel sensum habet, quo ea quae sensibus subjacent comprehendit." Cf. *ibid.* (26): "Hanc (mathematicam) Boethius intelligibilem appellat." The opposition between *intellectibilia* (intellect alone) and *intelligibilia* (through senses) is restated in various contexts, e. g., *Did.* I, 1; II, 17 (35) and explains why Hugh can say that "logica quandoque utitur pura intelligentia, mathematica autem nunquam sine imaginatione est, ideoque nihil vere simplex habet." (36).

³⁰ Cf. Boethius, *De Cons. Phil.*, V, metrum 4, which is a vigorous rejection of the Stoic conception of the mind as a blank sheet of paper passively receiving impressions from the outside world. (Fortescue, 151-152.)

edge.³¹ The distinction parallels that of wisdom and science and is analogous to St. Augustine's treatment of the superior and inferior reason.

It is clear that Hugh's theory of the three eyes and the three-fold division of faculties into sense, reason, and intelligence, together with the manifest preference for the activity of the higher faculty of intelligence — all this places him in the Augustinian tradition of Christian Platonism. In the thirteenth century St. Thomas Aquinas decisively and discreetly eliminated the confusion introduced into the philosophical vocabulary of the twelfth century by the Augustinian *ratio* and its varied interpretations in Boethius and early Scholasticism.³² Until the time of Thomas *ratio* was employed in describing a psychological dualism which did not accord with the Aristotelian conception of the unity of the human person, and Aquinas could eliminate the confusion in its use because he eliminated the Platonic theory of personality.

Hugh of St. Victor had not solved the problem of the soul which was to trouble the thirteenth century. He followed the persistent psychology of Platonic dualism which couples the word intelligence to the knowledge of the incorporeal and spiritual and attributes supersensible concepts to it. Most of the philosophers in Hugh's century spoke in the same vein,³³ and his disciples

³¹ Thus, in Hugh's definition of logic: "Logica consideratio est in rebus, attendens intellectus rerum (concepts), sive per *intelligentiam*, ut neque sint haec (i. e., *res*) neque horum similitudines, sive per *rationem*, ut non sint haec sed horum tamen similitudines." (*Did.*, II, 17, p. 35.)

³² Cf. Demers, *art. cit.*, p. 106.

³³ The examples are many. St. Augustine, Boethius, and Gundisalvi have already been quoted. The Pseudo-Augustinian *De Spiritu et Anima* (ca. 1160, cf. p. 70, n. 22 *supra*), which adapts Boethius and Augustine and is also influenced by Hugh (cf. Ueberweg-Geyer, *op. cit.*, pp. 260-261), lists the faculties according to the increasing perfection of knowledge up to the simple apprehension of the most pure object, God. "Cum ab inferioribus ad superiora volumus ascendere, prius occurrit nobis sensus, deinde imaginatio, postea intellectus, et postea intelligentia." (*PL* 40, ch. 11; cf. ch. 38, 809); Demers, *art. cit.* (p. 120). A short time after Hugh, Isaac of Stella, a Cistercian monk from 1147-1169, who was much influenced by the Victorine (Ueberweg-Geyer, 258-9), wrote in his *De Anima* (platonie-

went even further than he in placing a gulf between reason and intelligence.³⁴ A "divinization" of intellect is the end result of this Neoplatonic psychology, and we shall have occasion to analyze Hugh's position in the matter in a chapter on the knowledge of God. Meanwhile, it will be useful to speak further of his theory of reason and intelligence.

It should be noted that for Hugh reason and intelligence, though directed to different objects, are not two separate faculties but are rather two aspects of that rational power of the soul which elevates man above the level of brute animals.³⁵ In the passage quoted previously as a summary statement of Hugh's

augustinian psychology) that the *sensus animae* include *sensus corporeus*, *imaginatio*, *ratio*, *intellectus* and *intelligentia* (*De Anima*, PL 194, 1880ab) with the latter highest: "Empyreum autem soli igneo, acutissimo et subtilissimo conferenda videtur intelligentia" (*ibid.*, 1885B). Cf. John Scotus Erigena, *De Div. Nat.* II, 23 (PL 122, 569); John of Salisbury, *Metalogicus* (wr. 1159-60) IV, 18 (PL 199, 926D); William of Conches, *Dragmaticon* VI (PL 198, 309); Alanus de Insulis (d. 1203), *Sententiae*, 14 (PL 210, 236 ff.), *Theologicae Regulae* 99 (*ibid.*, 673 ff.). In general cf. Wilhelm Jansen, *Der Kommentar des Clarenbaldus von Arras zu Boethius De Trinitate, Ein Werk aus der Schule von Chartres im 12 Jahrhundert* (Breslau, 1926), pp. 60 ff.

³⁴ Richard of St. Victor distinguishes three objects of knowledge—the *sensibile* or corporeal world, the *intelligibile* or spiritual world, the *intellectibile* or God. Three eyes of the soul or faculties corresponding to them are *imaginatio*, *ratio*, *intelligentia* (*Benjamin major*, I, 3, 7 [PL 196, 66DC, 72C]). Richard was to develop Hugh's teaching in many points. He distinguishes *intelligentia pura* and *intelligentia simplex* (*ibid.*, 196, 74C): "Simplicem intelligentiam dico quae est sine officia rationis, puram vero, quae est sine occusione imaginationis." Cf. Ebner, *op. cit.*, 38-42, 82-99. Ostler remarks, "Einigermassen deckt sich die Unterscheidung zwischen dem Auge der Vernunft und dem der Intelligenz beim Hugo mit dem Gegensatz der 'reinen' und 'einfachen' Intelligenz bei Richard von St. Viktor" (*op. cit.*, p. 143). Richard differed from Hugh on several important points. For instance, he has a different definition of *intellectibilia* and *intelligibilia*: "Sensibilia dico quaelibet visibilia et sensu corporeo perceptibilia. Intelligibilia autem dico invisibilia, ratione tamen comprehensibilia. Intellectibilia hoc loco dico invisibilia et humanae rationi incomprehensibilia" (*Benj. Major*, I, 7 [PL 196, 72C]). For Clarenbaldus of Arras, another disciple of Hugh, cf. Jansen, *op. cit.*, p. 65 ff.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, I, 3 (9). "Vis animae tertia. . . tota in rationa est constituta."

theory of knowledge it will be noted that intelligence is described as reason formed from within. Reason (whether it be *ratio in imaginationem agens*, or *ratio pura supra imaginationem*) and intelligence are two different modes in which the eye of reason operates.³⁶ This is also indicated by passages like the following:

The same soul, therefore, under different aspects is at the same time intellectible and intelligible—intellectible insofar as it is an incorporeal nature and cannot be grasped by any sense. But it is also intelligible in that it is a representation of sensible objects, though not of a sensible nature itself.³⁷

Thus Hugh would agree with St. Thomas³⁸ that reason and intelligence are not two separate faculties, but are two aspects of intellectual activity.

Hugh would agree also with the statement of Boethius that intelligence compares to reason as eternity compares to time.³⁹ He follows Augustine⁴⁰ and Boethius in advising his readers to remain as far as possible in the higher plane of reason which is

³⁶ Cf. *supra*, p. 67, n. 12. It should be noted that in this passage Hugh limits intelligence to the contemplation of God. This is a *denominatio a potiori*. We have seen that in other contexts Hugh also includes spiritual creatures (angels and the soul) as objects of intelligence (p. 71 ff., *supra*). Sometimes, indeed, intelligence means only a higher knowledge, insight, understanding in the usual senses of those terms. (Cf. *De Sac.* 1, X, 4 [176, 332]; *Did.*, I, 3 [9]; I, 8 [15]); cf. Liebner, *op. cit.*, p. 336 ff.

³⁷ *Did.*, II, 3 (27): "Eadem igitur res (anima) diversis respectibus intellectibilis simul et intelligibilis est. Intellectibilis eo quod incorporea sit natura, et nullo sensu comprehendi possit. Intelligibilis vero ideo, quod similitudo quidem est sensibilium, nec tamen sensibilis."

³⁸ Cf. *Summa Theologica*, I, 79, 8, corp.: "Respondeo dicendum quod ratio et intellectus in homine non possunt esse diversae potentiae." *Ibid.* 2-2, 49, 5, ad 3: "Etsi intellectus et ratio non sint diversae potentiae, tamen denominantur ex diversis actibus. Intellectus enim nomen sumitur ab intima penetratione veritatis; nomen autem rationis ab inquisitione et discursu." Cf. *De Veritate*, q. 15, art. 1, where Thomas gives his interpretation of the texts of Boethius on *ratio-intelligentia*. On the superiority of knowledge by intellect to that of reason in St. Thomas, cf. P. Rousselot, *The Intellectualism of St. Thomas*, pp. 32-37.

³⁹ *De Cons. Phil.* IV prosa 6 (Fortescue, 125).

⁴⁰ St. Augustine, *De Trinitate*, X, 7, 10 (PL 42, 979).

intelligence and not to descend to the discursive reason which operates with images arising from sense and memory. The mystical strain in Hugh is evident in the several passages where he recommends that one occupy the mind with *intellectibilia* rather than *intelligibilia*. The descent from one to the other is viewed as a "degeneration." The soul loses something of its simplicity when it becomes interested, as it is prone to do, in the dark images served up by sense to the lower reason.⁴¹ True happiness comes only when the soul recollects itself and ascends to the contemplation of the soul and of God, which is the proper field of intelligence.

Reason and intelligence are faculties and also acts of intellect. When they are considered as the subjects of intellectual virtues or habits they are called science and wisdom, and we now turn to Hugh's theory of these intellectual virtues.

SCIENCE AND WISDOM

The orientation of the theory of knowledge in Hugh of St. Victor is ethical and religious. St. Augustine set the tone for this philosophy in the famous remark (borrowed from Plato) that "if God is Wisdom . . . the true philosopher is a lover of God."⁴² Hugh writes no impartial and detached appraisal of the intellect's power to penetrate reality; his reflections on science and wisdom are in the spirit of Augustine—relevant to practical living.

The two dominant intellectual traditions flowing through the philosophical thought of the twelfth century take their rise in Plato and Aristotle. Platonism came through the *libri platonici* "some books of the Platonists translated from Greek into Latin,"

⁴¹ *Did.* II, 5 (29): "Vides nunc satis aperte, ut puto, quomodo animae de intellectibilibus ad intelligibilia degenerant, quando a puritate simplicis intelligentiae, quae nulla corporum fuscatur imagine, ad visibilium imaginationem descendunt rursusque beatiores fiunt, quando se ab hac distractione ad simplicem naturae suae fontem colligentes, quasi quodam optimae figurae signo impressae, componuntur." Cf. *De Arca*, IV, 2 (176, 665D.)

⁴² St. Augustine, *De Civitate Dei*, VIII, 1 (ed. Hoffman, *CSEL*, 40, 1, p.353).

of which St. Augustine wrote that God brought them to his notice.⁴³ These, of course, were Neoplatonic works. Hugh of St. Victor might quote the *Timaeus* directly from the translation of Chalcidius,⁴⁴ but for the most part it was Augustine who brought Platonic and "Plotinian" philosophy to the twelfth century.⁴⁵ And the medieval mind was early formed on the Aristotelian logic of Boethius.

One of the chief tools of thought in each of these traditions was a distinction between science and wisdom. Each used this tool in different ways and found different connotations in the terms. The followers of Augustine found wisdom in eternal principles of truth acquired by intelligence, while the Aristotelians found it in first principles arrived at through an initial abstraction from objects of experience. Science is always the foundation of wisdom for the peripatetic strain, since *nihil in intellectu nisi prius fuerit in sensu* — and reason leads to wisdom.⁴⁶

For Saint Augustine there is a decisive opposition between wisdom and science. The "right distinction" between them is this: "that the intellectual cognition of eternal things belongs to wisdom, but the rational cognition of temporal things to knowledge." He adds that it is not difficult to judge which is to receive the preference.⁴⁷ Hugh of St. Victor formulated no explicit

⁴³ *Confessions*, VII, 9 ff. (Gibb-Montgomery, pp. 180 ff.).

⁴⁴ Cf. B. W. Switalski, *Des Chalcidius Kommentar zu Platos Timaeus* (Muenster i. W. 1902), BGPM, III, 6. Eine historisch-kritische Untersuchung.

⁴⁵ Cf. H. Meyerhoff, "On the Platonism of St. Augustine's Quaestio de Ideis," *The New Scholasticism*, XVI (1942), 1, pp. 16 ff.; On the reception of Aristotle and Plato in the 12th century see C. H. Haskins, *The Renaissance of the Twelfth Century*, ch. XII: The Revival of Philosophy; Cl. Baeumker, *Der Platonismus im Mittelalter*; Ueberweg-Geyer, *op. cit.*, No. 16; "Quellen der Scholastik," pp. 145-152; A. Schneider, *Die abendländische Spekulation des 12ten Jahrhunderts in ihrem Verhältnis zur aristotelischen und jüdisch-arabischen Philosophie*.

⁴⁶ Cf. F. Ballaine, *The Relations Between Science and Wisdom: Illustrations of the History of a Distinction* (New York: Columbia, 1936), p. 2.

⁴⁷ St. Augustine, *De Trinitate*, XII, 15, 25 (PL 42, 1012); Cf. *ibid.*, XIII, 1, 2 (1013); XIV, 1. The distinction was always in Augustine's thought from his first works in 386 to his last. The *De Trinitate* expresses

theory of the intellectual *habitus*, but the distinction between science and wisdom is omnipresent in his works. His application of it may be described as a variation on the theme in St. Augustine. Wisdom in general means the knowledge of God and Soul, while science is turned to temporal things — the distinction between *frui* and *uti*.⁴⁸

The approach to a division of philosophy in Hugh of St. Victor is moral, even pragmatic, rather than metaphysical. In the first part of the encyclopaedic *Didascalicon* (Books I-III) where the whole scheme of sciences and liberal arts is a development of Aristotle and Boethius, a twofold purpose of philosophy is distinguished. His concern on the one hand is to restore the image of God in man through the search for truth and the practice of virtue,⁴⁹ and on the other to eliminate the weaknesses which necessity to work for a living (after the Fall) forces upon man. Men find three great evils in the world — ignorance, vice, weakness. To extirpate them three remedies were found — wisdom, virtue, and necessity itself. Every art and every science was discovered by man to combat the three evils. Intelligence works in wisdom and virtue, while mere science is the necessity of earthbound man. Through theoretical philosophy comes wis-

it best. Cf. J. Martin, *Saint Augustin* (Paris: Alcan, 1901), pp. 1-6 (Series: Les grands philosophes); J. Maritain, *The Degrees of Knowledge* (New York: Scribners, 1938), ch. VI, "Concerning Augustinian Wisdom," pp. 358-381.

⁴⁸ Cf. J. Maritain, *Science and Wisdom* (New York: Scribners, 1940), p. 18: "Later centuries were to live on Augustine's doctrine of wisdom and knowledge. Augustine taught them that between *wisdom* which knows by higher understanding in the daylight of the divine order, and *science* which knows by inferior reason in the twilight of created things, there is an order of preference for or against which souls and civilizations must choose. For science is good and worthy of love, but it is not above wisdom. . . . It is clear that the wisdom of which Augustine speaks is first and foremost the wisdom of grace. The wisdom of this world is overcome and subordinate to it." In Hugh also wisdom is primarily an infused wisdom, but there is a lesser wisdom—the *speculatio veritatis* which is the highest function of reason. Cf. *Did.* II, 18 (37).

⁴⁹ *Did.* I, 8 (15): "Duo vero sunt quae divinam in homine similitudinem reparent, id est speculatio veritatis et virtutis exercitium."

dom, through practical philosophy comes virtue, while necessity urged men to develop the mechanical arts. Logic came later — *propter eloquentiam*. Wisdom then is the perfecting of the speculative intellect, the full grasp of reality, and the remedy against ignorance and the closed eye of contemplation which came with the Fall of man: "There are four principal sciences, therefore, from which all others come: Theoretical, practical, mechanical philosophy, and logic."⁵⁰

It is not difficult to realize that Hugh's account of the origin of the different divisions of philosophy will lead him to accept the ancient definition of philosophy as the science of all things, human and divine, investigating causes fully. From Hugh's division and subdivision of philosophy it is apparent that the whole sweep of human knowledge is covered by the term. "Philosophy is divided into theoretical, practical, mechanical, and logical. These four embrace all knowledge."⁵¹ Here, too,

⁵⁰ *Did.*, VI, 14 (130-131): "Tria sunt: sapientia, virtus, necessitas. Sapientia est comprehensio rerum prout sunt. Virtus est habitus animi in modum naturae rationi consentaneus. Necessitas est sine qua vivere non possumus, sed felicius viveremus. Haec tria remedia sunt contra mala tria, quibus subjecta est vita humana: sapientia contra ignorantiam, virtus contra vitium, necessitas contra infirmitatem. Propter ista tria mala extirpanda quaesita sunt tria ista remedia, et propter haec tria remedia inveniendae, inventa est omnis ars et omnis disciplina. Propter sapientiam inventa est theoria, propter virtutem inventa est practica, propter necessitatem inventa est mechanica. Ista tres usu primae fuerunt, sed postea propter eloquentiam inventa est logica. Quae cum sit inventionem ultima, prima tamen esse debet in doctrina. Quattuor ergo sunt principales scientiae a quibus omnes aliae descendunt: theoria practica, mechanica, logica." Cf. *Did.* II, 8 (15-16).

⁵¹ *Did.*, I, 4 (11): "Quod si verum esse constiterit, iam non solum ea studia in quibus vel de rerum natura vel disciplina agitur morum, verum etiam omnium humanorum actuum seu studiorum rationes, non incongrue ad philosophiam pertinere dicemus. Secundum quam acceptionem sic philosophiam definire possumus: Philosophia est disciplina omnium rerum humanarum atque divinarum rationes plene investigans." Cf. *ibid.* II, 1 (24). "Omnium studiorum ratio ad philosophiam spectat et ideo philosophia aliquo modo ad omnes res pertinere videtur"; *ibid.*: "Philosophia est ars artium et disciplinarum, id est, ad quam omnes artes et disciplinae spectant." This notion of philosophy appears in Macrobius (*Conviviorum*

is evidence of Hugh's eclecticism. The inspiration for this division is Aristotelian in that it is based on the speculative and practical activity of man. As a revival and expansion of Aristotle's *schema* it meant abandoning the Stoic and Platonic division (logic, physics, ethics) which had been accepted through the earlier centuries.⁵² But there is an Augustinian coloring in the distinction of science and wisdom which lies at its root. *Theorica* (divided into theology, mathematics, and physics) has for its object the *speculatio veritatis*, and for that reason it alone merits the name of wisdom.⁵³ The other three parts of philosophy, al-

primi diei Saturnaliorum VII, 1, 6, ed. Eyssenhardt, Teubner, p. 406) and St. Augustine (*De Trinitate*, XIV, 1, 3; [PL 42, 1037]): "Sapientia est rerum divinarum humanarumque scientia", who traces it to the Presocratics. Hugh probably took it from Cicero, through whom it can be traced to the Stoics. (Cf. Sextus Empiricus, *Adv. Math.*, 9, 13: quoted by K. Praechter, *Die Phil. des Altertums* [Berlin, 1926], p. 415.) Hugh has made a wider application of it than the ancients by including *mechanica*. Cf. J. Mariétan, *op. cit.*, p. 130-31. Hugh's division of philosophy influences also the famous work of St. Bonaventure: "De Reductione Artium in Theologiam."

⁵² Hugh's division of philosophy has drawn much comment from the historians. See especially the section on him in the history of the division of philosophy in L. Baur, *Dominicus Gundissalinus De Divisione Philosophiae*, etc. Baur has shown that in the twelfth century the Aristotelian division broke in again after the stoic-platonic division which had been general since Isidore and could still be found in John of Salisbury. Aristotle's division is found in Hugh and Richard of St. Victor (through the Latin encyclopaedic literature) and in Gundisalvi and Michael Scotus (directly from the Arabians). Hugh widened the Aristotelian schema by the addition of the *artes mechanicae* and *logica*, but the content stems from Augustine, Boethius, Cassiodorus and Isidore. (pp. 358-362). His division influenced St. Albert the Great and Robert Kilwardby.

⁵³ *Did.* II, 18 (37): "Sunt qui has tres theoricæ partes (i. e., theologia, mathematica, physica) mystice quodam Palladis nomine, quæ dea sapientiae fingitur esse, significari putant. Dicitur enim Tritona, quasi tritoona, id est tertia cognitio, videlicet Dei, quam intellectibile nominavimus, et animarum, quam intelligibilem diximus, et corporum, quam naturalem appellavimus. Et merito ab his tribus tantum sapientia vocabulum sumit . . . Solam autem theoricam, propter speculationem veritatis, sapientiam nominamus." Cf. *ibid.*, I, 11 (22). In a wider sense *sapientia* includes both wisdom (identified with intelligence) and science, while *theorica* and *practica* (ethics) are subsumed under the wide term *intelligentia*. This is

though they are in the service of wisdom and may be included under it, are properly called science or prudence.⁵⁴ In another context the hierarchy of God, Soul, World is the basis for a distinction into wisdom, prudence, and sense appetite (*affectus*). Wisdom is fixed on God, prudence on earthly things. The function of prudence is to regulate the sensual appetites. And human reason again holds the middle place, looking above and beneath itself — the principle of order.⁵⁵ It is evident that the distinction

in accord with a definition of philosophy (*sapientia*) as the science of all things, human and divine. Cf. *Did.* II, 8 (15-16): "Omnis actio igitur vel divina est vel humana. Possumus autem non incongrue illam, eo quod de superioribus habeatur, intelligentiam appellare, hanc vero, quia de inferioribus habetur, et quasi quodam consilio indiget, scientiam vocare. Si igitur sapientia, ut supra dictum est, cunctas quae ratione fiunt moderatur actiones, consequens est jam ut sapientiam has duas partes continere, i. e., intelligentiam et scientiam, dicamus. Rursus intelligentia, quoniam et in investigatione veritatis et in morum consideratione laborat, eam in duas species dividimus, in theoreticam, id est, speculativam, et practicam, id est, activam, quae etiam ethica, id est, moralis, appellatur. Scientia vero, quia opera humana prosequitur, congrue mechanica, i. e., adulterina vocatur."

⁵⁴ *Did.*, II, 18: "Quia, licet tres reliquas, id est, ethicam, mechanicam, logicam congrue ad sapientiam referre possimus, expressius tamen logicam propter vocis eloquentiam, mechanicam et ethicam propter circumspectionem morum et operum, prudentiam sive scientiam appellamus."

⁵⁵ *De Sacr.*, 1, IX, 13 (176, 315C-316A): "Sic quippe conditus est homo, ut quiddam in eo supremum esset, et in homine nihil altius esset. Post illud autem aliud sub illo esset et subiectum illi; deinde aliud novissimum in imo constitutum, et caeteris duobus subiectum. Erat quippe in homine ratio supremo loco constituta, solis divinis et invisibilibus intendens et divinae voluntati se conformans. Post haec alia quaedam ratio ad corporalia et visibilia respiciens, quae subiciebatur superiori, et ab illa informata subjectae sibi sensualitati dominabatur, quae tertio et imo loco fuerat constituta. Sic itaque tria inventa sunt in homine: sapientia, prudentia et sensualitas. *Sapientia scilicet hoc est ratio ad divina, prudentia hoc est ratio ad humana*; sensualitas vero hoc est affectus sive appetitus ad terrena. E quibus prima, scilicet ratio, regebat tantum et non regebatur. Sensualitas ultima regebatur tantum et non regebat. Media vero ratio et a superiori regebatur et inferius regebat." Hugh goes on to compare man to wisdom, woman to earthly prudence, and animals to sense appetite. Cf. *De Sacr.*, 1, I, 19 (176, 200D-201A). Speaking of the two contrary movements of soul upward and body downward: "Sed fit aliquoties ut contrarii motus

between science and wisdom, as in Bonaventure and the Augustinian tradition generally, is based upon the objects toward which these two activities are directed. Hugh would agree with St. Bonaventure that knowledge contemplates God in his works; wisdom contemplates Him in Himself.⁵⁶ The theory of the two worlds, the one eternal and immutable, the other temporary and changing, is again implicit in Hugh's concept of science and wisdom. The movement of knowledge is that which St. Augustine had recommended—*ab exterioribus ad interiora, et ab interioribus ad superiora*.

Can we trace this influence of Augustine on Hugh's theory of knowledge more definitely? The question of illumination and *cognitio in rationibus aeternis* rises to the mind of anyone who makes that inquiry, for it is a well-known fact that many of Hugh's contemporary Augustinists in the twelfth century fell back upon the theory of divine illumination for their explanation of the ultimate source of knowledge. Therefore, we propose to end this chapter on reason and intelligence with an investigation of the theory of illumination as it appears in Hugh of St. Victor.

THE THEORY OF ILLUMINATION

After the foregoing analysis of the relations between sense, reason, and intelligence it is apparent that Hugh's theory of knowledge is no consistent synthesis such as St. Thomas Aquinas was to produce a century later. In Hugh we have found elements derived from Plato and Plotinus, from Aristotle and Boethius. There was some confusion and never a complete integration. Hugh's historical position at the beginning of the transition period of the twelfth century will help explain this lack of syn-

confusionem gignant; nisi ratio media interveniens dividat ab invicem, et discernat voluntates et appetitus desideriaque dijudicet."

⁵⁶ St. Bonaventure, *Comment. in Ecclesiasten*, I, 10 (Quaracchi, VI, p. 74); Cf. St. Augustine, *De Trin.*, XIII, 1, 1. (*PL*, 42, 1013): "Wisdom tends toward contemplation; knowledge toward action." That is why Hugh can say, "Summam igitur in vita solamen est studium sapientiae (i.e., philosophy) quam qui invenit felix est, et qui possidet beatus." (*Did.* I, 1, 6.)

thesis. It would be wrong, however, to conclude from the eclectic character of his theory of knowledge that Hugh of St. Victor found no metaphysical foundation and no principle of order on which to base his philosophy of knowledge. Human reason does find the principle of order in the hierarchy of God, Spirit, and World. Hugh adopted the Augustinian theory of exemplarism as the basis for his study of created essences in relation to God, the creating intelligence.

The doctrine of *causae exemplares* had already had a long history before St. Augustine followed the lead of Plotinus and transferred the separated Platonic Ideas from the *τόπος ὑπερουρανικός* to the mind of God himself. From Plato the history of these *rationes aeternae* may be traced through the Stoics to Philo Judaeus and the Neoplatonists, and from them to the Logos-doctrine of the Alexandrian Fathers. St. Augustine and Pseudo-Dionysius modified the doctrine of the Neoplatonists. Through Augustine especially the theory of exemplarism passed into the whole of the Christian tradition of the West. Venerable Bede, Scotus Erigena, Anselm and Thomas Aquinas—all spoke of the *ideae exemplares*.⁵⁷ At the end of his chapter on the Divine Will Hugh of St. Victor adopts an Augustinian voluntarism and exemplarism as the metaphysical foundation of the hierarchy of being which human reason discovers in the universe.⁵⁸ In the appendix to the *Didascalicon* Hugh de-

⁵⁷ For a brief historical survey of the doctrine of *causae exemplares*, cf. P. G. Schulemann, *Das Kausalprinzip in der Philosophie des hl. Thomas von Aquin* (Muenster i.W., 1915), *BGPM*, XIII, 5, pp. 92 ff.

⁵⁸ *De Sac.*, 1, IV, 26 (176, 246): "Sic igitur constat rerum ordo, ut post prima posteriora sequantur. Prima omnium rerum est voluntas Creatoris, quoniam ex ipsa sunt omnia. Post ipsam sequuntur quae sunt ex ipsa. Prima sunt quae sunt in ea; secunda sunt quae ex ea sunt. . . . Quae in voluntate Dei aeterna et invisibilia sunt, prima omnium sunt. Quae ex voluntate Dei temporalia et invisibilia sunt, secunda sunt post prima, quae temporalia et visibilia tertia post secunda. Et in ipsis visibilibus quae rationalia sunt propinquiora sunt invisibilibus, quia in ipsis invisibilia sunt quae rationalia sunt. Ponuntur ergo primo loco *causae primordiales et invisibiles et increatae creandorum omnium in mente divina*. Secundo loco angelica natura. . . . Tertio loco humana (natura) . . . Quarto loco creatura corporea.

velops the three modes of existence which created things may have—subsistence in actuality, in man's intellect and in the Divine Mind. Here the context is one of the numerous references to man as made to the image of God and to the lesser creatures made to the image of man.⁵⁹

The *rationes aeternae* as principles of knowledge in St. Augustine and St. Bonaventure play an essential role in the theory of illumination which these two philosophers used in their description of the process of knowledge.⁶⁰ From St. Augustine the later Franciscan scholar drew the conclusion that it is "plainly evident that all things are known in *rationibus aeternis*."⁶¹ It is somewhat surprising, to find that Hugh of St. Victor, who accepted the basic exemplarism of St. Augustine, did not employ the whole theory of illumination. As a matter of fact his use of it is re-

... "On the *causae primordiales*, cf. *ibid.*, 1, II, 2, 3 (De causis primordialibus et effectibus earum; de generatione causarum primordialium).

⁵⁹ *Did.*, appendix (p. 134): "Tribus modis res subsistere habent: in actu, in intellectu, in mente divina; hoc est in ratione divina, in ratione hominis, in seipsis. In seipsis sine subsistentia transeunt, in intellectu hominis subsistunt quidem, sed tamen immutabiles non sunt, in mente divina sine omni mutabilitate subsistunt. Item quod est in actu imago est ejus quod est in mente hominis, et quod est in mente hominis imago est ejus quod est in mente divina. Ad mentem divinam facta est creatura rationalis. Ad creaturam rationalem facta est creatura visibilis. Ideo omnis motus et conversio creaturae rationalis esse debet ad mentem divinam."

⁶⁰ For St. Augustine, cf. *De Civitate Dei*, XI (CSEL 40, 1, p. 528, ed. Hoffman), *De diversis quaestionibus*, 83, q. 46. Cf. C. Boyer, *L'Idée de vérité dans la philosophie de Saint Augustin* (Paris, 1921), p. 175 ff. Grabmann writes, "Die eigentliche Begründung der cognitio in rationibus aeternis, der Schau in Gott, in den ewigen göttlichen Ideen entnimmt Augustinus aus der Natur unserer Urteile und Wahrheitserkenntnisse zuerst aus dem absoluten und unveränderlichen Charakter unserer Urteile." For St. Bonaventure, cf. A. Luyckx, *Die Erkenntnislehre Bonaventuras* (Muenster i.W., 1923), BGPM XXIII, 3-4, pp. 200, 234. E. Gilson, *The Philosophy of Saint Bonaventure*, pp. 378-403.

⁶¹ After quoting with approval many texts of St. Augustine on the point, Bonaventure concludes, "Ex his auctoritatibus manifeste patet, quod omnia sciuntur in rationibus aeternis." (*De Scientia Christi*, q. IV, fund. 8 [Quaracchi, V, p. 18].) Cf. Sister Mary Rachael Dady, *The Theory of Knowledge of Saint Bonaventure* (Washington: Catholic University Press, 1939), p. 31.

stricted for the most part to the explanation of the knowledge which man has of God himself. We should expect Hugh's use of the illumination theory to anticipate the statements of St. Bonaventure rather than those of St. Thomas Aquinas, but it is toward the Thomistic interpretation of Augustine that Hugh inclines.

Many of the great Christian philosophers followed St. Augustine and wrote philosophical interpretations of the verse of the Psalm: *signatum est super nos lumen vultus tui, Domine*.⁶² In the more common interpretation of St. Augustine's theory of knowledge he is understood to say that man's power to know reality rests immediately on a divine illumination originating outside man himself.⁶³ St. Bonaventure and his disciple, Matthew of Aquasparta, speak in the same vein. St. Thomas Aquinas also maintains that God causes man's knowledge (as a Cause operating in the order of primary causality), but that man himself is the principal cause. According to St. Thomas the knowledge in man does not come through an immediate illumination from above, but through the light of intellect in individual souls. With Aristotle he terms the active intellect a *natural* light or a power native to man. The light of reason is a participation in the Eternal Light, a likeness of the uncreated Truth in us.⁶⁴ To the problem posed for the Middle Ages by St. Augustine: *utrum anima intellectiva cognoscat res materiales in rationibus aeternis*,

⁶² Ps. IV, 6.

⁶³ An excellent short treatment of the varied interpretations is found in M. Grabmann's comparative study of St. Augustine and St. Thomas on illumination: *Der göttliche Grund menschlicher Wahrheitserkenntnis nach Augustinus und Thomas von Aquin*. For a brief discussion cf. E. Portalié, art. "Saint Augustin," *D.Th.C.* I, 2, col. 2334 ff.

⁶⁴ Cf. *In Arist. librum de Anima Comm.*, III, lect. 10 (Pirotta, 730); *Summa Theologica*, I, 79, 4, cap. "Sed intellectus separatus . . . est ipse Deus, qui est creator animae, et in quo solo beatificatur . . . Unde ab ipso anima humana lumen intellectuale participat, secundum illud: Signatum est super nos lumen vultus tui, Domine."; *QQ. Disp. XI: De Veritate*, XI, 1, corp. (Paris: Lethielleux, 1884), pp. 136-137: "Hujusmodi autem rationis lumen, quo principia hujusmodi sunt nobis nota, est nobis a Deo inditum, quasi quaedam similitudo increatae veritatis in nobis resultantis."

Thomas replies that the soul does know *in rationibus aeternis*, but indirectly and by participation only.⁶⁵

In Hugh of Saint Victor one finds no *ex professo* discussion of the theory of illumination and of the problem which Augustine had formulated for the Middle Ages. He does make a few scattered remarks, however, which indicate that his position is in some respects similar to that of St. Thomas Aquinas. Thus, in one passage he says that the eye of reason "requires no light from without, but sees by means of its own proper light."⁶⁶ He speaks, too, of the innate power of the soul to become all things and to represent for itself the world of sense and the world above sense. Just as the piece of metal hammered out by the metal-smith becomes representative by its internal power, so the soul clothes itself with resemblances of the external world.⁶⁷ Finally,

⁶⁵ *Summa Theologica*, I, 84, 5, corp. "Et sic necesse est dicere quod anima humana omnia cognoscat in rationibus aeternis, per quarum participationem omnia cognoscimus. Ipsum enim lumen intellectuale, quod est in nobis, nihil est aliud quam quaedam participata similitudo lucis increati, in quo continentur rationes aeternae."

⁶⁶ *De Van.* I (176, 704BC): "Nolo igitur ut cogites visionem hujus oculi (carnis) quando audis te ad videndum invitari. Habes alium oculum intus multo clariorem isto, qui praeterita, praesentia et futura simul respicit, qui suae visionis lumen et aciem per cuncta diffundit, qui occulta per cuncta diffundit, qui occulta penetrat, subtilia investigat, *luce aliena ad videndum non indigens sed sua ac propria luce prospiciens.*" The contrast here is between the light of the sun needed to make vision possible (*oculus carnis*) and the fact that the intellect (*oculus rationis*) needs no other light but its own. In another place Hugh speaks of the soul seeing through the invisible (i. e., non-corporeal) light native to the soul: "Nam secundum invisibilem lucem insitam sibi noster animus ad invisibilia respiciens . . ." (*In cael. Hier.* II, 175, 949D.) Cf. *De Sacr.*, 1, VI, 7 (176, 268C): "Praeceptum naturae nos nihil aliud intelligimus, quam ipsam discretionem naturalem quae intrinsecus inspirata est ut per eam homo erudiretur de his quae sibi vel appetenda vel fugienda fuerunt"; cf. *ibid.*, 1, VI, 13 (176, 271AB).

⁶⁷ *Did.*, I, 1 (5): "Neque enim haec rerum omnium similitudo aliunde aut extrinsecus advenire credenda est, sed ipsa anima potius eam in se et ex se nativa quadam potentia et propria virtute capit. Nam sicut Varro in *Periphyssion* dicit: 'Non omnis varietas extrinsecus rebus accedit, ut necesse sit quidquid variatur, aut amittere aliquid quod habuit, aut aliquid aliud et diversum extrinsecus quod non habuit assumere.' Videmus cum paries extrinsecus adveniente forma imaginis cujuslibet similitudinem accipit.

in explaining why the human mind, "which is so far from God and yet can comprehend so much about Him" Hugh says that this comprehension comes either through divine revelation or directly through man's own power of reason. Reason is the light of truth placed within man—*insitum sibi lumen veritatis*.⁶⁸

We shall find that the theory of illumination exerts a greater influence upon Hugh's thought when he speaks of the possibility and the nature of man's knowledge of God. Before we discuss the rational and the mystical knowledge of God, however, we must consider the nature of man's knowledge of his own soul; for it is self-consciousness which gives man the surest and the best approach to his Creator.

Cum vero impressor metallo figuram imprimit, ipsum quidem non extrinsecus, sed ex propria virtute et naturali habilitate aliud jam aliquid representare incipit. Sic nimirum mens, rerum omnium similitudine insignita, omnia esse dicitur, atque ex omnibus compositionem suscipere, non integraliter, sed virtualiter atque potentialiter continere . . ." Concerning the *Periphyssion* mentioned here the German translation of the *Didascalicon* notes: "Ein solches Werk Varros ist nicht weiter bekannt. Wahrscheinlich ist das Werk des Scotus Erigena *περὶ φύσεως μερισμοῦ* gemeint." P. G. Meyer, "Hugo von St. Viktor's Lehrbuch," in *Ausgewählte Schriften* (Freiburg im Br.: 1890), p. 159, n. 1.

⁶⁸ *De Sacr.*, 1, III, 5 (176, 2180D): "Nunc oportet . . . considerare, qualiter mens humana, quae tam longe a Deo est, tanta de Deo potuerit comprehendere, vel *ratione propria directa*, vel revelatione divina adjuta. Et primum usquequo ipsa humana ratio ex insito sibi lumine veritatis convaluerit, dignum est consideratione; ne si vel totum homini detur negare convincamur gratiam, aut si tollatur totum ignorantiam excusare. Itaque utrumque modum humanae investigationis ordine prosequamur, quo ratio hominis vel per se directa vel ab iis quae extra se naturaliter erant visibilia admonita, ad verum cognoscendum enisa est."

CHAPTER VI

SELF-KNOWLEDGE AND CERTITUDE

CHRISTIAN SOCRATISM

A characteristic note of medieval philosophy is its preoccupation with the precept, "Know Thyself," which Socrates received from the Delphic Oracle. It would be inaccurate to say that the *γῶθι σεαυτόν* is the particular mark of any one school, but Augustine and his followers in the Middle Ages did employ introspection more intensively than the rest. All the schools believed that the dignity of man rested on the fact that he was made to the image of God, and that by studying the image one could learn something of Him in whose image man was made. This was a conviction that owed as much to a text in *Genesis* as it did to Socrates, and Gilson has given it a convenient name — Christian Socratism.¹

Christian Socratism is of moral inspiration. Socrates himself taught a philosophy of practical living; his followers were urged to know themselves that they might become better men. The Stoics constructed a philosophy centered in the principle that man should live according to his own nature. St. Augustine was more explicit. He wanted men to know themselves that they might learn thereby their proper place in the universe:

Why, therefore, is it enjoined upon the soul, that it should know itself? I suppose, in order that it may consider itself, and live according to its own nature, *viz.*, under Him to whom it ought to be subject and above those things to which it is to be preferred; under him by whom it ought to be ruled, above those things which it ought to rule.²

¹ E. Gilson, *The Spirit of Medieval Philosophy*, Ch. XI.

² St. Augustine, *De Trinitate*, X, 5, 7 (Translation by A. W. Haddan in *A Select Library of the Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers*, 1. series, ed. P. Schaff, Vol. III (New York: Scribners, 1905), p. 138).

Hugh of St. Victor also placed man at the center of creation — below God and above the irrational creature. His definition of self-knowledge in the first man is a reflection of Augustine's Socratism:

To know his own condition and place, what he owes to things above him and beneath and to himself, to understand what he has been made, how he should conduct himself, what he should do and not do — in this for man consists self-knowledge.³

The School of St. Victor inherited its passion for psychological mysticism from St. Augustine, who never ceased to marvel at the rich depths of his own soul — *grande profundum est homo*. One need but recall his famous motto: "I wish to know God and my soul. Nothing more? Nothing indeed!"⁴ It is not surprising that Hugh of St. Victor attached greater importance to introspection than to a scientific study of nature, because consciousness was the greater source of knowledge concerning the soul and its Creator. He did not deny that knowledge came also through the discursive reason working upon data served to imagination by the senses, but such knowledge or science was a lower stage in the journey of the mind to God. Self-knowledge was wisdom, superior to any knowledge of the fleeting and particular things outside the soul. Hugh begins the *Didascalicon* on this note:

The first thing to be sought after is wisdom, in which consists the form of perfect good. Wisdom illuminates man that he may know himself, who is no more than other things if he does not understand that he is made above other things. The immortal soul, illumined by wisdom, looks to its origin and realizes how unsuitable it is that it should seek anything outside itself when the knowledge of what it is is sufficient.

³ *De Sac.*, 1, VI, 15 (176, 272A): "Hoc siquidem erat semetipsum agnoscere, conditionem et ordinem et debitum suum sive supra se, sive in se, sive sub se non ignorare; intelligere qualis factus esset et qualiter incedere debet; quid agere, quid cavere similiter. Hoc totum erat semetipsum agnoscere."

⁴ *Soliloquia*, I, 2, 7; cf. J. Storz, *Die Phil. des hl. Augustins*, pp. 16-17.

Written on the tripod of Apollo were these words: *gnoti seauton*, that is, know thyself; because indeed, if man had not forgotten whence he came, he would know the worthlessness of anything subject to change.⁵

Man as the image of God is one of the principal themes developed by Christian Socratism, and Hugh expounds it on numerous occasions, particularly in his chapters *de cognitione divinitatis*. All the Scholastics agreed that according to the text in Genesis⁶ man is made to the image of God in that he is the vicar of God on earth. "God makes over a share of the government to man, who thus has a dominion over things analogous to God's."⁷ The various schools separated on the question of the exact nature of this image in man. Some stressed free-will as primary, some insisted on the greater dignity of mind.⁸ Hugh of St. Victor sees

⁵ *Did.*, I, 1 (4): "Omnium expetendorum prima est sapientia, in qua perfecti boni forma consistit. Sapientia illuminat hominem ut semetipsum agnoscat, qui ceteris similis fuit cum se prae ceteris factum esse non intellexit. Immortalis quippe animus sapientia illustratus respicit principium suum et quam sit indecorum agnoscit, ut extra se quidquam quaerat, cui quod ipse est, satis esse poterat. Scriptum legitur in tripode Apollinis: *gnoti seauton*, id est, cognosce te ipsum, quia nimirum homo si non originis suae immemor esset, omne quod mutabilitati obnoxium est, quam sit nihil, agnosceret." Schedler notes the dependence of Hugh upon Macrobius in this text. "Ganz besonders auffällig klingen Hugos Erörterung über die Selbsterkenntnis (*Did.* I, 1) an die des Macrobius an (*Comm. in Somnium Scipionis*, I, 9, 2 ff.). Die Gegenüberstellung der beiden Partien zeigt, dass eine so genaue Übereinstimmung der Gedanken ohne Benützung des Macrobius nicht möglich ist. Zugleich lassen sie erkennen, wie die Gedanken Macrobs in die christliche Spekulation übergegangen sind." P. M. Schedler, *Die Philosophie des Macrobius und ihr Einfluss auf die Wissenschaft des christlichen Mittelalter*, pp. 121-122.

⁶ Genesis, I, 26-27.

⁷ Gilson, *The Spirit of Medieval Philosophy*, p. 211. This is also a central thought in Hugh. *De Sacr.*, I, II, 1, (176, 205BC): "Prius siquidem opifex Deus mundum fecit; ac deinde hominem possessorem et dominum mundi, ut caeteris omnibus jure conditionis dominaretur homo, ipsi a quo factus fuerat soli voluntaria libertate subjectus. . . . Si enim omnia Deus fecit propter hominem, causa omnium homo est; et causaliter homo prior omnibus est, ipsum vero propter quod homo factus est prius homine est. . ."

⁸ Cf. Gilson, *loc. cit.*, for a summary of different opinions.

the image in the intellect primarily, while God's likeness is in man's will.⁹ It is not difficult to realize that the chief value of self-knowledge and its study of the image of God in the soul is the fact that it offers an easy approach to the knowledge of God, in which Hugh was primarily interested.¹⁰

This does not mean that the study of external nature was neglected. On the contrary, Hugh regards such an investigation as the preliminary step in the journey of the mind towards God, but intuition of self is always the surer method of finding God.¹¹

⁹ *Excerpt. Prior*, I, 1 (177, 193A): "Fecit autem (Deus) eam (creaturam rationalem) ad imaginem et similitudinem suam secundum dilectionem; ad imaginem suam secundum cognitionem veritatis; ad similitudinem suam, secundum amorem veritatis; ad imaginem suam secundum affectum." Cf. *Did.* I, 8 (15); appendix (134). Cf. St. Augustine, *Enarr. in Ps.* 42, n. 6: "We perceive then that we have a certain part which is the 'image of God'; viz., the mind and reason."

¹⁰ Cf. *De Sacr.*, 1, VI, 2 (176, 264D): "qualiter homo ad imaginem et similitudinem Dei factus est; *De Sacr.* 1, II, 13 (176, 211) Quod similitudo Dei in rationali creatura perfectior est quam foris." In the consciousness of this image of God within himself man not only finds God, but also the "vestiges" of the Trinity. This again is typically medieval, a part of a "luxuriant growth of Trinitarian symbols, a sort of symbolic psychology in which faculties, their functions, their objects, and the various ways of attaining their objects, all go in threes." (Gilson, *Spirit of M. Phil.*, p. 212). Cf. *De Sacr.*, 1, III, 21 (176, 225): "Quod imago Dei in rationali creatura expressior est, et vestigium Trinitatis invenitur in ipsa"; *De Sacr.*, 1, III, 28 (230): "Quod vestigium Trinitatis . . . etiam in creatura corporea reperitur." Parallels to these chapters are found in St. Augustine.

¹¹ *Did.* VII, 25 (176, 835BC): "In conditione (i. e., creatione) vero primo gradu ad imaginem Dei rationalis creatura facta est; deinde creatura corporea, ut creatura rationalis in ea foris agnosceret quid a creatore intus accepisset. In sapientia Dei est veritas, in rationali creatura imago veritatis, in corporea creatura umbra imaginis. Rationalis creatura facta est ad Dei sapientiam. Corporea creatura facta est ad rationalem creaturam. Propter quod omnis motus et conversio rationalis creaturae debet esse ad Dei sapientiam, ut dum quodque suo semper superiori adhaeret per conversionem, nec primae conditionis ordinem, nec primi exemplaris in se perturbet similitudinem. Quisquis ergo via investigationis de visibilibus ad invisibilia transit, primum a corporea creatura ad rationalem creaturam, deinde a rationali creatura ad considerationem sui Creatoris mentis intuitum ducere debet."

Whoever proceeds on the way of investigation from the visible to the invisible must first direct the intuition of his mind from the corporeal creature to the rational creature, and then from the rational creature to the consideration of its Creator.

He is eloquent in describing his wonder at the beauty and the grandeur of the universe and the marvelous structure of the human body. The whole visible world is like a book written by the finger of God, and the creatures in the world are the letters inscribed by God's pen to manifest His own wisdom. Those who do not read the book of Nature are like the illiterates who read the written characters of a book but do not grasp their meaning. The wise man is he who can read the inner meaning of things. He knows things in their own inner nature; but he also knows the meaning of the universe as a whole.¹²

On the other hand, Hugh leaves no doubt in his readers' minds as to his preference for self-consciousness as a means of knowledge. We shall discover that, although he does not reject the proofs for God's existence which start from sense-experience,

¹² *Did.* VII, 4 (176, 814BC): "Universus enim mundus iste sensibilis quasi quidam liber est scriptus digito Dei, hoc est virtute divina creatus, et singulae creaturae quasi figurae quaedam sunt non humano placito inventae, sed divino arbitrio institutae ad manifestandam invisibilium Dei sapientiam. Quemadmodum autem si illiteratus quis apertum librum videat, figuras aspicit, litteras non cognoscit: ita stultus et animalis homo, qui non percipit ea quae Dei sunt (I Cor. II) in visibilibus istis creaturis foris videt speciem, sed intus non intelligit rationem. Qui autem spiritualis est, et omnia judicare potest, in eo quidem quod foris considerat pulchritudinem operis, intus concipit quam miranda sit sapientia Creatoris. Et ideo nemo est cui opera Dei mirabilia non sint, cum insipiens in eis solam miratur speciem; sapiens autem per id quod foris videt profundam rimatur divinae sapientiae cogitationem, velut si in una eademque Scriptura alter colorem seu formationem figurarum commendat; alter vero laudet sensum et significationem." Cf. *De Sac.* I, VI, 5 (176, 266D-267A); *Hom.*, II (PL 175, 142A-C). Cf. Baeumker, "Geist und Form der mittelalterlichen Philosophie," in *Studien und Charakteristiken zur Geschichte der Phil. insbesondere des Mittelalters*. Ed. Grabmann (Muenster i.W., 1927), BGPM, XXV, 1-2 p. 96. Baeumker uses Hugh's text to disprove the notion that medieval writers thought it wrong to study natural science and the natural phenomena. H. O. Taylor, *The Mediaeval Mind*, vol. II, ch. XXIX.

he dwells principally on inner experience as the foundation for his proofs.¹³ Man's soul is the only spirit that he knows directly, and this knowledge can lead him to some cognition of the higher spiritual creation and of God Himself.¹⁴ More important still is the fact that self-knowledge opens the door to the higher contemplation practised by the mystic. The way to ascend to God is to descend into oneself.¹⁵

With the mystic strain predominant in his thought it was natural for Hugh to shift his interest from the outer world to the life of the inner world of his soul. But as a philosopher Hugh sought more than a knowledge of God in his inner experience. If anything is needed to show how far removed the Victorine spirit lies from the pure tradition of Aristotelianism, and how closely

¹³ Cf. p. 98 *infra*. Grabmann remarks with reference to Hugh's proofs for the existence of God: "Echt augustinisch ist hier die Voranstellung der inneren Erfahrung vor die Betrachtung der Aussenwelt. (*Geschichte der schol. Methode*, II, p. 257.)

¹⁴ *In cael. Hier.* III (175, 977C): "Et novimus quid sit spiritus, quantum animam novimus, et angelum novimus; et per animam angelum novimus; quoniam nosmetipsos novimus; quamvis et hoc modicum, et vix dici potest cognitio. Cum ergo audimus, quod Deus spiritus est, cogitamus angelum et existimamus similitudinem, quoniam tale aliquid Deus est." It should be noted that Hugh developed no doctrine of analogical knowledge such as one finds in Thomas Aquinas, but he is constantly referring to the symbols in creation by which man can glean some knowledge of God.

¹⁵ *Did.* VII, 17 (825A): "Janua ergo contemplationis homini aperitur quando ipse sua se ratione ducente ad se cognoscendum ingreditur." Cf. St. Augustine, *De Vera Religione*, 39 (*PL* 34, 154): "Noli foras ire, in te ipsum redi, in interiore homine habitat veritas; et si tuam naturam mutabilem inveneris, transcede et teipsum." Richard of St. Victor says the same, "Ascendat (homo) per semetipsum, per cognitionem sui ad cognitionem Dei." (*De praep. ad contempl.*, c. 83, *PL* 196, 59C). This accent on inner experience, or "introversion" is characteristic of the mystic's art. Cf. Evelyn Underhill's chapters on Introversion (chs. VI-VII) in *Mysticism: A Study in the Nature and Development of Man's Spiritual Consciousness* (London, 12th ed. rev., Methuen, 1930). Hugh would agree with Dean Inge's definition of the mystical ascent as "the great mystic quest, which is the journey of the soul, by an inner ascent, to the presence of God and to immediate union with Him." (W. R. Inge, *The Philosophy of Plotinus*, I, p. 2).

it reflects the enthusiasm of Plotinus and Augustine,¹⁶ it is this — that in consciousness Hugh seeks the answers to the great and perennial problems concerning the nature of man himself.

Hugh's analysis of his own soul enables him to develop his favorite proofs for the existence of a spiritual soul.¹⁷ Here, too, he discovers the unchanging Ego which is the permanent substrate of the stream of actions flowing from man's intellect and will.¹⁸ The unity and simplicity of God follows from the soul's consciousness of its own unique spiritual nature.

From these few passages it is clear that Hugh attaches a tremendous importance to inner experience as a source of philosophical proof.¹⁹ It would be interesting, therefore, to hear his ex-

¹⁶ On the influence of Augustine's shift to full and conscious use of inner experience on the subsequent development of medieval philosophy, cf. W. Windelband, *History of Philosophy*, No. 22: "The Metaphysics of Inner Experience," pp. 276-287.

¹⁷ *Did.*, VII, 17 (176, 825); *De Sacr.*, 1, III, 7 (219). Cf. Ostler, *op. cit.*, pp. 21 ff. These texts are in the same context in which Hugh establishes the possibility of certitude and the existence of God. They will be quoted and analyzed in the next section.

¹⁸ *De Sacr.*, 1, III, 25 (176, 227B): "Videt enim (ratio) quoniam quae in mente sunt non vere idem sunt quid est ipsa mens. Separantur enim a mente haec aliquando; et cum adfuerint recedunt, et redeunt iterum cum abierint et variantur circa ipsam, nec vere sunt idem cum ipsa, sed quasi affectiones quaedam et formae ipsius, quibus non sit hoc aliquid esse, sed ad esse tantum et quod est hoc aliquid." The proof for substantiality of the soul is here taken from the direct experience of change—of psychic accidents in willing and knowing. The conclusion is that there must be a subject of such change. Hugh continues: "Itaque cum sit homo ipse persona, haec autem tantum affectiones quaedam adhaerentes personae et circa ipsam existentes inveniuntur; non est omnino eis proprium esse persona, sed personae inesse tantum."

¹⁹ In this regard Hugh (d. 1141) can claim priority over William of Auvergne (d. 1249) who also relied on consciousness for many of his philosophical arguments, and of whom Baumgartner claims that he was the first after Augustine to stress inner experience as a source of knowledge. "Man wird zugeben müssen, dass kein anderer Scholastiker, weder vor Wilhelm noch unmittelbar nach ihm, auf die innere Wahrnehmung ein so grosses Gewicht gelegt und sie zur Begründung psychologischer Lehren verwertet hat. Gerade hiedurch unterscheidet sich in charakteristischen Weise seine Seelenlehre von der auf Aristotelischen Begriffe und Beweisen aufge-

planation of the exact nature of this knowledge which the soul has of itself. But it is impossible to find any detailed analysis in his works. He does say, as we have heard, that self-knowledge is the normal activity of the eye of reason, and the faculty employed by the soul in knowing itself is called *ratio pura supra imaginationem*.

The nature of self-knowledge — whether the mind knows itself through its essence or through some *species* — was a ground of debate between Aristotelians and Augustinists in the century after Hugh. St. Thomas was to argue the point at length and to conclude that the thinking mind knows itself only in its act of knowing. As Rousselot puts it, "These acts of knowledge are prompted by species received from material things. The soul knows itself accordingly in the process of knowing other things, as, for example, in knowing colour and in 'becoming' intelligibly white or blue."²⁰ Later followers of St. Augustine like Matthew of Aquasparta, Olivi, and Roger Marston opposed the Thomistic position.²¹

St. Thomas said that the soul knows itself indirectly; for him all knowledge presupposes abstraction from the data of sense. But Hugh was not bound by that principle. For him the soul

bauten Psychologie der späteren Scholastik." (M. Baumgartner, *Die Erkenntnislehre des Wilhelm von Auvergne*, p. 89). Cf. Cl. Baeumker, *Witelo*, p. 321, n. 2. Much of what Baumgartner claims for William might be said of Hugh.

²⁰ P. Rousselot, *The Intellectualism of St. Thomas*, p. 91. Cf. *Summa Contra Gentiles*, III, 46 — "quod anima in hac vita non intelligit seipsam per seipsam." In a note Rousselot summarizes the Thomistic position. "The doctrine of the soul's knowledge of itself is epitomized in these words: 'Ex objecto . . . cognoscit suam operationem, per quam devenit ad cognitionem sui ipsius' (*De Anima*, 3, 4; Cf. *Opusc.* 25, ch. I). As this object is something material, then 'Cognitio Dei quae ex mente humana accipi potest, non excedit illud genus cognitionis quod ex sensibilibus sumitur, cum et ipsa de se ipsa cognoscat quid est, per hoc quod naturas sensibilibus intelligit . . .' (*Contra Gentiles*, 47)." Rousselot also notes that St. Thomas "tries to force his own meaning into the texts of Augustine," and that Thomas' conception is "far removed from all forms of Cartesian Theodicies." (p. 91, n. 11).

²¹ Cf. E. Gilson, *The Spirit of Medieval Philosophy*, pp. 222-225.

was *intellectibilis* — an object known, not through the mediation of sense, but by the soul alone.²²

With the thirteenth century Franciscans he would agree, too, that the soul knew itself by its essence, and yet "that this spiritual essence does not apprehend itself without intermediaries." This is a phrase of Gilson, who explains why some intermediary was needed:

What is really much more remarkable is that even the Augustinian, although obstinately maintaining against St. Thomas that the soul knows itself by its essence, and not through sense images, nevertheless expressly held that this spiritual essence does not apprehend itself without intermediaries. And the reason? It lies precisely in the fact that this essence is an image of God. . . . Man, made to God's image, is also an intellectual substance which not only has to express other things in order to know them, but also expresses itself to itself when it would know itself. That is why even the Augustinian soul, which knows itself immediately, does not grasp itself as an object. It is formally the sufficient cause of its own self-knowledge, but nevertheless, and precisely as cause of this knowledge, it remains beyond the reach of its own most immediate apprehension. Thus every human soul reproduces on the plane of the finite the fecundity of the divine knowledge: it 'expresses' from itself the internal presentation of its own essence, and refers it to itself by an act of will, just as in God the Father generates the Word, and links it to Himself by the Holy Spirit.²³

²² *Did.*, II, 3 (27): "Intellectibilis (est anima) eo quod incorporea sit natura, et nullo sensu comprehendi possit. . . . Intellectibile est enim, quod nec sensibile est, nec similitudo sensibilis." Cf. *supra*, p. 70. Hugh refers to inner experience as *mentis intuitus* (*Did.* VII, 176, 835C). It is the function of *ratio pura supra imaginationem*. (*De Unione*, 177, 288D).

²³ Gilson, *op. cit.*, pp. 224-225. Gilson lists St. Augustine, *De Trinitate*, IX, 11-12, and St. Anselm, *Monologion*, cap. XXXIII, as the sources of the doctrine (*op. cit.*, p. 467) and notes that the Augustinians teach that the soul knows itself directly, but through "species." Matthew of Aquasparta is definite, "Sic ergo dico, quod anima semetipsam et habitus, qui sunt in ipsa, cognoscit non tantum arguendo, sed intuendo et cernendo per essentias suas objective, sed formaliter per species ex ipsis expressas, unde formatur acies cogitantis sive intelligentis." (*QQ disp. de cognitione*, V, resp.) The reason Matthew gives is this: "Anima enim rationalis est imago Dei."

Hugh also maintains that the soul knows itself directly,²⁴ but he does not discuss the question of the "intermediary" as the later Augustinist school explained it; but he, too, insists that the soul is the image of God, and we may presume that his further analysis of what this fact means to the soul's knowledge of itself would follow the thought of Matthew of Aquasparta rather than that of St. Thomas Aquinas.

More interesting to the historian of philosophy is Hugh's employment of self-consciousness as the basis for his demonstration of the possibility of certitude. This fact gives us the opportunity to examine the few and casual passages which he devotes to truth and certitude in his theory of knowledge.

CERTITUDE

The truth about the problem of certitude in Hugh of St. Victor is that it is no problem. At least it is not *the* problem of knowledge in the sense in which it has troubled philosophers since Descartes made his *Meditations* and Copernicus, Galileo, and Newton helped plant in men's minds the disturbing thought that things are not what they seem. Hugh assumed that the mind was in contact with reality through sense-perception, and the act of knowing was never endowed with a creative power. Knowledge mirrored being or sought to do so. Things for Hugh were entities endowed with certain qualities — the "common-sense" view.

²⁴ Cf. *De Sacr.* 1, III, 5 (176, 218D). At the beginning of his proofs for God's existence he writes, "Itaque utrumque modum humanae investigationis ordine prosequamur, quo *ratio hominis vel per se directa* vel ab iis quae extra se naturalia erant visibilia admonita ad verum cognoscendum enisa est." Cf. *De Sacr.*, 1, X, 2 (330A): "Fides ergo necessaria est, quae credantur quae non videntur, et subsistant in nobis per fidem, quae nondum praesentia nobis sunt per *speciem*." *Soliloquium de Arrha Animae* (176, 954C): "Non est invisibilis tibi facies tua. Oculus tuus nihil bene videt, si seipsum non videat. . . . Quod si forte interna illa tua visio . . ." These texts may not be conclusive evidence that Hugh held the latter position on the "intermediary" in self-knowledge which Gilson mentions, but they are but a few of the many passages where Hugh refers quite naturally to the soul's direct vision of itself. There is nothing of the Thomistic "indirect self-knowledge" to be found in them.

In the recurring cycle of skepticism and dogmatism which marks the history of epistemology from the Sophists of ancient Greece to Plato and Aristotle, from the skeptics of the New Academy to St. Augustine, from Augustinian to Aristotelian scholastics to fourteenth century nominalists—we may place Hugh on the side of the dogmatists. He is certainly not a skeptic.²⁵

The problem of certitude had indeed stirred the schools long before him. There were the well-known chapters of Augustine against the skeptical Academicians, for example, in which the great Doctor had defended the possibility of certitude by appealing to self-consciousness in order to furnish evidence for the validity of human knowledge. Conscious experience, when analyzed, became a solid basis for certitude in St. Augustine.²⁶

The medieval Augustinists followed him when they taught an intuitive and immediate knowledge of the soul through itself. In the early Middle Ages, however, the threat of skepticism was dormant, and his disciples no longer followed Augustine in making self-consciousness the point of departure and foundation for all certitude. It was left to Descartes to take the evidence of

²⁵ A thorough knowledge of Hugh's works would never lead to the conclusion of Achille Luchaire in Lavissee, *Histoire de France depuis les origines jusqu'à la Revolution* (Paris, 1900), II, p. 376: "Il (Hughes) redoute la science; il croit que la sensation est aussi pervertie que la raison et que l'intelligence ne peut avoir que pendant le sommeil de l'une et de l'autre une perception claire de la vérité."

²⁶ St. Augustine, *De Civ. Dei*, XI, 26 (*CSEL*, 40, 1, Hoffman, pp. 550-1); *Contra Academicos*, III, 11, 26 (*PL* 32, 947); *De beata vita*, II, 7 (*PL* 32, 963); *Soliloquia*, II, 1, 1 (*PL* 32, 885); *De Vera Religione*, XL, 73 (*PL* 34, 155). Cf. G. von Hertling, *Augustinus* (Weltgeschichte in Charakterbildern), (Mainz, 1901), pp. 41-49; M. Grabmann, *Die Grundgedanken des hl. Augustinus über Seele und Gott* (Köln: Bachem, 1929), p. 29; Eucken's summary is concise: "Sodann hat alle Wirklichkeit als tiefsten Grund ein geistiges Sein. Die einfache Selbstbesinnung zeigt uns als den festesten Punkt gegenüber aller Unsicherheit die Existenz der Seele. Denn mögen wir an allem zweifeln, der Zweifel selbst erweist die Thatsache des Denkens und damit unsere seelische Existenz. Unser Innenleben ist uns unmittelbar gegenwärtig, es kann kein blosser Wahn sein." (R. Eucken, *Die Lebensanschauungen der grossen Denker* (3rd ed., Leipzig, Veit, 1889), p. 213.

inner experience as the starting point of his whole system. It is interesting to note that Hugh of St. Victor anticipates the Cartesian "revolution." While he did not make it the foundation for a system of philosophy, he used (quite casually, it is true) the Augustinian argument for certitude. In the twelfth century we find a few lines foreshadowing Descartes' Meditation on the *Cogito*, and the transition from the *Cogito* to the existence of God. Hugh stresses, for example, the existence of the self as a primitive idea. The soul cannot but know its own existence, that it is not a body. "Why, therefore, should a man doubt the existence of invisible beings since he sees that the being is invisible which he himself really is, and of whose existence he can have no doubt at all?"²⁷

Gilson uses a parallel text of Hugh to document his thesis that the "gap" between Greek philosophy and modern philosophy is non-existent—that Descartes had used the same principles which sustained the philosophy of St. Augustine. The eminent historian explains his point of view by referring to a "humble text" of the twelfth century, a text "which cannot compare with the *Meditations*," but in it Gilson finds the whole progress of Descartes' thought. It is a passage in which Hugh takes inner experience as the starting-point for a proof for the existence of God. The soul's certitude of its own existence is greater than that which it has of the external world; it realizes that it is distinct from its visible body. Since it cannot but know itself, it cannot but know that it exists, and the conclusion to the existence of a Being which gives it existence follows naturally.²⁸ The

²⁷ *Did.*, VII, 17 (176, 825A): "Nemo enim est sane sapiens, qui se esse non videat. Et tamen homo si vere quod ipse est attendere coeperit, omnium quae in se vel videntur, vel videri possunt, nihil se esse intelligit. Illud namque quod in nobis rationis capax est, quamvis, ut ita dicam, infusum et commistum carni sit; ipsum tamen se a substantia carnis propria ratione secernit, et alienum esse intelligit. Cur ergo homo invisibilia esse dubitet, qui idipsum quod vere homo est de cuius existentia nequaquam dubitat, invisibile esse videtur."

²⁸ *De Sacr.*, 1, III, 6-9 (176, 219). This text will be quoted with Gilson's insertions, which bring out the parallelism between Hugh and Descartes: "Hoc autem (*scil.* imago Dei) ipsa ratio erat et mens ratione

parallelism between Hugh and Descartes is far from complete, however. Hugh starts with no systematic doubt of all things save his own existence; he does not demand the Cartesian "clear and distinct ideas." His remarks are casually inserted; they are not his whole foundation.

Hugh maintains that the thinking mind cannot doubt on this point. But why is it that some men do doubt and fail to achieve the certitude of which pure reason is capable? For it is apparent that not every man will follow this line of thought which takes the soul as the first element of observation as to the contingency

utens, quo ad primam similitudinem Dei facta fuerat, ut per se invenire posset eum a quo facta erat (*Dieu a laissé sa marque sur son ouvrage, et c'est le fondement des preuves de son existence*). Non enim (mens), ut id loquamur quod primum occurrit (*c'est le premier principe*) seipsam esse aliquid ignorare potest . . . (*c'est le Cogito*), cum ex his omnibus quae in se, hoc est in corpore suo, visibilia videt, nihil se esse vel esse posse videt (*c'est la distinction de l'âme et du corps fondée sur le Cogito*). Secernit ergo et dividit se per se ab eo toto quod visibile videt in se, et invisibile omnino se videt, in eo quod se videt, et tamen videri se non posse videt. Cum ergo de se dubitare non possit quoniam est, quia se ignorare non potest (*rappel de Cogito*) cogitur ex se et hoc credere quod aliquando se coepisse meminit. . . . Ut ergo inciperet quod non erat, ab alio factum est qui erat (*passage du Cogito à la preuve de l'existence de Dieu*). E. Gilson, *Études sur le Rôle de la Pensée Médiévale dans la formation du Système Cartésien* (Paris: J. Vrin, 1930), pp. 293-294, n. 2. Hugh continues, "Constat ergo nec dubitari ullo modo potest quod ille per quem coepit quod non semper fuit nunquam coepit, sed semper fuit. Illum autem rerum auctorem et primum principium hoc modo ratio investigat; et inventum pietas veneratur, et adorandum fides praedicat Deum." Alexander of Hales (*Summa Theologica*, I, 3, n. 1, 6) takes over Hugh's argument from inner experience and cites it as "argumentum per rationem causalitatis." Geyer agrees with Gilson that this passage is an anticipation of Descartes: "Hugo bildet so ein bedeutsames Glied in der Reihe, die von Augustinus über Wilhelm von Auvergne, Occam, Peter d'Ailly, Campanella zu Descartes führt." (Ueberweg-Geyer, *op. cit.*, p. 266). This passage proves once more that Hugh of St. Victor is fundamentally Augustinian in his theory of knowledge, for, as Gilson remarks in the note we have just quoted: "Ceci, qui est la marche même de la pensée de Descartes, se refait spontanément chez tous les augustinieniens et constitue la négation radicale du thomisme, dont le point de départ n'est pas dans l'âme, mais dans le contact de l'âme et du corps." (p. 294)

of nature and thence rises to God. Hugh realizes this fact and explains that it is only the wise man who knows himself with sufficient clearness to make this transition from self to God.²⁹ The wise man alone withdraws from the lure of sense-images which are continually bombarding him from without; it is he alone who remains in the higher world of *intellectibilia* and does not undergo the "degeneration" which occurs when the soul descends to the lower world of *intelligibilia*.

We have heard already of Hugh's insistence that a Plotinian catharsis is necessary if one wishes to know himself and God. The condition of self-knowledge is the abandonment of the world of sense and the refusal to submit to the strong lure of sense-images which leave their imprint on the soul.³⁰ This is but an application of Hugh's version of the basic principle — *simile simili cognoscitur*.

STATES OF MIND

These are the reasons why Hugh can claim that it is only the wise man who achieves the proper function of reason through reason itself. The great majority of men, who do not withdraw sufficiently from the world of sense, must depend on faith for their knowledge of the higher world.

This does not mean that Hugh is a fideist in his epistemology. Belief founded on authority is indeed the source of our highest knowledge, but Hugh does not make revelation a substitute for all natural cognition. Faith is superior in that its content is much wider than that of reason, but reason thereby does not cease to be an independent source of knowledge. Hugh does say that the divine wisdom of the Scriptures is always the ultimate wisdom, however, which all the arts and sciences must subserve.³¹

²⁹ *Did.* VII (176, 825A), "Nemo est sane sapiens, qui se esse non videat, etc. . . ." Note 27, *supra*.

³⁰ Cf. *De Unione* (177, 288B). Hugh writes many sentences in this vein. Cf. p. 56 *supra*.

³¹ *De Scripturis et scriptoribus sacris* I (175, 10): "Logica, mathematica et physica quandam veritatem docet, sed ad illam veritatem non pertingunt, in qua salus animae est, sine qua frustra est quidquid est." *De Sacr.*, prol., 6 (176, 1850D): "Ex quo constat quod omnes artes naturales divinae

We are not called upon in this study of human knowledge according to Hugh's theory to analyze his celebrated definition of faith as a "kind of certitude of the soul about absent things, above opinion and below knowledge."³² But it must be introduced briefly because it is in connection with it that Hugh describes the attitudes which the mind may assume toward truth.

In an earlier work the definition reads, "Faith is a *voluntary* certitude . . ." ³³ This emphasizes the fact that in his psychology of faith Hugh makes the will-act the essential act of faith, while the content comes from knowledge (*cognitio*). Hugh is a proponent of the view that faith is in the will formally and essentially, and that it belongs to intellect only materially. In

scientiae famulantur; et inferior sapientia recte ordinata ad superiorem conducit. . . . Super haec (i. e., artes liberales) ante omnia divinum illud est ad quod ducit divina Scriptura sive in allegoria, sive in tropologia . . . in quibus constat cognitio veritatis et amor virtutis: et haec est vera reparatio hominis." On this passage Krebs comments, "Von Hugo's Erbe kehrt in der Hochscholastik wieder der ihm allerdings nicht originaliter eigene Gedanke wieder — 'quod omnes artes naturales famulantur divinae sapientiae.'" (E. Krebs, *Theologie und Wissenschaft nach der Lehre der Hochscholastik* [Muenster i.W., 1912]). *BGPM* XI 3-4, p. 21. Cf. *Did.* IV, 10 (70); *In cael. Hier.*, I, 1 (175, 926 ff.).

³² *De Sac.*, I, X, 2 (176, 330): "Fides est certitudo quaedam animi de rebus absentibus supra opinionem et infra scientiam constituta." It was in the theory of religious knowledge based on this definition that Hugh exerted the greatest influence on subsequent scholasticism. The notions entering into the definition may be traced to Augustine and Anselm. (Cf. E. Gilson, "Sens et nature de l'argument de Saint Anselme," *Archives d'Histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Age*, IX (1934), p. 29, pp. 18 ff.). Many scholars have analyzed it and commented on its influence. Cf. Ziesché, *Verstand und Wille beim Glaubensakt. Eine spekulativhistorische Studie aus der Scholastik im Anschluss an Bonaventura* (Paderborn, 1909); M. D. Chenu, "La Psychologie de la Foi dans la Théologie du XIII^e Siècle" *Études d'Histoire Littéraire et Doctrinale du XIII^e Siècle. Deuxième Série* (Ottawa, 1932), pp. 121-161; Grabmann has studied the relation of faith and reason especially (*Geschichte der schol. Methode*, II pp. 261-283). Those who are under the influence of Hugh's definition (but not always his psychology) of faith include Richard of St. Victor, John of Salisbury, Alan of Lille, St. Thomas Aquinas, Matthew of Aquasparta, Duns Scotus, Godfrey of Fontaines, and Roland Bandinellus.

³³ *De Sac. legis naturalis et scriptae* (175, 35D).

other words, faith — *assentire* — is an act of will; that which is believed belongs to intellect. *Credere in affectu est, quod vero creditur, in cognitione est.*³⁴

Of the various subjective states of mind possible in the different relations of human knowledge to truth, it is only faith which receives a detailed analysis. Mental attitudes which a person may adopt when confronted with a proposition which he understands are denial, opinion, belief, or knowledge. One may deny the proposition altogether (*negantes*); one may hesitate between affirmation and denial (*dubitantes*); one may adopt it as the more probable hypothesis while remaining unconvinced of its truth (*opinantes*); one may assent to it on faith, either human or divine (*credentes*). These four states of mind are contrasted with a higher kind — the actual knowledge of a thing present to the mind and judged to be true (*scientes*).³⁵

³⁴ *De Sac.*, 1, X, 3 (176, 331B): "Duo sunt in quibus fides constat. . . . In affectu enim substantia fidei invenitur; in cognitione materia. Aliud enim est fides qua creditur, et aliud quod fide creditur. Propterea fides in affectu habet substantiam, quia affectus ipse fides est; in cognitione habet materiam, quia de illo et ad illud quod in cognitione est, fides est. . ." Cf. Englhardt, *Die Entwicklung der dogmatischen Glaubenspsychologie in der Mitteralterlichen Scholastik vom Abaelardstreit* (um 1140), bis zu Philipp dem Kanzler (Gest. 1236), (Muenster i.W., 1933), BGPM, XXX, 4-6, pp. 17-22; M. Grabmann, *Die phil. u. theol. Erkenntnislehre des K. Matth. v. Aquasparta*, p. 123 ff.

³⁵ *De Sac.*, 1, X, 3 (176, 330CD): "Si quis pleniam ac generalem diffinitionem fidei signare voluerit, dicere potest: 'Fidem esse certitudinem quamdam animi de rebus absentibus, supra opinionem et infra scientiam constitutam.' Sunt enim quidam qui audita statim animo repellunt et contradicunt his quae dicuntur; et hi sunt *negantes*. Alii in iis quae audiunt alteram quaecunque partem eligunt ad existimationem sed non approbant ad affirmationem. Quamvis enim unum ex duobus magis probabile intelligunt, utrum tamen adhuc idipsum verum sit asserere non praesumunt; et hi sunt *opinantes*. Alii sic alteram partem approbant, ut ejus approbationem etiam in assertionem assumant; hi sunt *credentes*. Post ista genera cognitionis illud perfectius sequitur cum res non ex auditu solo, sed per suam praesentiam notificatur. Perfectius enim agnoscunt qui ipsam rem ut est in sua praesentia comprehendunt: hi sunt *scientes*. Primi ergo sunt *negantes*, secundi *dubitantes*, tertii *opinantes*, quarti *credentes*, quinti *scientes*." Other states of mind are simple lack of knowledge (*nescire*) and

There are several things to remark in Hugh's *definitio magistralis*, as later authors were to accept it. One is the substitution of *certitudo* for the *aestimatio* of Abelard's definition of faith.³⁶ For Hugh faith is certain because it excludes doubt.³⁷ It is higher than opinion or *aestimatio*, because opinion is not certain, since the *formido errandi* is still present. Hugh underlines the fact that, cognitively speaking, knowledge is above faith, but not in dignity. The superiority of faith is one of dignity, not of certitude.³⁸ One achieves more subjective satisfaction and happiness from knowledge — the seeing of things present, than from faith — the certitude about things absent.³⁹

ignorantia, absence of knowledge which should be present. Cf. *De Sac.*, I, VI, 26 (176, 279C); *De Sapientia Animae Christi, praef.* (847B).

³⁶ E. Portalié, "L'École théologique d'Abélard," *D.Th.C.*, I, 1 (col. 51 ff.); F. Vernet, *art. cit.*, *D.Th.C.*, VII, 1 (cols. 273-4). Abelard's conception of faith as merely *aestimatio* was the cause of much of his disrepute among later scholastics and helps explain why his name occurs but rarely in their volumes. For Hugh's relation to Abelard, cf. A. Liebner, *op. cit.*, p. 173. Hugh treats *existimatio* as synonymous with *opinio* (*De Sac.* I, X, 3 [330D]), and opposes (against Abelard) *existimatio* and *affirmatio* (330C).

³⁷ *De Sac.*, I, X, 2 (330D): "Ex his conjici potest quare fidem certitudinem appellamus, quoniam ubi adhuc dubitatio est, fides non est." Cf. St. Augustine, *De Trinitate*, VIII, 5, 7 (*PL.* 42, 952). Hugh's definition of faith is psychological, not philosophical, in that he defines it as certitude, which is an accidental feature. Cf. Thomas Aquinas, in *III Sent.*, d. 23, q. 2, a. 1 ad 8. (Vivès ed. IX, p. 355): "Hugo autem de Sancto Victore definit fidem per aliquod ejus accedens, scilicet certitudinem."

³⁸ *De Sac.*, *loc. cit.*: "Patet etiam quare ipsam certitudinem quam fidem appellamus supra opinionem vel aestimationem et infra scientiam dicimus esse constitutam. Quia nimirum aliquid credere sicut minus est quam scire; sic plus est quam opinari et aestimare. Minus dico non quantum ad meritum, sed quantum ad cognitionem."

³⁹ *Ibid.* "Plus est praesentem videre quam absentem credere sicut et plus est fide stare quam opinione nutare." Hugh divides the objects of knowledge between faith and knowledge in his chapter — quid distet inter videre et credere. "Constat igitur nostra scientia ex rebus visis et creditis, sed in iis quae videmus vel vidimus (i. e., remember) nos ipsi testes sumus. . . . Non autem immerito nos scire dicimus, non solum ea quae vidimus aut videmus; verum etiam illa quae idoneis testimoniis vel testibus credimus." It is interesting to note that Hugh anticipates St. Thomas' thesis that one

From all this it is clear that the Victorine measures the perfection of knowledge according to the mode in which the known object is present in the soul. The modes of knowledge we have already analyzed are sense-perception, intellectual apprehension through the imagination, and (if the object be the soul itself or its acts) self-consciousness. Since it is the soul itself which is immediately present to the thinking mind, we are not surprised at Hugh's obvious preference for inner experience. There is a higher knowledge than this, however. It is the knowledge of God.

cannot simultaneously have belief and knowledge of the same object (*Summa Theologica*, II-II, 1, 5). Knowledge is of things present, faith of things absent . . . "nam si vides, non est fides" (331B). "Quamvis etiam nonnunquam ipsa quae ex praesenti contemplatione nascitur certitudo, abusive fides appellatur. De illa autem, quae proprie appellatur fides, citum est: 'Nam si vides, non est fides'." *De Sacr.*, 1, III, 1 (176, 218A); 2, XVIII, 27; Abelard, *Introd. ad Theol.* I, 2 (*PL* 178, 984 ff.); cf. *De Sacr.*, 1, III, 20 (176, 231-232). "Quae enim ex ratione omnino nota sunt et credi non possunt quoniam sciuntur."

CHAPTER VII

THE ASCENT TO GOD

THE EXISTENCE OF GOD

To the great medieval philosophers the journey of the mind to God was the supreme consideration of any theory of knowledge. The knowledge of God was not only the crown of their metaphysical speculations; it was paramount throughout their greatest works. Scholastics did not, as modern philosophers since Kant will do, begin their treatises with the inquiry: what can we know of the external world? They first ask: what can human reason know of God? In his chief work Hugh of St. Victor writes an early section *de cognitione divinitatis*.¹

To Saint Augustine the rational knowledge of God was a divine gift, inseparable from the soul of man. Man could not but know Him, but at the same time man could not comprehend Him.² In a sentence frequently quoted by later writers Hugh perfected Augustine's formula and transmitted it to the thirteenth century. This sentence is the key to his conception of the knowledge which created reason might have of its Creator: "From the beginning God has measured out the knowledge man has of Him in such a way that we can never either totally comprehend His essence or be in total ignorance of His existence."³

¹ *De Sac.*, 1, III (176, 217-234).

² St. Augustine, *In Johan. Evang.*, tr. 106, 17, 4 (*PL* 35, 1910): "Haec est enim vis verae divinitatis, ut creaturae rationali jam ratione utenti, non omnino ac penitus possit abscondi."

³ *De Sac.*, 1, III, 1 (176, 217A): "Deus enim sic ab initio notitiam sui ab homine temperavit, ut sicut nunquam quid esset totum poterat comprehendere, sic quia esset nunquam prorsus posset ignorari." This formula, which was frequently quoted together with St. John Damascene's famous sentence: "Cognitio existendi Deum naturaliter nobis inserta est" (*De fide orthodoxa*, I, 3) has been interpreted to mean that Hugh holds that the idea of the existence of God is *innate* in every man. St. Bonaventure quotes both Damascene and Hugh to witness his own theory that God's existence is a truth naturally innate in every soul. (*QQ. disp. de mysterio Trinitatis*, I, 1, Quaracchi, V, p. 51; *I Sent.*, 8, 1, 1, 2, concl. I, p. 154). Speaking of

This leads at once to Hugh's own proofs for the existence of God. He is no agnostic. Some knowledge of God is possible to man by reason — knowledge of existence, not of essence. Reason and revelation are the two sources of knowledge, and reason may approach God in two ways — through internal and external experience.⁴

In his history of the medieval proofs for the existence of God Grunwald distinguishes four phases, corresponding to St. Augus-

Bonaventure's view, Gilson says, "Hugh of St. Victor gives the definitive formula of this *innatism* . . ." (*The Philosophy of St. Bonaventure*, p. 120) and adds in a note that it is "frequently cited by St. Bonaventure, who makes this formula entirely his own." (p. 508; cf. Gilson, *Introduction à l'étude de Saint Augustin*, p. 12, n. 1). The formula was popular in the Middle Ages and is quoted for innatism also by William of Ware and Richard of Middleton, for example. (Cf. texts printed in Aug. Daniels, *Quellenbeiträge und Untersuchungen zur Geschichte der Gottesbeweise im dreizehnten Jahrhundert mit besonderer Berücksichtigung des Arguments im Proslogion des hl. Anselm* (Münster, i. W., 1909, *BGPM*, VIII, 1-2, pp. 84, 99). But the formula does not necessarily imply an *innate* knowledge of God's existence. It can mean simply that in natural reason God gives every man the means to know His existence. This interpretation is confirmed by the fact that in the context Hugh proceeds immediately to discuss reason and revelation as the ways or modes in which the knowledge of God comes to man. The way of reason starts with internal and external experience — not with an innate idea. Bernhard Rosenmüller (*Religiöse Erkenntnis nach Bonaventura*, Münster i. W., 1927, *BGPM*, XXV, 3-4, p. 51) has realized this, for he remarks of St. Bonaventure's use of Hugh's formula, "Es folgt ein Wort Hugos das anders zu deuten ist." Hugh's proofs of God's existence are closer to those of St. Thomas, who says: "Cognitio existendi Deum dicitur omnibus naturaliter inserta, quia omnibus naturaliter insertum est aliquid unde potest pervenire ad cognoscendum Deum esse." (*De Veritate*, q. X. art. 12, ad 1.)

⁴ *De Sacr.*, I, III, 3 (176, 218): "Modi sunt duo et viae duae, et manifestationes duae, quibus a principio cordi humano latens proditus est et judicatus est occultus Deus; partim scilicet ratione humana, partim revelatione divina. Et ratio quidem humana duplici investigatione Deum deprehendit, partim videlicet in se, partim in iis quae erant extra se." Englhardt comments on this passage, "Die menschliche Vernunft erfasste Gott, wie Hugo im Zusammenhang mit der von Augustinus sich herleitenden frühmittelalterlichen Erkenntnistheorie sagt, auf zwei Arten, teils in sich, teils in den Aussendungen." (*Die Entwicklung der dogmatischen Glaubenspsychologie in der mittelalterlichen Scholastik*, etc., p. 19.)

tine, the Victorines, St. Bonaventure, and St. Thomas Aquinas. The new phase inaugurated by Hugh is an abandonment of purely abstract reasoning and a turning to experience, external and especially internal, as a sure point of departure for the proofs.⁵ Hugh thus rejects the ontological argument of St. Anselm and uses the principle of causality. As we have already noted, he favors the psychological argument starting from consciousness of the soul's contingency and concluding (through the principle of the impossibility of infinite regress) to a necessary cause of human souls.⁶ But God's existence is also proved *in his quae videt homo extra se*. Hugh is among the first to employ the cosmological argument, starting from the fact of change or contingency in nature and rising to an *ens necessarium*.⁷ The teleological argument appears through the whole seventh book of the

⁵ G. Grunwald, *Geschichte der Gottesbeweise im Mittelalter bis zum Ausgang der Hochscholastik*, p. 69: "Das Neue, was ihre (i. e., Victorines) Richtung in der Behandlung unseres Problems besonders charakterisiert ist die entscheidende Ablehnung von rein dialektischer, abstrakt-begrifflicher Spekulation und die voll-bewusste Hinwendung zu einem auf der Empirie basierenden Verfahren."

⁶ Cf., p. 98 *supra*.

⁷ *Did.*, VII, 17 (176, 825). *De Sacr.*, 1, III, 10 (219D): "Hoc autem ratio inventum in se probat et in his quae videt extra se; quia ortum et occasum habentia cuncta, sine auctore nec originem habere possent nec reparationem. Quae in toto aliquando coepisse idcirco dubium esse non potest; quia et in partibus suis sine cessatione quotidie et oriri videtur quod non est et praeterire quod est. Omne autem quod mutabile est, aliquando non fuisse necesse est; quia quod stare non potuit cum praesens fuit, indicat se aliquando non fuisse priusquam fuit. Sic respondent qui foris sunt iis quae intus videntur ad veritatem comprobendam et auctorem suum natura clamat quae se ab illo factam ostendit." Hugh here distinguishes the world of particulars as such and the world as a whole. This is a different approach than that of St. John Damascene (*De fide orthodoxa*, I, 1, 3; *PG*, 94, 796A) who considers only the change in particulars, not change in the universe as a whole. The oriental theologian in his abstract speculation makes no decisive contact with the ultimate, while Hugh "den Schwerpunkt des Problems richtig erkannt hat, und sich mit einer allerdings populären Erwägung die Brücke aus der Empirie zur Transzendenz zu schlagen bemüht ist." (Grunwald, *op. cit.*, p. 75.) Cf. *Did.* VII, 4 (*supra*, p. 91, n. 12).

Didascalicon.⁸ In this doctrine on God's existence as known through reason Hugh marks the beginning of a new period.

Hugh of Saint Victor lived and wrote in the same intellectual milieu which produced St. Anselm of Canterbury, Abelard and Richard of St. Victor. Against him, too, the accusation is made that he was a "rationalist" in theology in that he admitted the possibility of a knowledge of the Trinity through natural reason. This is the charge of a few writers, notably of Heitz,⁹ but it has been disproved in several investigations of Hugh's theology.¹⁰

This is not the place for a treatment of Hugh's natural theology, but from these few indications it is evident that he shows something of his independent spirit, that he did not follow the

⁸ Especially *Did.*, VII, 18 (176, 826): *De motu quadruplici creatoris*.

⁹ Th. Heitz, *Essai Historique sur les rapports entre la philosophie et la foi, etc.*, pp. 79-80: "Or, pour Hughes, la raison peut démontrer par les choses visibles, et sans le secours de l'Écriture, l'unité aussi bien que la trinité de Dieu, et même en dire le pourquoi. La Trinité est donc du ressort de la théologie naturelle: la Trinité se rapporte à la nature de Dieu, objet de la théologie naturelle. . . ." Cf. H. Bouchitté, *Dictionnaire des Sciences Philosophiques*, 733.

¹⁰ It seems clear that Abelard's excessive zeal in submitting dogma to reason (cf. *Introd. ad Theol.* II, 3, *PL* 178, 1050) had led him to maintain the possibility of understanding the mystery of the Trinity by reason, but Kilgenstein especially has demonstrated Hugh's orthodoxy on this point. (*Die Gotteslehre des Hugo v. St. Viktors*, pp. 47 ff.) Those who agree with Kilgenstein are U. Baltus, "Dieu d'après Hugues de Saint-Victor," *Revue Bénédictine*. XV (1898), pp. 200-214; F. Vernet, *D.Th.C.*, VII, 1, cols. 267-268; A. Stöckl, *Die Philosophie des Mittelalters*, I, pp. 312-314. The error has been attributed to Hugh on the basis of a few passages, e. g., *De Sac.*, I, III, 21: "quod imago Dei in rationali creatura expressior est et vestigium Trinitatis invenitur in ipsa"; *ibid.*, 28: "Quod vestigium Trinitatis etiam in creatura corporea reperitur." (176, 225, 230.) Grabmann's conclusion is sound, "Wenn man auch zugeben muss, dass bei Hugo die Grenzen der Vernunft in Bezug auf die Trinität nicht so klar sind wie etwa später bei Thomas von Aquin, so wird man doch . . . die Trinitätslehre des Viktoriners von der Anklage auf Rationalismus mit guten Gründen freisprechen können. Wenn nämlich die ratio bis zur Erkenntnis der Trinität vordringen lässt, so will er doch nur nach seiner eigener Bemerkung erweisen 'vestigium Trinitatis summae, quantum valet ratio humana de modico, quo suum est illi et datum est illi et est in illa, et modicum est ad perfectum totum'." (*Geschichte der schol. Methode*, II, pp. 281-282.)

Platonic tradition of St. Augustine slavishly. A century before the full penetration of Aristotelian realism in the *Physica* and *Metaphysica* which St. Thomas used, we find Hugh of St. Victor anticipating much of the latter's well-known chapters *utrum Deus sit*. The treatment of God's attributes — aseity, unity, simplicity, immensity, eternity — is also written in the Thomistic spirit.¹¹ The *via negationis*, by which men mount from creature to creator, is taken over from Pseudo-Dionysius and expressed in Hugh's own words.

THE ESSENCE OF GOD

Human reason can know the existence of God. Can it also know His essence? There are those (like Gonzalez and Werner) who have claimed that Hugh admits such knowledge as an ordinary function of reason, and Hugh's renown as a mystic and constant reiteration of the term *contemplatio* would naturally raise the question.

It will be remembered that the eye of contemplation in the first parent before the Fall enabled him to see God directly in Himself and "that which was in God."¹² God was present in his soul for him to contemplate.¹³ This was not the knowledge of God by faith — *ex auditu*, but a direct inspiration and illumina-

¹¹ For Hugh's theodicy cf. J. Kilgenstein, *op. cit.*, summarized in two articles by Baltus, "Dieu d'après Hugues de St.-Victor," *loc cit.*, pp. 109-123, 200-214. Baltus sums up, "Dans ses écrits dogmatiques sur Dieu, Hugues de St.-Victor n'est pas un rêveur mystique, dont la science n'ait à faire aucun cas. Il s'y révèle, au contraire, comme un profond penseur, un génie de première ordre, et l'un des grands théologiens du moyen âge. N'eut-il d'autre mérite que d'avoir été, sur bien des points, suivi comme pas à pas, par Pierre Lombard et S. Thomas d'Aquin, ce lui serait un titre de gloire précieux et enviable." (p. 123)

¹² *De Sacra.*, 1, X, 2 (176, 329D); cf. *supra*, p. 18.

¹³ *De Arca*, IV, 5 (176, 670D-671A): "Primi hominis natura ita a Deo ordinata et instituta fuerat, ut anima, quae corpori praeerat, per sensus quidem ministeria corporis foris impleret, sed intus per rationem semper ad Creatorem suum intenderet. . . . Unde nec dubitare de Creatore suo poterat, cui semper per contemplationem praesens erat. Cujus visio, et per cognitionem cor ejus illuminavit, et per amorem stare et requiescere fecit." Cf. *ibid.*, prolog. (176, 619A).

tion from above, *per praesentiam contemplationis*.¹⁴ Hugh hesitates in defining the exact nature of this vision of God: "It is difficult to explain the knowledge of God which the first man had."¹⁵ In one place it is termed a "contemplation through species." He does say explicitly that it is not the Beatific Vision which souls in heaven enjoy. It was not a *visio Dei sicuti est*.¹⁶

Whatever this intuition of Adam may have been, Hugh will admit no habitual direct vision of God in men after the Fall, for the Fall extinguished the eye of contemplation. From this fact

14 *De Sacr.*, 1, VI, 14 (176, 271): "Cognovit ergo homo creatorem suum, non ea cognitione quae foris ex auditu solo percipitur, sed ea quae potius intus per aspirationem ministratur . . . ea qua tunc per praesentiam contemplationis scienti manifestius cernebatur."

15 *Ibid.*, "Modum vero cognitionis divinae illae quam primus homo habuisse creditur explicare difficile est, excepto eo quod diximus quod per internam inspirationem visibiliter edoctus, nullatenus de ipso creatore suo dubitare potuit." St. Thomas Aquinas was to reject Hugh's position completely: Replying to an objection that Hugh had maintained "quod angelus aut homo in sua prima conditione fidem non habuerit," Thomas answers, "Quamvis dicta Hugonis de S. Victore magistralia sint, et robur auctoritatis habeant; tamen potest dici quod contemplatio quae tollit necessitatem fidei, est contemplatio patriae, qua supernaturalis veritas per essentiam videtur." (*Summa Theologica*, 2-2, 5, 1, ad 1.) Peter Lombard, who accepted Hugh's theory (*II Sent.* a. 33, cap. 3), was reproached by the doctors of the University of Paris for having said that man before the Fall enjoyed the intuitive vision of the divine essence; this was one of sixteen propositions which he had to promise not to teach. (*Histoire littéraire de la France par des Religieux Bénédictins de la Congregation de Saint-Maur*, t. XII, p. 605, quoted by A. Mignon, *op. cit.*, II, p. 9.) Matthew of Aquasparta (*QQ. disp. de Fide*, q. 7, *QQ. disp. selectae* I, 181-201) follows Bonaventure (*II Sent.* d. 23, a. 2, q. 3 ad 1 [Quaracchi II, 542]) but Bonaventure is not too clear. (Cf. S. Grünwald, *Franziskanische Mystik*, p. 46, n. 70.)

16 *De Sacr.*, 1, VI, 4 (176, 271): "Sciendum tamen est quod illam primam cognitionem hominis quam de creatore suo habuit, sicut maiorem et certiore illa cognitione quae nunc in sola fide constat, veraciter dicimus; ita etiam illa quae postmodum in excellentia contemplationis divinae manifeste revelabitur, minorem necesse est confiteamur. Cognovit ergo creatorem suum homo, non tamen ita excellenter sicut postea cognoscere debuisset si perstitisset." On the *Visio Beata*, cf. *De Sacr.*, 2, XVII, 16 (176, 613-614).

he deduces the necessity of faith.¹⁷ The two ways left to a knowledge of God for man on this earth are reason and revelation.

The charge of ontologism which some writers have brought against St. Augustine¹⁸ can never be made against Hugh, for the Victorine decisively rejects the theory that the unaided human reason can know God directly and that it can penetrate to God's Essence while the soul is yet *in statu viae*. In a long passage of his commentary on the *Celestial Hierarchy* of Pseudo-Dionysius Hugh establishes his concept of the "negative theology" which Dionysius transmitted to Scholasticism. That which can be predicated of creatures cannot be predicated of God in the same way. In this life reason can know only the image of God, but not his Essence. The theme of the whole passage is this — *Deus est ineffabilis quia incogitabilis est*; God is ineffable because He cannot be thought.¹⁹ Hugh's exegesis of the Pauline principle —

¹⁷ *De Arca*, IV, 3 (176, 667B): "Primus autem homo deseruit Creatorem suum, cum eum per contemplationem praesentem aspiceret; nunc autem homo Creatorem, quem non videt per speciem, quaerit per fidem." Cf. *De Sacr.*, I, X, 2 (330A); *De Sacramentis legis naturalis et scriptae*, (176, 40A).

¹⁸ These writers are notably the ontologists of the 17th and 19th centuries: Malebranche, Gioberti, Ubaghs, etc. Peter John Olivi tells us that in the medieval period the same accusation was made. Because of certain of Augustine's statements regarding illumination and *visio in rationibus aeternis* he was held to mean a direct and immediate vision of God in this life. Grabmann has a summary of the literature on this point in *Der göttliche Grund menschlicher Wahrheitserkenntnis nach Augustinus und Thomas von Aquin*, pp. 18-20, 30.

¹⁹ *In cael. Hier.* (175, 974-978). Cf. 975BC: "Novit autem (cor hominis) ea, quae foris per sensum concipit, et ea quae intus per experientiam sentit; et omne quod capit, vel in istis capit, vel secundum ista conjicit. Quod autem nec in istis nec secundum ista est, cor humanum capere non potest. Quod autem Deus est, nec horum aliquid est, quia creatura non est; nec secundum ista, quia Creator est. Quod ergo Deus est, nec in istis inveniri potest, nec secundum ista intelligi quale est. Si enim intelligeretur secundum ista, in eadem similitudine deduceretur ad ista, et esset hoc in istis quod in illo est." The principle *simile simili cognoscitur* is operating behind these arguments, and the influence of the negative theology is apparent in the lines which follow them. "Habemus ergo quod dicamus non est hoc Deus; sed non habemus quod dicamus, hoc est Deus; quia omne quod

videmus nunc per speculum in aenigmate, is completely orthodox.²⁰

Up to this point Hugh speaks as a philosopher and theologian. In his mystical works one finds him frequently adopting a tone entirely opposed to that indicated above. To some men, he writes, it is given to know and enjoy God's presence even while they are still on earth. This is the special privilege of those in whom the eye of contemplation, closed by Adam's sin, is reopened by the illuminating grace of mystical knowledge.

Hugh's theory of mystical knowledge, which exercised a wide influence in the later Middle Ages,²¹ lies outside the field of this study. Some consideration should be given his remarks on the contemplation of God, however, if only to distinguish it from the ordinary contemplation possible to an unaided intelligence.

habemus, hoc non est Deus, sed a Deo." In his chapter on faith Hugh repeats this idea that God cannot be known by any of the ordinary ways of knowing (sense, imagination, intellect, internal experience and emotions): "Nullo horum modorum invisibilia Dei comprehenduntur a nobis, quae credi solum possunt, comprehendere omnino non possunt." (*De Sac.*, 1, X, 2, [176, 328CD]); *ibid.* (329B): "Non potest cogitari Deus quid est, etiam si credi potest quia est, non qualis est comprehendere." *Ibid.*, 2, XVIII, 16 (613C): "Quia nemo potest videre faciem Dei et vivere, id est, nemo potest in hac vita vivens videre sicuti est."

²⁰ Cf. *De. Sac.*, 1, X. 9 (176, 342) for a fine commentary on St. Paul's text (I Cor. XIII, 12).

²¹ Cf. Vernet, *art. cit.* (col. 302 ff.); Hugonin, *Essai sur la fondation de l'École de Saint-Victor* (PL 175, lxvii, ff.). K. Werner, *Der Entwicklungsgang der mittelalterlichen Psychologie*, p. 41. This influence is chiefly due to circumstance. Richard of St. Victor used Hugh's theory as the basis of his far more scientific account of mystical theory, and it is through Richard that Hugh's influence was brought to bear on later mystics. Evelyn Underhill writes: "The spirit of Richard and St. Bernard was destined to dominate (later mystical literature) for two hundred years." Of Hugh she says, "In spite of the deep respect shown toward him by Aquinas and other theologians Hugh's influence on later mystical literature was slight." (Evelyn Underhill, *Mysticism* [London, 12th ed., rev., Methuen, 1930], p. 458.) To this writer it seems that she ignores the influence of Hugh upon Richard himself. The Franciscan school of mysticism borrowed much from Hugh. Cf. S. Grünwald, *Franziskanische Mystik*, p. 17; P. Pourrat, *La spiritualité chrétienne* (Paris, 1928), II, p. 264 ff.

Contemplation is the highest of all his degrees of knowledge, and in describing it Hugh again demonstrates his indebtedness to the Neoplatonists and the "Light-metaphysics" which was an integral part of the philosophy of Christian Platonists.²²

The history of Christian Mysticism must take account of the development in ancient and medieval philosophers of the principle that like things are known by like. In that portion of the *Timaeus* known to the twelfth century Hugh might read Plato's argument that, since the knowledge of the mind (νοῦς) and true opinion are different mental states, there must also be a difference between the objects attributed to them. According to Plato, the object of mind is self-existent Ideas, and mind is "the attribute of the gods and very few men."²³ In the *Republic* Plato had described the eye as ἡλιοειδεστανόν — "most like the sun." And just as the eye requires the light of the sun before it can see, so, too, mind must be illuminated by the Ideas before it can reach Truth.²⁴ Plotinus, too, wrote that, just as the eye cannot see the sun without being like the sun, the soul cannot see the Beautiful without becoming beautiful. For "every being must first become like God if it wishes to contemplate God and the Beautiful."²⁵ Where Plato limited the eye of mind to a few men Plotinus gave all men an interior divine eye of mind by which they might see God, but said that it remains closed unless it undergoes the "purification" of a dialectic of Love.²⁶

Christian philosophers in the Platonic tradition also attributed this eye of intelligence to the soul, but made it a part of human nature, powerless of itself to see God. More than a Plotinian "purification" is required before the vision of God is possible. For the Fathers the eye of intelligence had to be "illuminated,"

²² On the *Lichtmetaphysik* in the Middle Ages, cf. Cl. Baeumker, *Witelo*, pp. 379 ff., also, *Der Platonismus im Mittelalter*, *passim*.

²³ Plato, *Timaeus*, 51 E.

²⁴ Plato, *Republic*, VII, 508B ff.

²⁵ Plotinus, *Enneads*, I, VI, 9: "Γενέσθω δὴ πρῶτον θεοειδὴς πᾶς καὶ καλὸς πᾶς, εἰ μέλλει θεάσασθαι Θεὸν καὶ καλόν." (Text ed. Émile Bréhier, Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1924, p. 106).

²⁶ Plotinus, *loc. cit.* (Bréhier, 105-106).

"elevated," or "deified" by divine grace.²⁷ St. Augustine wrote in his *Confessions* of a vision of God he had experienced above the level of discursive thought, with the obscure intuition of the center of his soul, "I entered into my inward self, Thou being my Guide . . . and beheld with the eye of my soul above my mind the Light Unchangeable."²⁸ Augustine speaks here of a genuine mystical experience, of "arriving at That Which Is with the flash of one trembling glance" of "the eye of the soul above my mind."²⁹ This eye at the center of the soul becomes the *apex mentis* frequently spoken of in descriptions of medieval mystics; it is also the *fine pointe* mentioned by St. Francis de Sales and other later mystics.³⁰

The Victorines drew upon this Neoplatonic tradition when they spoke of the contemplation of God which man experiences *in acie mentis*.³¹ They christianize the tradition when they deny that this contemplation is a function of natural reason. For Hugh the light of divine illuminating grace is required before the eye of contemplation may be reopened in the vision of God. Those who receive this grace are they "who have the spirit of

²⁷ Cf. R. Arnou, "Platonisme des Pères," *D.Th.C.*, XII, 2379 ff. Pseudo-Dionysius, who wielded great influence on Hugh in this respect, spoke of τὸ ἐνοειδὲς and τὸ θεωειδὲς ἡμῶν. (Cf. *Celestial Hierarchy*, III, 7-IV, 13.)

²⁸ St. Augustine, *Confessions*, VII, 16, 23 (Pusey's translation). Cf. Dom Cuthbert Butler, *Western Mysticism* (London: Constable, 1927), pp. 41 ff.; Edward Watkin, "The Mysticism of St. Augustine" in *A Monument to St. Augustine*, pp. 107 ff.

²⁹ St. Augustine, *loc. cit.*; Cf. *De Trinitate*, XV, 27, 49; 1, 1 (*PL* 42, 1096, 1057). St. Thomas also identifies *mens* with the highest part of soul: *De Ver.* X, 1; *De Spir. Creat.* XI, ad 3.

³⁰ On *acies mentis* and the vision of God, cf. Joseph Bernhart, *Die philosophische Mystik des Mittelalters* (Munich, 1922), p. 259-262; A. Gardeil, "Le Mens d'après S. Augustin et S. Thomas," pp. 145-147.

³¹ Hugh speaks of contemplation (in Adam) occurring *in acie mentis*. (*De Arca*, IV, 5 [671A].) For other uses, cf. *De Sacr.*, 1, X, 2 (176, 329D); *De Van. Mundi* (704BC); other terms are *acumen mentis*, *vivacitas intelligentiae* (Hom. 1, 175, 117), 176, 879B, *apex mentis*. Richard speaks of *vertex mentis*, *intimum et summum mentis*. Cf. Boethius, *De Cons. Phil.*, V, prosa 4 (Fortescue, 155): "Quare in illius summae intelligentiae cacumen, si possumus, erigamur; illic enim ratio videbit quod in se non potest intueri . . ."

God within themselves, who have God Himself." Since like things can be known only by like, the soul must be raised to the power of Godlike vision if it is to see God.³² Contemplation means, not the knowledge of God by discursive reason, but intelligence raised to a higher power by God, who "informs it from above."³³ When souls withdraw from the distractions offered in imagination and recollect themselves in the contemplation of the "source of their nature" they are, as it were, "stamped with the seal of the best Figure."³⁴

What is the nature of this contemplation which grace effects

³² *In cael. Hier.* (175, 976AB): After repeating that the *oculus contemplationis* was blinded by original sin, Hugh continues: "Ergo Deus quod est, incogitabilis est, et humanae rationi, quae non percipit, nisi quod novit, vel secundum id quod novit, quod est in se vel extra se. Qui autem spiritum Dei in se habent, et Deum habent; hi Deum vident, quia oculum illuminatum habent quo Deus videri potest, et sentiunt non in alio, vel secundum aliud quod ipse non est, sed ipsum et in ipso quod est; quod praesens est." It is obvious that Hugh is speaking of the mystical experience of God, not of the ordinary exercise of intelligence. The Victorines state more explicitly than their predecessors that without the special aid of God men would never actuate the powers of contemplation given them. For a parallel statement in Richard of St. Victor, cf. *Benj. Major*, IV, 7 (PL 196, 140D): "Frustra homo ad hos theoreticos excessus nisi divinis revelationibus adjuvetur."

³³ *De Unione* (177, 389A): "Quando autem ab anima sursum itur ad Deum, prima est intelligentia, quae est ratio ab interiori formata, quae rationi concurrens conjungitur praesentia divina, quae sursum informans facit sapientiam sive intelligentiam, sicut imaginatio deorsum informans rationem scientiam facit."

³⁴ *Did.*, I, 5 (29): ". . . (Animae) . . . beatiore fiunt, quando se ab hac distractione (scil. imaginatione visibilium) ad simplicem naturae suae fontem colligentes, quasi quodam optimae figurae signo impressae, componuntur." Cf. Ostler's interpretation of this passage, "Da nämlich jedes Erkennen eine Verähnlichung in sich schliesst, muss die Seele in der Gotteserkenntnis eine Vervollkommenung ihrer natürlichen Form erhalten; sie muss 'mit dem Siegel der besten Gestalt' gezeichnet werden." (*Op. cit.*, p. 142.) The necessity of the soul's withdrawal into itself is constantly reiterated. Cf. e. g., *De Van.* II (176, 715B): "Ascendere ergo ad Deum, hoc est intrare ad semetipsum, et non solum ad se intrare, sed ineffabili quodam modo in intimis etiam seipsum transire. Qui ergo seipsum, ut ita dicam, interius intrans, et intrinsecus penetrans transcendit, ille veraciter ad Deum ascendit."

in the summit of the mind? In the last paragraph we have noted but three of the several figures of speech which Hugh employs to describe contemplation. Before man can enjoy the vision of God which is the highest wisdom which man can possess, he must be "informed from above," or "stamped with a seal," or "illuminated." It is the last term which reappears most frequently when Hugh speaks of contemplation. There is a long passage in his work *De Sapientia Animae Christi* which insists on the need of illumination if man is to see God. The light of God shines upon all men, but not all men are wise. Only those who participate in this divine light of Wisdom see the Light itself — and this participation is a gift of God. It is given to the "good" only.³⁵

The historical sources of this "deification" of the natural intelligence of man may be traced back to Plotinus, but for the most part the twelfth century writers draw their vocabulary and their ideas from Boethius. For Hugh the theory of mystical contemplation is intertwined with the notion of *intellectibilia*. In Hugh also one finds the combination of the practical-mystical and the theoretical-speculative conceptions of theology which developed in those writers who went back to Neoplatonism and

³⁵ *De Sapientia Animae Christi* (176, 848 ff.): "Unus est enim sol, et omnis oculus per eum irradiatur, sed non omnes qui per eum vident agnoscunt eum. Similiter lux vera (i. e., Verbum Dei) quae illuminat omnem hominem venientem in hunc mundum, cunctis superfunditur, in omnes clarescit, universos illustrat; sed alius per eam videt, alius eam videt. Mali illuminantur ut caetera videant; ipsum per quem vident, non videant, quia lux in tenebris lucet, et tenebrae eam non comprehenderunt. Boni vero illuminantur, ut eum videant a quo, et per quem vident, ut ad eum referant et in eo ament omne quod vident. Omnes ergo per eum illuminantur qui vident, sed excellentius qui eum vident . . ." (849B). There are echoes of Augustine's theory of illumination scattered throughout Hugh's works, but in general it may be said that Hugh demands a divine illumination only for knowledge of God Himself. Cf. Ostler's comment on the passage just quoted: "Bemerkt mag hier noch werden, dass Hugo nirgends ein 'intellektuelles Licht' für die Möglichkeit abstrakter und übersinnlicher Erkenntnisse im allgemeinen fordert, ausgenommen jenes Licht der göttlichen Weisheit, das auf die Erkenntnis Gottes selbst hinzielt." (*Op. cit.*, p. 147.) Cf. Mignon, *op. cit.*, I, 116.

Boethius for their terminology and for some of their psychology.³⁶

In the preceding pages we have written of the philosophical background of Hugh's theory of mysticism. We now turn to an analysis of the passages which treat of one of his favorite themes — the mystical ascent to God.³⁷

THE MYSTICAL ASCENT

In the first chapter of this study we referred to a group of historians who refused to give any serious consideration to Hugh of St. Victor as a philosopher, because, as they claimed, he was a mystical theologian only. This was a distorted view, but it is not difficult to understand why it arose. One can read almost any page of Hugh's works and find there some reference to God as the end of all knowledge. Constantly Hugh repeats his basic theme — that all the roads of reason and revelation should end in the contemplation of God. For Hugh the true wisdom is the wisdom described by Aristotle, a contemplation of truth for its own sake. Philosophy is a means toward the higher goal, and reason is but the servant to be used in achieving that goal.

It is important to note again, however, that Hugh does not identify mysticism and philosophy. Philosophy is valuable in its own right because it is, as its name implies, the love and zeal and

³⁶ For the historical sources of the psychological mysticism of the twelfth century (Victorines, John of Salisbury, Isaac of Stella, William of Conches, Alan of Lille, etc.), cf. Wilhelm Jansen, *Der Kommentar des Clarenbaldus von Arras zu Boethius de Trinitate. Ein Werk aus der Schule von Chartres im 12. Jahrhundert* (Breslau: 1926). B. Analyse des Werkes des Clarenbaldes vom Standpunkte der Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie, pp. 33-104; esp. pp. 55 ff.; also J. Bernhart, *Die philosophische Mystik des Mittelalters*, V. Das Begriffsmaterial der mittelalterlichen Mystik, pp. 63-83; K. Werner, *Der Entwicklungsgang der mittelalterlichen Psychologie*, etc., *passim*.

³⁷ *Mysticism* is understood here in the strict sense defined by Parente as "sive cognitio sive unio, ex speciali divina illuminatione obtenta, et non ut fructum humanae activitatis et diligentiae assecuta." (P. Parente, *Quaestiones de Mystica Terminologia ad mentem Psuedo-Areopagitae et sanctorum Patrum* (Washington, 1941), p. 56. Hugh's term for mysticism is *contemplatio*.

friendship for wisdom. It is an exercise of reason (*inquisitio veritatis*) preparatory to and directed towards the illuminated knowledge of divine things which constitutes true wisdom.³⁸ That is why Hugh borrowed his favorite definition of philosophy from one who wrote of the "Consolation of Philosophy" and why he could say that "the greatest solace in life is the study of wisdom; if one finds it he is happy, and if he possesses it, he is blessed."³⁹

The whole pattern of Hugh's thought is consistent here. Man is destined to participate in the beatitude of God; he attains this end in the vision of God within him and the love which follows upon it. Philosophy therefore is more than a cold quest of abstractions for Hugh of St. Victor. The pursuit of knowledge ennobles a man, for wisdom and science are reflections of eternal wisdom; they bring the lover of wisdom into an intimate communication with the most pure, divine Spirit. The true philosopher is he who rises to the vision of God over the ascending degrees of knowledge.

In the mystical works of Hugh one finds frequent reference to different stages which human reason must pass through in its ascent to God. The basic notions contributing to this doctrine on the gradual ascent towards knowledge of the Divine may be found in the older pagan and Jewish philosophers like Plato, Philo, Plotinus, Jamblichus and Proclus. Hugh, for example, devotes a section of his Commentary on the *Celestial Hierarchy*

³⁸ *Did.* I, 2 (6-7): "Est autem philosophia amor et studium et amicitia quodammodo sapientiae, sapientiae vero non hujus, quae in ferramentis quibusdam, et in aliqua fabрили scientia notitiaque versatur, sed illius sapientiae, quae nullius indigens, vivax mens et sola rerum primaeva ratio est. Est autem hic amor sapientiae, intelligentis animi ab illa pura sapientia illuminatio, et quodammodo ad seipsam retractio atque advocatio, ut videatur sapientiae studium divinitatis et purae mentis illius amicitia." Cf. *ibid.*, II, 1. For an exhaustive analysis of this definition, which is taken from Boethius (*Isag. Porph. Comm.* I, CSEL, 48, 7) and for its background in the tradition of Christian Platonism cf. Hugonin, *Essai sur la fondation de l'Ecole de Saint-Victor* (PL 175, lii ff.).

³⁹ Cf. *Did.*, I, 1 (6): "Reparamur autem per doctrinam, ut nostram agnoscamus naturam, et ut discamus extra non quaerere quod in nobis possumus invenire. Summum igitur in vita solamen est studium sapientiae, quam qui invenit felix est, et qui possidet beatus."

to purgation-illumination-perfection, an enumeration which Pseudo-Dionysius found in Proclus and to which he gave a Christian interpretation.⁴⁰ If Hugh had merely transmitted the description of these three stages which he found in Pseudo-Dionysius, he would have little interest for the historian of mysticism. His interesting and original contribution is an analysis of two series of steps by which the soul ascends to contemplation. One of these series starts with an act of faith; the other starts with reason. Both end at the same goal — the vision of God. Both found acceptance in later writers.

Among those who begin the mystical ascent with an act of faith Hugh distinguishes between the simple faith of the pious, the reasoned explanation of the dialectician, and the foretaste *in puritate intelligentiae* of things believed on faith. This enumeration of the three kinds of believers occurs in a chapter where Hugh stresses the moral element in faith. Moral purity and perfection are the chief means toward a higher and deeper understanding of the truths of faith.⁴¹

⁴⁰ *In cael. Hier.* IV. (175, 998 ff.). On Pseudo-Dionysius' "Christianization" of Proclus in this regard, cf. J. Stiglmayr, *Des Heiligen Dionysius Areopagita angebliche Schriften über die beiden Hierarchien aus dem griechischen übersetzt*, Bibliothek der Kirchenväter (Munich: Kösel, 1911), p. 19, n. 1. Patristic and medieval writers were fond of such enumerations of the "degrees of contemplation" through which the soul arose from rational activity to the vision of God. Cf. for example, St. Augustine's seven degrees. (*De Quantitate Animae*, 33 (PL, 32, 1073). St. Bernard has two: *consideratio* and *contemplatio* (*De considerat.* II, 2 [PL 182, 745]); Richard of St. Victor lists six (*Benj. Major*, I, 6 [PL 196, 700]); Bonaventure has seven (*Itinerarium mentis ad deum*). St. Thomas Aquinas, who enumerates six levels in the manner of contemplation as one ascends to the contemplation of God (*S. Th.*, 2-2, 180, 3, ad 4), also gives the reason why medieval writers devoted so much time to such enumerations: "Haec autem differentia est inter hominem et angelum ut patet per Dionysium (*De Divinis Nominibus*, VII, 2, *ante med.*), quod angelus simplici apprehensione veritatem intuetur, homo autem quodam processu ex multis pertingit ad intuitum simplicis veritatis." (*Loc. cit.*, art. 3, *corp.*)

⁴¹ *De Sac.*, I, X, 4 (176, 332D): "Item secundum incrementum fidei, tria genera credentium inveniuntur. . . . Quidam enim fideles sunt qui sola pietate credere eligunt, quod tamen utrum sit credendum an non credendum sit ratione non comprehendunt. Alii ratione approbant quod fide cre-

Hugh's well-known division of the grades of knowledge into thought, meditation, and contemplation is more interesting for the philosopher, because here the ascent begins within the act of reason.⁴² Most historians of medieval thought have written their interpretations of these three activities of the mind, but the interpretations differ. For the majority they are three activities flowing from three different principles — imagination, reason, and intelligence. The objects ascribed to the three acts are the same as those assigned to the threefold eye of the soul — World, Soul, God. Thus Myers writes:

The gist of his (Hugh's) teaching is that mere knowledge is not an end in itself; it ought to be but the stepping stone to the mystical life — through thought, meditation, and contemplation; thought seeks God in the material world, meditation discovers Him within ourselves, contemplation knows him supernaturally and intuitively.⁴³

dunt. Alii puritate cordis et munda conscientia interius jam gustare incipiunt quod fide credunt. In primis sola pietas facit electionem; in secundis ratio adjungit approbationem; in tertiis puritas intelligentiae apprehendit certitudinem." St. Bonaventure (III *Sent.* d. 25, a. 2, q. 3, 1 c) incorporates into his theory of religious knowledge this classification of the degrees of faith. Cf. Rosenmöller, *Die religiöse Erkenntnis nach Bonaventura*, BGPM, XXV, p. 210.

⁴² *Hom. in Eccl.*, I (175, 116D-117A): ". . . distinguenda sunt genera speculationum spiritualium. Tria sunt animae rationalis visiones: cogitatio, meditatio, contemplatio. Cogitatio est, cum mens notione rerum transitorie tangitur, cum ipsa res sua imagine animo subito praesentatur vel per sensum egrediens vel a memoria exurgens. Meditatio est assidua et sagax retractatio cogitationis aliquid vel involutum explicare nitens vel scrutans penetrare occultum. Contemplatio est perspicax et liber animi contuitus in res perspicandas usquequaque diffusus." Cf. *De Modo Dicendi et Meditandi* (PL 176, 878), where the same definitions are repeated, but *intuitus* is substituted for *contuitus* in the definition of contemplation. In the *Didascalicon* (V, 9) Hugh expands this classification into five degrees — *lectio, meditatio, oratio, operatio, contemplatio*; but it is the threefold activity which he develops at length. For a longer analysis of the ascent of the mind to God, cf. *De Arca*, IV, 2 (176, 665-667): "De ordine et dispositione cogitationum nostrarum, quae finitae non sunt, ut ex eis construatur domus Dei."

⁴³ E. Myers, "Hugh of Saint Victor," *Catholic Encyclopedia*, VII, 523. Cf. Fr. Overbeck, *Vorgeschichte und Jugend der mitteralterlichen Scholas-*

De Wulf has a different version:

As for the knowledge of God, to which introspection leads us, this is completed in mystical illumination. Just as the threefold eye of the soul is related to a threefold knowable object, so also a triple mode of vision denotes the more or less penetrating way in which we grasp one and the same object; the *cogitatio* is a superficial and extensive regard; the *meditatio* a sustained and deliberate reflection on a given point; *contemplatio* a profound intuition, leisurely and comprehensive.⁴⁴

De Wulf's summary is more accurate when it refers to the three activities of the soul as three modes of vision and a progressively deeper penetration of reality. Hugh is not describing three kinds of mental activity based in three different faculties and working with three different objects. Thought, meditation, and contemplation are rather three modes or aspects of mental activity springing, not from three principles, but rather from the one faculty of reason.⁴⁵

tik, Eine Kirchenhistorische Vorlesung aus dem Nachlass herausgegeben von Carl Albrecht Bernouilli (Basel: Schwabe, 1917), p. 278: "Er (Hugo) von den niederen Stufen der nur sinnlich Welterfassenden *cogitatio* und der innerliche das Erfasste denkend verarbeitenden *meditatio*, der seine scholastischen Traktate angehören, zur höchsten Stufe der *contemplatio*, oder des unmittelbaren Schauen Gottes sich erhebt." Ueberweg-Heinze speak in the same vein, but identify *meditatio* and discursive reason: "Hugo und Richard von St. Viktor unterscheiden drei Tätigkeiten der Kenntnis, die *cogitatio*, die *meditatio* und die *contemplatio*, welche der Einbildungskraft, der Vernunft und der Intelligenz entsprechen. Die *cogitatio* hat es mit dem Sinnlichen zu tun, die *meditatio* ist das diskursive, begriffliche Denken, und in der *Contemplatio* erscheint dem Geist ohne diskursives Denken das ideale Objekt unmittelbar." (*Grundriss der Geschichte der Phil. der patr. und schol. Zeit*, p. 224). Cf. art. "Hugh of St. Victor," *The Columbia Encyclopedia* (New York: Columbia, 1940), p. 858. "(Hugh) was responsible for the celebrated division of the mystical ascent into three stages: thought (with which we see God in nature); meditation (with which we see God within ourselves); and contemplation (with which we see God face to face)." Stöckl, *Die Philosophie des Mittelalters*, I, p. 352.

⁴⁴ M. De Wulf, *History of Medieval Philosophy*, I, p. 214.

⁴⁵ This interpretation is also that of Hugh's disciple Richard of St. Victor. Cf. *Benjamin Major*, I, 3 (*PL*, 196, 66CD): "Sciendum itaque quod

The first of these three "visions" or *speculationes*, as Hugh terms them, is thought (*cogitatio*), which "occurs when the mind is superficially touched with the idea (*notio*) of things, and the thing itself is presented suddenly in its image, either entering the mind through sense or rising from memory."⁴⁶ What Hugh describes here in his own way is really sense-perception and the formation of concepts. At the end of this first stage the universal idea is present, arising directly from the action of reason upon the image acquired in sense-perception or retained in memory.

The next higher stage is meditation, the "assiduous and sagacious revision of thought which strives to explain something involved or to penetrate something hidden."⁴⁷ Meditation is judgment, consideration, reflective thinking, reasoning. It is the ordinary function of discursive reason, a passage from the known to the unknown.

Contemplation is the highest exercise of reason, the function of intelligence, "a penetrating and free intuition of the soul, diffused everywhere throughout the range of whatever may be explored."⁴⁸ Thus meditation and contemplation are distinguished as reason and intelligence are distinguished. Contemplation apprehends in a simple way an intelligible (or intellectible) truth; reason moves from the known to the unknown. Meditation is related to contemplation as movement is to rest. Medi-

unam eandemque materiam aliter per cogitationem, aliter per meditationem rimamur, atque aliter per contemplationem miramur. Multum a se invicem haec tria *in modo* differunt, quamvis quandoque in materia convenient. De una siquidem eademque materia, aliter cogitatio, aliter meditatio, longue aliter agit contemplatio." Ostler writes, "Allein wie schon die Definitionen ersehen lassen, ist doch nicht das dreifache objekt der drei Augen: Körper, Seele, und Gott — der Einteilungsgrund, und deshalb erklärt auch Richard als ausschlaggebend für die drei Funktionen den 'Modus' nicht die Materie der Erkenntnis." (*Die Psychologie des Hugo von S. V.*, p. 146); Ebner agrees with Ostler's interpretation, "Nach diesem (Ostler) sind die drei Tätigkeiten nur nach dem modus verschieden; sie sind nicht drei verschiedenen Prinzipien zuzuordnen." (*Die Erkenntnislehre des Richards von S. V.*, pp. 92-93.)

⁴⁶ *Hom. in Eccl.* I (175, 116D), text quoted n. 42 *supra*.

⁴⁷ *Loc. cit.* (116D-117A).

⁴⁸ *Loc. cit.* (117A).

tation is a search; contemplation is the clear vision of that which is sought. Hugh himself makes the distinction in the lines which follow his three definitions:

There is this difference between meditation and contemplation: meditation relates always to things hidden from our intelligence; contemplation relates to things made manifest, either according to their nature or our capacity. Meditation always is occupied with some matter to be investigated; contemplation spreads abroad for the comprehending of many things, even the universe. Thus meditation is a certain inquisitive power of the mind, sagaciously striving to look into the obscure and unravel the perplexed. Contemplation is that acumen of intelligence which, keeping all things open to view, comprehends all with clear vision. Thus contemplation has what meditation seeks.⁴⁹

Hugh proceeds immediately to distinguish two kinds of contemplation. That which he has just defined is the contemplation of beginners, which considers creatures. It is the climax of the progression from thought through meditation to contemplation and is preparatory to a higher kind of contemplation, "which comes later, belongs to the perfect, and contemplates the Creator."⁵⁰ The distinction here is between what modern writers

⁴⁹ *Loc. cit.* (117AB): "Inter meditationem et contemplationem hoc interesse videtur, quod meditatio semper est de rebus ab intelligentia nostra occultis; contemplatio vero de rebus vel secundum suam naturam vel secundum capacitatem nostram manifestis; et quod meditatio semper circa unum aliquid rimandum occupatur, contemplatio ad multa vel etiam ad universa comprehendenda diffunditur. Meditatio itaque est quaedam vis mentis curiosa et sagax, nitens obscura investigare et perplexa evolvere. Contemplatio est vivacitas illa intelligentiae, quae cuncta in palam habens manifesta visione comprehendit. Et ita quodammodo id quod meditatio quaerit, contemplatio possidet." The English translation is that of H. O. Taylor, *The Mediaeval Mind*, II, pp. 388-389. By permission of The Macmillan Company, publishers. Cf. S. Behn, *The Eternal Magnet* (New York: Devin-Adair, 1929), pp. 163-164.

⁵⁰ *Hom. in Eccl.* I (175, 117B): "Contemplationis autem duo sunt genera: unum quod et prius est, et incipientium: in creaturarum consideratione; alterum quod posterius, et perfectorum est: in contemplatione Creatoris." For a symbolic description of the ascent to contemplation under

would call acquired and infused (passive) contemplation, but Hugh does not use the terms.⁵¹ Both are products of grace and not of nature.

The contemplation of beginners is termed *speculatio*, in which the "novelty of an unwonted vision produces admiration." Thus Hugh describes a new series of steps in the mystical ascent, beginning with meditation, continuing through speculation, and ending in the vision of God, for which Hugh's term is simply *contemplatio*.⁵²

This highest form of contemplation is also, of course, the highest degree of knowledge to which man can rise. For the first man in Paradise it had been a natural function of the eye of contemplation. After the Fall it is the privilege of those few who attain the summit of the mystical ascent and in whom the eye of contemplation is reopened by illuminating grace.

In this discussion we have long since arisen above the level of philosophy. We have completed the study of Hugh's theory of knowledge, and we have found that in this theory the principle of all Christian philosophers is verified — grace perfects and does not destroy nature. This is the constant theme of Hugh's writings — that it is only after a disciplined use of man's natural faculty of reason that man will complete the mystical ascent under the influence of grace. God may be approached by two roads, reason and revelation, but the ultimate truth lies only in a vision of God which reason cannot give. That is the meaning of the few sentences in which Hugh of St. Victor epitomizes his theory of knowledge:

the figure of the growth of the "arbor sapientiae" see the whole of Book III of *De Arca Noe Morali* (176, 647-664).

⁵¹ Cf. Vernet, *art. cit.*, *D.Th.C.*, VII, col. 286-289, for a succinct treatment of Hugh's psychology of mysticism and his notion of contemplation.

⁵² *Hom. in Eccl.* I (118B): "Ut igitur tria haec propriis vocabulis distinguamus, Prima est meditatio; secunda, speculatio; tertia contemplatio. In meditatione, mentem pie devotione succensam perturbatio passionum carnalium importune exsurgens obnubilat. In speculatione novitas insolitae visionis in admirationem sublevat. In contemplatione, mirae dulcedinis gustus totum in gaudium, et jucunditatem commutat. Igitur in meditatione est sollicitudo, in speculatione, admiratio; in contemplatione, dulcedo."

There were two images set for man, in which he might perceive the unseen: one consisting of nature, the other of grace. The former image was the face of this world; the latter was the humanity of the Word. And God is shown in both, but He is not understood in both; since the appearance of nature discloses the artificer, but cannot illuminate the eyes of him who contemplates it.⁵³

These few lines catch the whole spirit of the School of Saint Victor. The great philosophers of the thirteenth century would speak with greater precision. They would erect a more consistent synthesis of philosophy. In the end, however, they would agree that human reason is insufficient of itself to know the whole of reality. Something more is needed if man is to discover all truth. Hugh of St. Victor found it in an illumination from above.

⁵³ *In cael. Hier.*, I, 1 (17, 926C): "Duo enim simulacra erant proposita homini, in quibus invisibilia videre potuisset: unum naturae, et unum gratiae. Simulacrum naturae erat species hujus mundi. Simulacrum autem gratiae erat humanitas Verbi. Et in utroque Deus monstrabatur, sed non in utroque intelligebatur; quoniam natura quidem specie sua artificem demonstravit, sed contemplantis oculos illuminare non potuit."

CONCLUSION

The conclusions to which this study of the theory of knowledge of Hugh of St. Victor have led may be summarized in the following statements:

1. Hugh was primarily a mystic whose approach to philosophy was moral and religious rather than metaphysical, but he was not a mystic only. The older historians misrepresent him when they describe him as hostile to natural science and philosophy. He respected all knowledge, whether natural or supernatural; philosophy, however, is regarded as ancillary and propaedeutic to theology. Hugh distinguishes (vaguely at times) between natural and supernatural theology, and his solution of the problem of faith and reason is essentially that which St. Thomas Aquinas developed more accurately. The value of the scientific hypothesis is admitted. Hugh followed St. Anselm of Canterbury in introducing philosophy into the study of theology. His scholastic method is a *via media* between the two extremes of intransigent theologism and exaggerated dialectics; his orthodox use of the new method saved it from the peril it encountered because of the doctrinal temerity of Abelard.

2. Basically Hugh is a Christian Platonist who wrote in the spirit of Saint Augustine. This is indicated by the fact that he takes the Fall of man as a point of departure for his discussion of the three eyes (*oculus carnis*, *oculus rationis*, *oculus contemplationis*) with which God endowed the soul. A hierarchy of being—World, Soul, God—is the ontological structure on which Hugh rears his theory of knowledge. Body and soul are conceived in Platonic fashion as two disparate natures. The theory of personality is distinctive. "The soul is the man"—and hence the subject of knowledge is not the human composite, but the soul. Man is a microcosm placed at the center of creation between two contrasting worlds of sense and spirit. The soul has faculties which enable it to look toward both these worlds; for the ways of knowing are sense-perception, intellectual apprehension of the sensible world by means of imagination, and the

intuition of the soul by itself, which also leads to knowledge of the higher world.

3. Hugh's analysis of sense-knowledge recalls Aristotle more frequently than it does Plato. He is convinced of the essential reliability of the senses as instruments of real knowledge. In random passages he speaks of the subject, act, and object of sensation. St. Augustine had limited himself to a description of the soul's activity in sensation; Hugh also considers the part played by the sense object, adding a few physiological notes to explain the process whereby the "form" of the external object is impressed on the sense-organ and carried to imagination, where it exists as a corporeal image. In general, sense-perception is a passive process. Memory is dismissed in a few words, and there is no discussion of *sensus communis*, while "instinct" has no cognitive aspect. Hugh may be said to have developed a complete theory of imagination, which is reminiscent of Aristotle in some respects. Sense and intellect are sharply distinguished. The corporeal image "touches" the spiritual *ratio*, and the idea or universal concept results.

4. The idea is a spiritual representation of reality. Knowledge is an assimilation between knower and known. This is in accord with a basic postulate (*simile simili cognoscitur*) which Hugh accepts from the Presocratics. The nature of knowledge is summarized in these words: "The mind, stamped with the representation of all things, is said to be all things and to be composed of all things, not actually, but virtually or potentially."

Hugh accepts the correspondence theory of truth, but does not develop his thought to any great extent. The opinions of his commentators vary widely in regard to Hugh's solution of the problem of universals. He did not treat the problem *ex professo*, nor did he take sides in the controversy which divided the schools in his time. He followed Boethius in an eclectic suspension of judgment and seems to have underestimated the importance of the discussion. He definitely rejects both nominalism and Platonic Realism and inclines toward the moderate realism of Aristotle. This is indicated: (1) in his *Logic*, whose object is *intellectus rerum*—concepts. The division of philosophy is

based on the Aristotelian degrees of abstraction, a notion frequently employed. (2) In his opusculum *De Unione Corporis et Spiritus* some striking similarities to the peripatetic theory of abstraction appear; but the reminiscences of Plotinus and Augustine (especially the emphasis on moral purification) are also present. Although Hugh speaks of *ratio in imaginationem agens* and the illumination of the image, he writes no clear statement of any function like that of the *intellectus agens*. (3) In his epistemological explanation of universals Hugh is close to Boethius and William of Champeaux in that he inclines toward a theory of the similitude of essences. Essences are multiplied in individuals, though similar in each. In general it may be said that in the problem of universals Hugh is an eclectic who manifests a preference for the Aristotelian solution of moderate realism.

5. Hugh accepts the traditional distinction between reason, which knows the lower, temporal things, and intelligence, whose object is spiritual and especially divine things. To designate these objects he adopts the terminology introduced by Boethius. Reason knows the *intelligibilia* with the cooperation of the senses, while intelligence knows *intellectibilia*, acquired by intellect alone. Reason and intelligence are not two separate faculties, but are two aspects of the power of reason (*ratio*) which distinguishes men from animals. *Ratio* is a broad term covering every phase of intellectual activity. It apprehends, judges, and reasons. It knows material sense-objects (*ratio in imaginationem agens*); it is the faculty by which the soul experiences itself directly (*ratio pura supra imaginationem*); and it can enjoy the mystical experience when illuminated by divine grace (*ratio ab interiori formata*).

The occasional inconsistencies in this theory of knowledge may be traced to its eclectic character and to Hugh's acceptance of a Platonic dualism in psychology. Hugh superimposes a Platonic *intelligentia* upon a *ratio* which has both Augustinian and Aristotelian elements. His division of philosophy into theoretical, practical, logical, and mechanical is fundamentally

that of Aristotle, but there is an Augustinist coloring in the distinction of science and wisdom which lies at its root.

In his application of the *Lichtmetaphysik* and theory of illumination Hugh anticipates St. Thomas Aquinas; he does not reproduce the interpretation of illumination found in St. Augustine. Reason is considered as a natural light native to the soul. Direct illumination of the intellect is required only for the mystical knowledge which God grants to souls who rise to the plane of contemplation.

6. Self-consciousness is the starting-point of much of Hugh's psychology and epistemology. It is the indispensable approach to a knowledge of the soul and of God. In his inner experience Hugh seeks the answer to the great and perennial problems of philosophy which have to do with the soul. Hugh follows Augustine in holding that the soul knows itself directly, not indirectly through sense-images or its own acts. He anticipates the *Cogito ergo sum* of Descartes by making self-consciousness the basis of certitude, but one cannot say that he was troubled by the problem of knowledge as it is understood today. It is in connection with the soul's knowledge of itself that he especially stresses the need of the Plotinian "purification," or withdrawal from the images served up to reason by the senses.

7. Hugh rejects the *a priori* arguments for the existence of God which had been part of the Augustinist tradition before him. He turned to external and internal experience as the basis for his proofs, anticipating much of the natural theology of St. Thomas Aquinas. He represents in this point a new departure in the history of philosophy. Hugh is no ontologist; the essence of God cannot be known by unaided human reason, although the first man did enjoy an intuition of God's nature.

Hugh writes frequently on mysticism, and his theory of mysticism, as developed by Richard of St. Victor, exerted great influence, especially upon the later Franciscan school. Affective rather than intellectual approaches to God are emphasized; with Augustine and Plato he suggests that Truth must be approached "with the whole soul." Especially interesting for the philosopher

is Hugh's description of *cogitatio*, *meditatio*, and *contemplatio* as the ascending stages in the mystical ascent.

8. The most striking aspect of Hugh's theory of knowledge for the historian of philosophy is the fact that it reflects the transitional character of the thought of the twelfth century. Fundamentally it is the theory of a follower of Plato and St. Augustine, but in Hugh's works one notes an infiltration of Aristotelian conceptions into the history of medieval philosophy. In the Victorine school the fusion of the various streams of ancient philosophy is far from complete. Hugh of St. Victor never achieved the balanced synthesis of Aristotle, Plato, and St. Augustine which came with St. Thomas Aquinas in the thirteenth century, but his theory of knowledge contributed some important elements toward the formation of the Thomistic synthesis.

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